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INTRODUCTION

Choice of law is a mess. That much has become a truism. It is a
"dismal swamp," 1 a morass of confusion , a body of doctrine "killed
by a realism intended to save it," 2 and now "universally said to be a
disaster." 3 One way to demonstrate its tribulations would be to
look at the academic dissensus and the hopelessly underdeterminative Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 4 Another would be
to examine the Supreme Court's abdication of the task of articulating constitutional constraints on state choice-of-law rules. 5 This article will do both. At the outset, though, I want to suggest that one
need look no further than the nomenclature of the subject. I do not
mean the arcane terminology - depe<;age, renvoi , retorsion, false
conflicts, comparative impairment, and unprovided-for cases that falls liltingly from the tongues of conflicts scholars and crushes
listeners into bemusement or horror. I claim instead that the conceptual difficulties of this field can be discerned at the broadest
level of generality, in the dual names of the subject itself: "Choice
of Law" and "Conflict of Laws." 6
1. William L. Prosser , Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953).
2. Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. R Ev . 1403, 1407 (1996).
3. William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 Mo. L. R Ev. 1371, 1371
( 1997).
4. See infra section II.D.
5. See infra section Vl.A.
6. Joseph Beale, whose theory of vested rights was received wisdom for the first half of
the tw entieth century, considered the question of nomenclature sufficiently important to
merit five sections of hi s trea tise. See 1 JosEPH H. BEALE , A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLI CT
OF LAws §§ 1.15-1.19 (1935). Beale ad mitted that "conflict of laws" was not "exactly acc urate" and comme nted that " '[t]he only conl1ict is among th e legal authors who are doing this

-~
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The mere existence of multiple monikers should not surprise.
Areas of legal study often go by more than one name. The class
called "Federal Jurisdiction" at one law school might be "Federal
Courts" at another; the same is true for "Corporations " and "Business Organizations." Sometimes these names are synonyms; other
times the relation is obvious enough to n eed no explanation. Federal courts exercise federal jurisdiction , and the study of one is the
study of the other. Conflicts nomenclature is less transparent. An
ordinary speaker of English might be puzzled to learn that " Choice
of Law" and "Conflict of Laws" denote the same area. V.Jhen laws
conflict, one might think, the question is not which law should be
chosen but rather which law prevails. 7
Legal training teaches us otherwise. When laws conflict, we
learn, courts decide which law to apply. There is almost never a
unique " right " answer to the question. More precise ly, there is no
right answer that can be articulated without adopting what Lea
Brilmayer calls the "internal perspective" :8 the perspective of a
particular forum state. From the subjective perspective of a particular forum , there may be a determinate answer, given by the
choice-of-law rules of that state. But different states will give different answers about the same set of facts. If a case has contacts with
a number of different jurisdictions, each may apply its own law if
the case comes to its courts Y Thus the answer to the question
"what law governs this case? " 10 will often vary depending on the
forum in which the suit is brought.
This result may seem natural if we suppose that choice-of-law
rules simply compose part of a state's substantive law. 11 Substanwork."' He co ntinue d , '" [y]et since the ex pression is consecrated by good use and is simple
we may we ll m ake use of it. "' !d. § 1.1 9 (quoting CoMTE DE VAREILI. Es- SoM MI ER ES, LA
SYNTI-IESE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL P RIVE xviii (1897)). Interestingly, Beale a lso mentions
Eduardo Cimba li, who argued that the " fa lse designa ti on of the subject" had led scho lars
as tray. !d. (citing EDUARDO C rMBALI, Dr UNA NuovA CATEGRICA DI CoNF LI TTI DE LEGG E
(1892)).
7. For precisely this reason Eugene Scoles and Pe te r H ay find fault with th e phrase "Conflict of L aws," arguing th at because forum cho ice-of-law rules will selec t a governing law,
there is no conflict between laws. See E uGENE F. ScoLES & PETER H AY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS
§ 1.1 (2d e d. 1992).
8. See LEA BRILMAYE R, CoNFLICT OF LAws 1 (2d ed. 1995) (emphasis omitted).
9. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1 981) (plurality opinion).
10. One of my claims is th at this is a co unte rpr od uctive way of framing th e question. See
infra section IY.B. In fact, I will be changing a fair amount of what I find to be mi sleading
terminology. At th e moment, thou gh, I a m simpl y discussing the cu rrent und e rsta nding of
co nfli cts.
11. See Nicholas deB e lleville Katzenbach, ConfliCis on an Unru ly Horse: R eciprocal
Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International La w, 65 YAL E LJ. 1087, 1099 (1 956)
(stating that th e task of co urts a lways " in volves a cho ice of law "). Bea le a lso he ld the posi-
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tivc law differs from state to state, and states will reach different
answers about the legal consequences of th e same facts. Thus it is
not surprising that a constellation of facts entitling the victim of a
car accident to recover under the tort law of a state employing a
negligence standard will not allow recovery under the gross negligence standard of another state. Similarly, one might think , it is not
surprising that one state might conclud e that the appropriate law is
th e law of the state where the accident too k pl ace , whil e another
might look to the law of the victim 's domicilc. 12
This inconsistency arises from , essentially. Brilmayer's " internal
perspective.'' On e of the major goals of this article is to suggest
th at this way of viewing the choice-of-law problem is mistaken not beca use the alternative that Brilmaye r mentions , th e "exte rn al
perspective ," is correct,13 but because the dichotomy itse lf is false
and the internal perspective fails on its ovm terms . In fact , I will
argue, conceiving of choice-of-law rules as substantive domestic law
does not legitimize the variance of results across forums. It merely
masks the illegitimacy, hiding the conflict be tween laws be hind the
veil of choice of law, and the veil does not stand up to analysis.
To start seeing this, take a step back. Return to the purely domestic context and imagine a plaintiff who comes to court alleging
that a wrong has been committed against him. He claims that some
tion th a t choice-of-law rules were part of forum law; in fact , it is a necessary C<Jns equ e nce o f
his principle that law can opera te only within a sta te. See 1 BEALE , supra no te 6, § 5.4 , a t 53
("Contlict of Laws is part of th e law of th e forum. lt is q uit e obvious that since th e o nl y law
that can be applicable in a state is th e law of that stat e. no law of a fo re ign sta te ca n ha ve
there the forc e of law . ... The foreign law is a fac t in th e tra nsacti on ... ). O f co urse, he did not
conclude that va riance was th erefore pe rmissible; he fo und ge ne ral organi zing principles in
th e na ture of law. !d. § 4.12, at 46.
I think there is so me thing different about choice-of-law rules, though it turns o ut to be
esse nti a ll y that they are so much a matter of fe dera l conce rn as to be subject to severe const itutional strictures. (On my account, not the Supreme Court's. See inji·a Pa rt V.)
12. In fact, variance between forums is m o re like ly to tak e th e fo rm of eac h fo rum's
loo king to its ow n law. This te ndency, which Michael Gree n calls " lexfo rism, " is th e deeply
troubling as pect of disuniformity. See MichaelS. Green , Note , Legal Realism, Lex Fori, {i!ld
the Choice-of-Law Revolwion, 104 YALE L.J. 967, 967 (1995).
13. The external p erspective supposes that choice-of-law rules are unique ly determined
by objec tive principles ex te rnal to a ny state's law a nd he nce th at each forum must reach the
sa me conclusion. See BRI LMA YER, supra note 8, at 1. The the ore tical app ro ach that I adv ocate will destroy the dichotomy. The Constitution is, in an inte res tin g way, both internal and
ex ternal. It is inte rnal in that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, it is pa rt of the local law of
each sta te. See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman , 93 U.S . 130, 137 (1 876 ). It is ex te rnal in th a t it
imposes rul es sta te law can no t change - again, by virtue o f the Supre macy Clause. See, e.g.,
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). And wh at I will suggest is that the Constitution
dictates a mixed perspective - both inte rnal and external. It does no t require consistency
across states, so tha t each state must adopt the same rul es (the full y exte rn al perspective).
Rath e r, it requires a so rt of consistency IVithin states, a lesse r degree of fr eedom th a n that
recogni zed by the inte rn al perspective. 1l1is will surely see m cryptic, but a full exp lanation
must await so me gro und-l aying.
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law - here, let us assume local tort law - gives him a right to
relief. The court may disagree with this claim. It may be that the
law gives him no right on these facts, or that the law provides the
defendant vvith a defense that precludes liability. Either of these
determinations is an appropriate judicial decision. But what if the
court simply refuses to consider his tort claim because , it says, contract law governs the case? TI1is should seem odd. 14 Tne plaintiff
has asserted a right. and surely the court must either recognize that
right or refuse to re cognize it. E ither he has st ated a daim or he
has not. To avoid this dichotomy by invoking a differe n t law seems
at best an oblique rejection of the plaintiff's claim, at worst a decision based on something other than whether he has an enforceable
right. 1-; It seems, in short , that the court has made a choice, not
resolved a cont1ict. 16
-n1e substitution of choice for conflict, I will argue, is the fundamental error of conflicts j urisprudence. 17 It is an attempt to avoid
difficult q uestions that succeeds only in resolving them sub rosa,
and poorly. Conflicts between rights are a common feature of lawsuits, and in most circumstances, the legal system deals with them as
conflicts: courts look to rules specifying which right shall prevail,
14. I am not objecting to the idea that a court may tell a plaintiff that, although he cannot
recover in tort. he may recover in contract. Cf BRAINERD CURRIE, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in Ne11' York, in SELF.CTED EssAYS ON THE CoNFUCT OF LAws 690, 693-94 ( 1963)
(hereinafter SELECTED Ess,\ vs] (labeling as "anachronistic" criticizing a court for .. tell[ing] a
litigant that though he cannot recover in contract he may in tort"). The problem I am concerned with arises when the plaintiff pleads in tort and the court refuses to evaluate the tort
claim.
15. Courts do not ordinarily apply law not invoked by the parties. Affirmative defenses,
for example, are waived if not raised at the proper stage. If the court refuses to honor the
law the plaintiff pleads , I will suggest, it must be because that law is legally unavailable. And
that means either that some other law operates to interfere with it, or that the law the plaintiff invokes grants him no rights.
16. Of course. choosing one law effectively resolves the conflict between them: it awards
victory to the chosen law. But it does so, we will see, without a consideration of the factors
that should govern a resolution of the conflict. Identifying these factors is, of course, a difficult task. Common policy considerations include predictability, discouragement of forum
shopping. and the rather amorphous goal of fairness to litigants. These are certainly values
that a system for resolving conflicts between sovereigns should seek to promote. My prescriptions, when they come. will indeed seek to promote them. But they will not rest simply
on those values; instead, they will be drawn from another body of law aimed chiefly at melding the several states into a federal union: the Constitution. Without the constraints I identify, states may succumb to the temptation to promote forum interests, slighting the concerns
of other states. Within the constraints, states may do many things to promote the canonical
conflicts values. But interstate discrimination needs to be addressed first; at this moment in
our cont1icts jurisprudence. it is the primary evil and the chief distraction from sound conflicts rules.
17. Consequently. I will refer to the subject as "conflicts ," and continue to refer to
··choice-of-law rules" where appropriate. My ultimate suggestion is that things will be clearer
if we eliminate the idea of "choosing" a •·governing" law. but that is a different stage of the
rocket and must drop away later.
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and then express the ir conclusions in such terms. 18 In cases \Vhcr e
the cont1icting rights originate from differen t states, however, a different description is employed. Courts speak not of deciding which
right prevails but of choosing which law applies to the case. This
resort to choice-of-law rh etoric is peculiar for two reasons. First, it
is unn ecessary. M ul tistate cases can be described and resolved perfectly easil y within the vocabulary of cont1icts. 19 Second , it is descriptively inaccura te . I nt erest a nalysis (th e choi ce -o f-l avv'
meth odology I will consider in the greatest detail) simply doe s not
select the law that applies to a case. 20 The rhetoric of cho ice persists in part as a conceptual hangover from the early days of conflic ts theory,2 1 but it also continues to allure because it makes less
app arent the coni1icts that have proven too hard to resolv e.::: 2 Indeed, the Supreme Co urt swiftly backed away from its ini tial bold
interventions into state conflicts practices; more recently it seems to
have given up entirely.23 Consequently, there is a temptation to
deny problems we cann ot solve, by fra ming the issue as one of
choice.
This article aims to show that things are not as bad as all that.
Interstate conflicts are a chief concern of the Constitution, and the
Constitution will allow us to deal with them. Conflicts theory has
fail ed to locate external constraints on state law and has actually
urged states to adopt regimes that are blatantly discriminatory regimes that, if not explained by parochialism, are in fa ct selfcontradictory.24 Judicious use of garden-variety antidiscrimination
principles embedded in the Full Faith and Credit and the Privilege s
and Immunities Clauses will prevent such favoritism . These co nstitutional principles do not resolve conflicts by their own fo rce 18. See infra sectio n JV.B.
19. See infra sectio n III. C.2.
20. See infra section I V.C.
21. The territorial approach to conflicts , discussed below, did in fact work by identifying
the law that go ve rned a transaction. Inte res t ana lysis re tain ed this voca bulary, eve n though
the descripti o n no longer fit the operatio n of the theory. See infra section IV.C.
22. Whe n a state find s foreign law inapplicable, it may seem not to h ave rej ected foreign
rights. See CuRRIE, Notes on J\tlethods and Objectives in th e Confli ct of Laws, in SELECTED
E ssAYS, supra not e 14, at 177, 181-82. Effectively, of course, it has done so , and perh aps few
will find th e rh etoric of choice an effective fig le af. Whe the r its po tenti al for obscuring co nflicts is the real reaso n fo r its co ntinue d popula rity is a psychological qu es ti o n, and my sugges ti o ns along these lines are o nly hypotheses. It does seem to be the case that Currie saw a
di ffere nce be tween applying local la w and rej ecting fo re ign rights, see id., and without this
di fference , inte rest anal ysis's bi as toward forum Jaw is obviously problematic. See inji-a secti on IV. C.
23. See infra section V .A .
24. See infr a secti o n IV .C.
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they do not dictate unique sol utions - but they constrain the
states' resol utions in ways that produce a co herent jurisprud ence of
conflicts.25 In ord er to see how the Constitution works, we need a
theory that frames the issue in terms of conflict, not in terms of
choice.
Part II of the article sets the stage for that theory by briefly
recounting th e history of conflicts sch olarship and offering a word
on methods and objectives in the cont1ict of laws. Part III extracts
appropriate building blocks from the rubble of previous theoretical
constructs: it then puts the blocks together, demonstrating in outline what the theory should look lik e. Part IV defe nds the theory
by examining two situations neglected by conventional cont1icts
theory: conflicts within one state's law, and cont1icts between state
and fe deral law. Part V examin es the relevance of the Constitution,
and Pa rt VI applies the constitutional principles thereby derived.
II.

CONFLICTS THEORY

Articles about conflicts frequently begin with - or are entirely
devoted to- a history of the subject.2 6 The need for another such
recapitulation may certainly be questioned. This recounting,
though, is not mere intell ect ual dressage. Because I intend to arg ue
that the correct way of thinking about conflicts may be derived
from the historical approaches, it is worthwhile to show both how
the essential concep ts already exist and how they h ave been prevented from uniting into a coherent th eory.
Conflicts has a rich history. To begin at the beginning might
require a return to ancient Egypt and the wrappings of a crocodile
mummy, which supposedly contain the first recorded choice-of-law
principles.27 A full account would then consider the theories of medieval Europe, the early E nglish approach that did away with the
problem of for eign transactions via the fiction th at all events occurred in London ,2 8 and subsequent developments in the courts of
America. The perspective afforded by a thorough historical exposition is of significant value, for conflicts revolves around a few great
and recurring themes. But the full-dress reenactment has itself al25. See infra Part VI.
26. See BRILMAYER , supra note 8, § 1.1, at 11-13.
27. See Hessel E. Ynte ma, Th e J-Iisroric Bases of Privare lmernarional Law, 2 AM. J .
COMP. L. 297, 300-01 (1953).
28 . See Friedrich K. Ju enge r, A Page of History, 35 MERCER L. R Ev. 419, 436 (1984) .
1l1is led to pleadings assert ing, for example, that wrongful ac ts were commi tted on the island
of Minorca , in the city of London. See id. at 436-37.
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ready been done ,2 Y and only a few scenes are necessary to my project. Of course, any attempt to sketch the history as mere opening
act fo r a theoretical venture will inevitably be selectively incomplete. What follows is an account th at highlights those aspects important to my proj ect - how the issue of conflict has been
repressed, and how, in later th eo ry, choice has taken its place.
A.

Vested Rights: Jos eph Beale

A lth ough Joseph Story exerted a profound influence on the
early development of confli cts theory in A merica,30 my story starts
with Joseph Beale. Beale was the reporter of the First R estatem ent,
and his three-volume treatise on the contlict of laws is structured as
a commentary to the Restatement. 3 1 The R estatement's task - rationalizing the law of forty-eight states - was a formidable one.
But Beale did not intend merely a catalogue of judicial decisions;
his quarry was the general common law, of which the decisions of
courts were evidence only. 32 Beale's task, as he saw it, was to derive the general common law of conflicts from the raw data of judicial decisions.
In this enterprise he was greatly aided by a few strong principles
co ncerning the nature of law, rights, and remedies. 33 Law, for
Beale, was fundamentally territoriaL supreme within a jurisdiction
but generally powerless outside it. 34 This principle gives a relatively
easy answer to the question of what law governs a particular occurrence. Since local law, and only local law, applies within a given
29. "(E]verything worthy of trying has been trie d before, under th e same or o th er labels. "
Kurt H. Nadelmann, Marginal Remarks on the 1Vew Trends in A m erican Conflicts La w, 28
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs . 860, 860 (J 963 ). For th o rou gh recapitulatio ns, sec, e.g. , Juenger,
supra note 28; Ynte ma, supra no te 27.
30. See, e.g. , JosEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, FoREIGN AND
DoMESTIC (Melville M. Bigel o ed ., Boston , Little , Brown , & Co. 1883). Story extensively
developed the idea of co mity as a basis for resolving conflicts. Comity does not go ve rn interstate co nflicts, however; the Co nstitutio n does. Story's work has va lue for this article primarily beca use it illuminates th e original understanding of so me co nstitutio nal provisions . Apart
from that, I will large ly ignore his contributions.
31. See 1 BEALE, supra note 6, at xv.
32. See id. § 1.12, at 10. This is, of course , the jurispruden tial position of Sw ift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. ( 16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which Beale cited approvingly several tim es. See, e.g., 1 B EA LE,
supra note 6, § 3.3 , at 22 & n.1, § 3.5 , a t 26, § 4.6, at 39 & n.l. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304
U .S. 64 (1938), overruled Swift just three years afte r the publication of Beale's treatise. One
ca nn ot avoid some sympathy for an auth or wh ose 2000-page m agnum opus, the product of
ove r twen ty years of labor, e njoyed such a brief reign befo re o ne of its primary supports was
unceremoniously knocked away. Worse was to foll ow .
33. Nowad ays Beale's first principles ap pea r to be so me what arbitrary assumptions, but
wit hin th e jurisprudential clima te of his d ay, th ey we re fairly unre markab le.
34. See 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 4.12 , a t 45-46, § 59.2, a t 308, § 61.1 , at 311.
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jurisdiction , local law must determine the consequence of acts
within that jurisdiction: '''If two laws were mesent at the sam e time
and in the same place upon the same subject we should also have a
condition of anarchy. By its very nature law must ap ply to everything a nd must exclusively apply to everyt hing within the bo und ary
of its jurisdictio n. " 35 If suit is brought within that jurisd iction,
courts \vill obvio usly apply local law. Indee d, Beale de ni ed the ability of courts to apply any but their own loc al law - tho ugh this
in cl uded his general common law. 3n
J

"

The transpare nt workings of the territ orial model become so mewhat more turbid when suit is brou ght in a jurisd iction other than
the one in which the litigated trans acti on too k place . In such circumstances, territoriality might seem at vvar with itself: If courts
can app ly only loca l law , but foreign law must de termine th e consequences of acts in foreign states, how are parties ever to obt ain reli ef in courts of o ther jurisdictions? Beale's solution to this problem
relied on a somewhat complicated taxono my of rights , which he
claimed to derive from the " difference made by our law in trea ting
rights o f the differe nt classes with respect to the law creating and
having power over them. " 3 7 On his account, law pro tects inte rests;
these protected interests he terms primary rights.38 The violation of
a primary right gives rise to a secondary right - a right of redress .39
This right vests at the mome nt of the violation of the primary right
and thereafter may be considered much like personal property of
the injured party.40 In particular, it may be brought into other for ums and sued upon. Forum courts, in granting relief, are not applying fore ign law but simply recognizing the secondary rights
vested under fo reign law. 41 To de termine whether a right has

35. /d. § 4.12 , at 46.
36. See id. §§ 3.4 , 5.4.
37. /d. § 8A.9 , at 66.
38. See id.; see also id. § 8A.6. Thus, " (p] arties are bound , not by the law, but by obligati ons created by th e law. " !d. § 3.4 , at 25 .
39. See id. § SA.25.
40 . See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican N a t!. R.R. Co. , 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (Holmes, J. );
Loucks v. Standard O il Co ., 120 N.E. 198, 200 (N.Y. 1918) (Ca rdozo, J. ).
41. Indeed , th e granting of what Beale termed a " remedi al right " - an actual damages
claim - was in fa ct a matter of forum law. See 1 B EALE . supra note 6, § SA .28, at 85 -86 .
Thi s all owed th e forum to recognize th e right to redress while retaining some t1exibility in
crafting a remedy - a feature H olmes ex ploited in O cean ic S1eam Navigarion Co. v. M ellor,
233 u.s. 718 (191 4) .
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vested , th e forum co urt might need to examine fore ign la\v. but as a
question of facL not law .42
One aspect of Beale's account is of special interest for my purposes . Tne aspect is this: given his territorial understan ding of law.
there is no such thing as conflict between laws. Each is supreme
within its jurisdiction and does not, by the nature of law, extend
beyond . Because laws operate only te rritorially , a state' s law cannot create rights fr om trans actions occurring outside its borders.-+:;
Denvin g the anDlication of fo reign law to a transactio n occurring
with in the forum state , then, is not the denial of a foreign right but
sinrply a recognition of the nature of law. O n this account. laws
C<:1.nn ot even come into contact with each other, much less cont-1i ct. 4 +
The task of courts in m ultista te cases is truly to identify which law
appl ies. which law crea tes the parties' rights and obligations.
The elimination of conf1icts made Beale's model pleasingly simple to opcrate, 4 5 but his approach would ultimately be judged no t
for its theore tical niceties but for its real-world results. From this
perspective, hiding difficult questions is not a virtue. Metaphysical
observations about the nature of law do not resolve concrete
problems, and Beale's theoretical purity was purchased at the price
of ignoring practical iss ues . This preference for theory over praxis
m ade Beale an easy target fo r criticism. He suffered so at the hands
o f the realists that his conflicts theory was for quite a while dismissed as an arbitrary metaphysics, based on "jejune notions of an
'omnipresence' which cannot 'brood' more than three miles from
home. '' 46 But it is more a vessel of reflection, and less a bark of
dogma, than such apprais als indicate. 4 7 The internal structure is re..1

~

1.

l

'-'

'--'

42. See 1 BEALE. supra note 6, § 5.4, a t 53 (" It is quite obvio us that since the o nl y law th at
can be applicable in a state is the law of th at state, no law of a fore ign state can ha ve th ere
th e force of law .... The for e ign law is a fact in th e transaction. ").
43 . "'Since th e power o f a stat e is supre me within its own territory, no other sta te ca n
exercise powe r there. " !d. § 61.1. a t 311.
44. While canvassi ng objectio ns to th e na me ''conflict of la ws," Bea le offe rs a de sc rip tio n
th at precise ly fi ts hi s theo ry: "The laws of different soverei gns do no t con tend with one
another for the maste ry. Each o ne keeps within its sphere of o peration , and o nly asse rts its
powe r in a fo reign country when th e law of that country co mm ands o r pe rmi ts it. In practice,
a co nt1ict is impossible ." !d. § 1.16, at 13 (quotation omitted ).
45. Indeed, Bea le believed th a t atte mpts to resolve co nflicts we re doo med to failur e .
'"Which of the two indepe nd e nt sovereigns should yield is a question not sus cep ti ble of a
solution on which all parties wo uld agree." 3 B EA LE, supra no te 6, §53, a t 1929.
46 . Ka tze nb ach, supra note 11. a t 1096.
47. See B RI LMAYE R, supra not e 8, § 1.2, at 20 (calling Beale 's th eory " qu a intl y mo tiva te d·· hut "well-de ve loped, " a nd rejecti ng c ritics' accusation that it was " mindless dogma tism'"). Beale di d hi mse lf no favors with his vaguely Shake spea rean re sponse to accusations
of dogma tism : " O ne ca nnot de ny that most o f the sta tem ents in this wo rk wi ll be d og matic.
D oes no t th e Bar de sire dogma tic stateme nts'?"' J B EA LE, supra note 6, at xiii.
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ally rather elegant, its concepts interacting with a smoothness and
complexity suspiciously reminiscent of celestial spheres, phlogiston,
luminiferous ether, and other refined illusions. And many of
Beale's claims have been taken up more recently by scholars as eminent as R onald Dworkin. 4 s
A dmitt ed ly, the practical effects of th e theory were somewhat
less pleasin g. In ord er to pick a single jurisdiction where rights
vested - as the territorial principle required - Be ale ne eded to
identify a specific act triggering the rights. Not unreasonably, given
the alternati ves . he decided that this should be the last act necessary
to the exis tence of the cause of action. 49 But the rigidity of the last
act doctrin e interacted with the intricacies of tort law to produce
resul ts that we re undeniably arbitrary and verged on the bizarre.so
The serpent of the practical fatally compromised Beale's conceptual
Eden , and soon enough came the "archangels of doctrinal destruction " :51 the legal realists.
B.

Legal Realism: Walter Wheeler Cook

In part of the Preface entitled "Apologia," Beale noted that his
legal principles had been criticized by what he optimistically called
" a current but ephemeral school of legal philosophy" 52 - namely ,
legal realism. The characterization was, if not whistling-past-thegraveyard bravado, a historic underestimation rivaling that of Louis
XVI. 53 Beale struck closer to the mark when he commented that
48. Bea le be li eved th a t cases had uniqu e ri ght a nswers a nd that courts e nforce rights th a t
e xist prio r to and inde pe nde nt of th e ir decisions. See 1 BEALE, supra no te 6, §§ 3.1 -3.4 . This
cluste r has obvio us a ffiniti es with Dworkin 's acco unt in R o NALD D wORKI N, LAw 's EMPI RE
(1986). Indeed, e le ments of Be ale's co nflicts the o ry are enj o ying a mod es t resurge nce as part
of a co n11icts coun te rrevoluti o n. See Pe rry Dane , Vested Rights, "Vestee/n ess, " and Choice-ofLaw, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1 987). T11e present article be longs to th e same tra dition ; like
Dane's, it atte mpts to re suscita te a fe w key conce pts that B e al e got ri ght.
49. See RESTATE MENT (FIRST) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 377 (1934).
50. Fo r ex2mple , the victim of a po iso ning mi ght trave l through m any states be fore th e
effects of the po iso n were fe lt. Beale, reasoning tha t no tort e xists with o ut an injury, would
look to th e law of th e state where th e poison to ok effect , sin ce that e ffe ct is th e last occurrence nece ssary to the vestin g of the right. But whi ch state th e victim h appens to be in wh en
this occurs has little to do with any policy relevan t to conflicts of law; no r, without th e stro ng
te rritori alist ass umpti o n, does it seem to have much to do with the nature of law. I owe thi s
e xampl e to Lea Brilmayer, see BRI LMA YE R, supra note 8, § 1.3, at 25-26, who points out
further that "it is no easy matter to dete rmine [as the First Restatement requires] where th e
'del ete ri o us substance tak es e ffe ct upon the body,"' id. (altera tion in o riginal) (qu ot ing R ESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLI CT OF L AWS § 377 Cmt. 2, illus. 2 (1934)).
51. K atzenb ach, supra n o te 11, at 1107.
52. 1 BEALE, supra note 6, at xiii.
53 . Lo ui s's di a ry e ntry fo r July 14, 1789, the da te of th e sto rming o f the B as till e, reads
simpl y " Ri e n. " ("No thin g."') . S IMON SCHAMA, C ITI ZENS 4 19 (1989). In fairn ess to Lo ui s, thi s
record ed an un successful hu nt.
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"one who hears the evening bell must hasten his \vork, if he is to
finish it. " 54 The ferocity, and the success, of the realist assault on
Beale's verities are well documented in the scholarly liter ature.
Katzenbach says that the vested rights theory was " brutally mur. clered " by Walter vVheel cr Cook, 55 and Brainerd Currie 's oftquoted evaluation was that Cook " discredited the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the int ell ect of one man can ever discredit the
intellectual product of another. '''> n Cook, for his part , made no secret of his intent to uproot and di scard B eale's approach in its entirety: "[U]ntil the intellectual garden is freed of the rank we eds in
question, " he wr o te , " useful vegetab les cannot grow and
flourish. " 57
The realists directly attack ed the idea of vested rights . In part
this was a matter of pointing out practical difftculties with th e approach. The principle that rights vest in the place of the tort seems
easy enough to apply, but in fa ct it encounters serious difficulties
when the events which make up the tort occur in different jurisdictions.58 As mentioned earlier, Beale accorded decisive importance
to the famous "last act " necessary to the vesting of the secondary
right. 59 Unfortunately, the domestic laws of different jurisdictions
might disagree about which act was the last one necessary to the
vesting of a right, producing situations in which each state believed
that rights vested within its territory - or, equally distressing,
within the territory of the other state. To resolve this problem
Beale had invoked the general common law,no a maneuver that became much less plausible after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 61 rejected
the existence of such an entity.
Still, problems of application were ancillary to Cook 's project.
His central attack was aimed at the jurisprudential groundwork of
Beale's theory, his understanding of the nature of law and rights.
54. 1 BEALE, supra note 6, at xii.
55. See Katzenbach, supra no te 11, at 1087-88.
56. CuRRIE , On the Displacemenr of rh e Law of rhe Forum, in SELECTED E ss A vs , supra
note 14, at 3, 6; see also D avi d F. Cave rs , A Cririque of the Choice-of-Law Problem , 47 HA RV .
L. R Ev . 173, 175-76 (1933) (" Ind eed. o ne m ay now wonder how a ny juristic cons truct s uch as
'right ' could have been accepted as fundamental in the explanation of any important aspect
of judicial activity. " ); Juen ge r, supra note 28, at 435 (" pure sophi s try") .

57. W ALTER WH EELER CooK, THE L oG ICAL AND L EGA L BAsEs oF TH E CoNFLICT or
LAWS at ix (1942).
58. See, e.g. , id. at 314-1 8.
59. See supra not e 49 a nd accompanying tex t.
60. See, e.g., 1 B EA LE , supra not e 6, § 3.1-3.6; R ESTATEMENT (FrRsT) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 377 cmt. d (1934).
61. 304 u.s. 64 (1938).
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Rejecting Beale's conception of ''theoretical law" as "the body of
P rinciples worked out by the light of reason and by general usacre
b
,
without special reference to the actual law in any particular state,"62
Cook warned that "we must as always guard ourselves against
thinking of our assertion that 'rights' and other legal relations 'exist'
or have been 'enforced ' as more than a conventional way of
describing past and predicting future behavior of human beings_
judges and other officials. " 63 He therefore opposed the reification
of rights, arguing , in the words of the ever-quota ble Holmes, that
"'a right is only the hypostasis of a pro p hecy.' '' n-+
Cook's positive program for resolvin g cho ice-of-law questions
was not as theoretically well-developed as that of his predecessor
(Joseph Beale) or successor (Brain erd Curri e ). 65 This is understandable, given his pragmatic and antimctap hysical bent, but it
means that his import ance to this article lies largely in his critique.66
His most notable positive contribution was the "local law theory,"
which asserted that states could apply only their own law. Beale, of
course, agreed with this proposition; it was what necessitated his
distinction between foreign law and the rights that vested under it.
Cook went further, however, arguing that states did not enforce foreign rights but rather applied "the rule of decision which the given
foreign state or country would apply, not to this very group of facts
now before the court of the forum , but to a similar but purely dom estic group of facts involving for the foreign court no foreign element. " 67 This theory offered a solution to the problem of renvoi62. 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 1.12, at 9.
63. CooK, supra note 57, a t 33. One obvious probl e m with this "predictive" theory of law
is that it fails to explain the thinking of a judge deciding a case, whose attempts to discern the
co rrect rule of law are surely not attemp ts to predict his own behavior. Cook points out this
difficulty, then comments that "our discussion at this point does not require further considera tion of the matter." !d. at 30 n.5 2a .
64. !d. at 30 (quotin g OLIVE R W ENDELL H oLi\tES, N atural Law, in CoLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 310, 313 (1920)) . Of course, Holmes's Supre me Co urt opinions constituted canonical
applica tions of the ves ted ri ghts theory. See, e.g., Wes te rn Union Tel. Co. v. Brown , 234 U.S.
542, 547 (1914); Slater v. Mexican Nat!. R.R. Co. , 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). Cook offers a
creative reconstruction of Starer as rooted in policy judgme nt rather than in the vested rights
theory, which he then cautiously attributes to Holmes. See CooK, supra note 57, at 35. It
may be safer to rest with the observation that Holmes contained multitudes.
65. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, !merest Analysis and th e Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U.
C Hr. L. REv. 1301 , 1301 (1989) ("(W]hile (the realist] criticism successfully undercut the intellectual foundation of traditional choice of law theory , a plausible alternative was not proposed until the 1950s.").
66. Cook would probably not have been unhappy to be ide ntified more with his negative
th an with his positive anal ysis; he believed that "(t]he re moval of the weeds is ... as constructi ve in effect as th e planting a nd culti va tion of th e useful vegetables ." CooK , supra note 57,
at ix.
67. /d. at 21.
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the interminable ping-pong cre ated when the choice-of-l aw rules o f
two states ea ch directed their courts to look to th e other state's law
- but had little other significance. 68 Th e elaboration of a choice of-l aw theory robust enough to di re ct co urts was the wor k of
Brainerd Currie .
C.

Interest A nalysis: B rainerd Currie

Currie's importa nt contri bution. and pe rh aps his mos t signi ficant di ffere nce with Beale , was to a nalyze law not as a n objecti ve ly
existing entity but as a tool o f sta te policy. Beale 's theory determined whi ch law applie d by "d ed uction from te rri torial po:stulatcs,''69 wit ho ut examining the co ntent of th e law. Essentially a
·'j urisd iction-selecting" appro ach , it picked no t a part icu lar l<nv but
the sovereign with authority to legislate the conseq uences of the
lra nsaction. 70 Jn contrast, Curri e realized tha t the fi rst step in
choice of law must be an an alysis of th e laws co ntending for ap plication. If laws are instrume nts of state policy, it follows tha t when
application of a state's law will not advance its policies, the sta te
would not want its law applied .71
This analysis revealed the arbitrariness of th e vested rights appro ach. Resolving all choice-of-law questions by territorial principles res ults in subo rdinating the interests of the nonse lected sta te
68 . Hesse l Yn tema ca ll s th e local la w th eo ry "'e m p ty lu ggage." See Yntema. supru no t<::

27. at 316.
69 . See Cavers, sup ra no te 56, a t 192-94.
70. See id. a t 194.
71. As th e tex t a bove says, this " instrume nt a l'' app roach to law is ge nera ll y co nsidered a
sign ifican t d iffe rence be twee n Beale a nd Cur rie. S ee, e.g. , Lea Bril maye r, Rig/us, Fa irness.
and Choice of L aw, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 , 1284 (1989) . Ye t it seems qui te easy to ass imila te
C urri e's insight into Beale's syste m by re aso nin g th at if th e sta te d oes no t wa nt its law applied. it does not ex te nd its law to cover th e transaction. Thus th e law att ac hes no lega l
co nseque nces; it creates no righ ts o r li abilities for parties to sue on. (Fo llow ing Perry D ane, I
will ca ll such restrictions on the exte nsion o f ri gh ts " rules of scope ." See Da ne. supra no te 48.
a t 1203-04. I discuss rules of scope a t more length in sectio n I I.E.) Bea le neve r sugges ted
th a t state la ws must always have maximu m scope - o bvio usly, he was q uit e e m p ha tic abo ut
territori al limi tatio ns. Tru e, he di d no t see th at limitatio n as th e sove reign 's cho ice , but if a
state sta tute provided th a t onl y loca l citizens co uld recove r for in-s ta te to rts, Beal e wo uld
pres um ably no t ha ve maintaine d that o ut-o f-sta ters acquired rights th e reby. H is fa scin ati o n
with th e ge neral co mmon law obscures th is poin t but pro vides no theo retica l o bst acle. In
truth . it was Cur rie who te:1ded to d isrega rd sta tes' expressions of inten t no t to have th eir
laws a pp lied to cases in which he found the m " inte re sted," crea ti ng will y-nilly the prac ti ca l
eq ui va le nt o f ri ghts. S ee B RI LMAYE R, sup ra no te 8, §§ 2.5.2-2 .5.4 (noti ng th at C urri e igno res
sta te choice-of-l aw rules dictating applica tio n o f ano th er sta te's law, tho ugh these seem like
exp ressio ns of lac k of interes t) . The fact th at the la nguage of ri gh ts is more characte risti c of
Beale than of Currie has been made to bea r mo re j urispr ude n tial we ight th an it ca n easi ly
suppo rt. See infra note 166. S ee generally Gree n, supra note 12. Now tha t th e cl amor has
di ed dow n, th e rea lis t a ttack o n vested ri ghts looks ra th er like any o the r atte m pt to ove rthrow an e ntre nched vocab ul ar y see n as esse ntia ll y conserv ati ve . 111 e rh e to ric may be p hilosop hi ca l. but the stakes are political.
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without even ascertaining that the selected sta te has an int e rest that
will be promoted by ap plication of its law. 72 Currie correctly suggeste d that thi s m ade little sense, and th at the vested rights approac h lumped toget he r quite dissimilar cases precisely because it
de termined the appli cable law without examining its content.
C urrie 's approach , by contrast, allowed for distinctions am ong
cases with multista te co nt acts. Currie bega n with a pres umpti on
that th e forum would app ly its own law.7 3 If one party sugges ted
th e app licati on of another state's law , the co urt was to analyze th e
substantive law a t iss ue to determine wheth er the forum or th e
oth e r state had an interest in the applic ati on of its own law. If on ly
one state ha s an interest, the case is wh at Currie called a "false
co nt1i ct. ., In such cases, it is appropri ate to apply the law of the
on ly interested sta te. This allows for effectuation of that state 's policies and docs no har m to the policies of o th e r states, since they are,
by definition, not interested. If both states have an interest, the
case is a " true conflict ," and more difficult to resolve. Regarding
true conflicts as insoluble , Currie suggested that the forum should
simply apply its own law. 74 A preference for forum law is not an
obviously desirable method of resolving true conflicts, and Currie
later suggested th at in such cases the court should reexamine the
policies at issue to see if a more moderate reinterpretation might
e limin ate one or th e o ther interest. The las t category of cases,
72. Reade rs may note tha t I have now moved fro m th e qu es ti o n of whet he r app lication of
a law adv an ces a state 's po licies to th e co ncep t of a "s tate in teres t" without muc h disc ussion
of eit her . Currie was simil ar ly e lliptica l, an unfortun ate parsimony that has enge nd ered substan tial confusion. A fa irl y aut horitative source, Currie's stud ent, coa uthor. and defender
He nna Kay. has suggested that a state is interested if th e poli cies behind the particular law at
iss ue - discerned by th e ord in ary process of statutory inte rpre tatio n - would be promoted
by th e application o f th at law. See Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmen tal
Interest Analysis, 215 R ECUE IL D Es CouRs 9, 50 (1984 ). This is the conventional way to
determ ine if a law is intended to apply to a particular case. See, e.g., EE OC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-59 (1991) (discussing sta tutory interpretation a nd legislati ve in tent
with respec t 10 ex traterritorial app lica tion of Title VII). Thus, when C urrie wro te that th e
proper role of co urts was to promote forum policies, he was saying simply that they should
app ly laws wi th a n eye to legisla tive inte nt. And that is simpl y e nforcing th e rights confe rre d
by th e law - ne ither a n unusual no r a n excessively instrumentalist approach. But cf D a ne ,
supra not e 48, at 1259 (cla iming that o nly a " Decision-Based " (realist) approach wo uld claim
th at courts are "primarily charged" with advancing th e policies of their stat es). What mak es
in teres t ana lys is proble matic, I wi ll sugges t, is Currie's tendency to construct legislative intent
around domiciliary status. See infra sec tion IV.C.
73. Larry Kram er has cri ti cized this presumption as unn ecessa ry. See Kramer, supra note
65. I will suggest th at it is unconstitutional, joining D ea n E ly and oth ers. See, e.g. , John H art
Ely, Choice of Law and rhe Slate's In terest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv.
173, 180-91 (J 981); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of La w, 92 CoLUM. L. R Ev. 249, 310-12 (1992). I wi ll
also sugges t tha t it is basica ll y incohe re nt, which I think has not bee n done. See infra secti on
I V.C.
74. See Cu1oZ1E. supra note 22, at 184.

August 1999]

R ethinking Conflicts

2463

those in which neither state has an interest, are "unprovided-for
cases." Th ese also proved somewhat embarrassing to interest analysis.75 Since a lack of interests provides no reason to disturb the
presumption of forum law, Currie suggested that in this category of
cases too, courts should apply the law of their own states.7 6
The jury is still out on interest analysis. In practice, it proves
quite und erdeterminative, given the difficulty in ascertaining the
policy behind a particular law.7 7 Issues of application aside , Lea
Brilmayer has mounted a more serious attack on the central notion
of governmental interest, suggesting that it is the prod uct of a priori
theorizing ra ther th an conventional interpretation J o I will have
more to say about her charges later. For present purposes, th ough ,
two observations will suffice.
First, interest analysis makes a very important advance by conceiving of multistate cases as clashes between sovereigns , each attempting to impose its own regulatory scheme in further ance of its
own policies. It is this perspective that reveals the conflict, which
Beale's analysis hid.
Second, like Beale 's vested rights theory, interest analysis avoids
the difficult task of resolving conflicts between laws , though in a
somewhat different way. While Beale's account denies the possibility of conflict - only one law governs the transaction - interest
analysis admits it: indeed, it is this recognition that allows the distinction between cases that present conflicts ("true conflicts") and
those that do not ("false conflicts" and "unprovided -for cases").
But having used the concept of conflicts to dispose of cases in which
th ere are none , interest analysis deals with true conflicts by employing a technique that suggests they do not need to be resolved. Th e
technique is what I will call " personal-jurisdiction-style " analysis,
similar to the one courts use to determine whether a state's attempt
to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant violates due process.
75. See, e.g., LEA 8RILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDI CTION IN TH E AMERICAN
F EDERAL SYsTEM 240 (1986); Aaron Twerski , Neumeie r v. Keuhn er: Where Are th e Emp eror's Clothes?, 1 H oFSTRA L. R Ev. 104, 107 (1973).
76. See CuRRIE, Survival of A ctions: Adjudication versus Autommion in th e Conflict of
Laws, in SELEC rED E ssAYS, supra note 14, at 128, 156, 168.
77. See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 2.1.2, at 61-62.
78. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of L egislative !nlen!, 78 MrcH.
L. REv. 392 (1980) (hereinafter Brilmayer, /m erest Analysis] ; Lea Brilmayer , Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge. 35 MERCER L. R Ev. 555, 555 (1984) (h e reinaft e r Brilmaycr, A Ch allenge] ("(I]nterest analysis is m ethodologic ally bankrupt. " ); id. at 563
(" Currie was as me taph ys ica l as Beale."). I di sc uss Brilmayer's attack in m o re detail below.
See infra section III.B.2.
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The due process test for personal jurisdiction is the familiar minimum contacts analysis.7 9 If the defendant has certain minimum
contacts with the forum. it may exercise jurisdiction. Of course.
other states may also have jurisdiction - indeed, they may have
substantially greater contacts than does the forum - but this has
no effect on the forum's ability to exercise its own. 80 The upshot is
that personal-jurisdiction-style analysis does not select a unique
state. It sets a certain baseline -- the constitutionally required minimum contacts - and any state that mee ts that baseline req uirement may exercise jurisdicti on .
Interest analysis proceeds in a similar way. using the basel ine
governmental interest. If a state has no interest, its law sho uld no t
be appli ed .81 B ut if a state does have an interest, there is no basis
on which to pre fer any other state. All interested states meet the
baseline requirement; there is no way to choose between them , and
therefore no grounds on which an interest analyst may direct an
interested forum to apply another state's law. 82 Thus, just as a state
may exercise personal jurisdiction without derogation of the jurisdiction of other states, it may exercise legislative jurisdiction- apply its own law - without claiming that its interest in the case is
greater than that of other states. 83 Currie made this point quite explicitly, arguing that "[a] court need never hold the interest of the
foreign state inferior; it can simply apply its own law as such." 84
79. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
SO. The forum may of course dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds. See
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 454 U.S. 235 ( 1981).
81. The exception is the unprovided-for case, in which no state has an interest. Here
Currie suggested forum law as the only plausible candidate. Larry Kramer suggests to the
contrary that a lack of interest is a lack of interest in granting relief. and that consequently
the plaintiff should lose. See Larry Kramer, The l'vlyth of the Unprovided-For Case, 75 VA. L.
REv. 1045 (1989) [hereinafter Kramer, i\llyth]; see also Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of
Law, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 277, 293-307 (1990) [hereinafter Kramer, Rethinking Choice of
Law]. My analysis will suggest something similar.
82. This is essentially the Supreme Court's constitutional position, though its notion of
interest is even weaker than Currie 's. See infi·a section V.A.
83. Though I will argue that personal and legislative jurisdictions are quite different, they
have similar histories. Both were originally territorial. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 722 (1877) (holding that a state can exercise personal jurisdiction only over people present within its borders), with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (rejecting application
of Louisiana law to a contract formed in New York). The Court retreated from territorialism
at about the same time in both contexts. The personal jurisdiction recantation came with
Jntemational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); territoriality gave way with respect
to legislative jurisdiction in Cardillo v. Liberty J\.Iut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947). Bw
see Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298. 319-20 (1992) (Scalia. J. , concurring) (distinguishing
between types of jurisdiction).
84. CuRRIE, supra note 22 , at 181-82.
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I will claim - and this preview is for guidance only - that this
characterization is misleading. Assertions of legislative jurisdiction
involve the rejection of foreign rights; legislative jurisdiction, unlike
personal jurisdiction, is a zero-sum game. \Ve will consequently do
better by abandoning the personal-jurisdiction-style analysis and
thinking instead in terms of a conflict between rights created by
different laws. Tne classic situation is one in which the plaintiff asserts a right derived from th e law of one state , and the defendant
counters with a right derived from the law of another. From this
perspective, the fundamental questi on of con fl icts law is simply the
ordinary legal ques tion th at arises in every case: whe ther the plaintiff has a right to recover, or whether th e defend ant' s asserted right
blocks the pl aintiffs claim. 'N hateve r court s say they are doing, this
is the question that conventional legal thinking implies they answer
when they decide conflicts cases.
This perspective shows the difference between vested rights and
interest analysis in a slightly different light. If we examine the
vested rights theory while thinking in terms of conflicts between
rights created by different laws, we see that they are always resolved on the basis of the territorial principle. The right created by
the law where the last necessary act took place prevai ls. This resolution is arbitrary, in that territorialism does not capture the relevant policy concerns, but it is coherent. 85 Interest analysis, by
contrast, denies the conflict in a way that produces incoherencies. 86
Currie's prescriptions for conflicts remain pla usible only so long as
the conflict is hidden behind the veil of choice , so long as conflicts
are conceived of as giving rise to a choice-of-law question that can
be resolved by personal-jurisdiction-style analysis. 87

85. It is coherent in that a conventi onal lega l principle (te rritorialism) specifies which
ri ght prevails.
86. This is, I rea lize , a bold cla im, and I do no t attempt a justification a t this point. What
I will show is th a t interes t analysis does not really choose an applicable law , as it claims. S ee
inf ra section IV .C. If we examine inte rest an alysis through th e len s of conflicts , what
emerges is not a conventional legal ration a le for choosing applica ble law but simple discrimination against foreign law and for e ign liti gants.
87. A more sophistica ted ve rsion of interes t anal ys is has been developed by Larry
Kramer. See, e. g., Krame r, Rethinking Ch oice of LaiV, supra note 81. Because his approach
is in many ways similar to the on e I advocate, I will postpon e consideration of his work ,
no ting he re onl y that it escapes many of the faults with which T charge Curri e's approach.
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Current Theory

The only accurate generalization one can make about current
conflicts theory is that consensus is lacking. 8 8 Interest analysis is
the leading scholarly position, and the only doctrine that could
plausibly claim to have generated a school of adherents. It has
been fiercely attacked , however, and the most thoughtful attempts
to develop its insights have been condemned as heresy. 09 Other
theories of choice of law, though less popular than interest analysis,
have also been articulated. 1l1ese approaches, which are not without appeal, urge courts to apply the law favoring the plaintiff,00 the
"better" law, 91 or the law whose policies would be more impaired
by rejection. 92 Into this chaos came the Second R estatern ent, synthesizing a wide range of insights into an indigestible stew. 93 For
torts, the Second Restatement urges application of the law of the
state with "the most significant relationship" to the action; 94 it then
lists a dizzying number of factors with no hint as to their relative
weight. 95
More recently, a counterrevolution of sorts appears to be
emerging, marked by the insistence that the concept of rights
should have a greater role to play. 96 Finally, there exists also a substantial body of scholarship insisting that, Supreme Court pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding, the Constitution has
88. This has been true for a while; more than sixty ye ars ago David Cavers commented
that "the article on a conflict of laws topic which does not deplore a current 'confusion of
authority' is still a rarity.'' Cavers , supra not e 56, at 177.
89. See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEo. L.J. 53 (1991) (criticizing Kramer).
90. See, e.g., RussELL J. WEINTRAUB, CoMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws 360 (3d
ed. 1986) .
91. See, e.g. , RoBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CoNFLICTS LAw§ 107 (4th ed. 1986).
92. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STA N. L. REv. 1
(1963).
93. See, e.g. , Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81 , at 321-22 n.l49 ("no explanatory power"); Laycock, supra note 73, at 253 ("Trying to be all things to all people, [the
Second Restatement] produced mush."); Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B .U . L.
REv . 1, 77 (1989) ("mystifies rather than clarifies").
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws§ 145 (1971).
95 . See id. at supra note 94, §§ 6, 145. The Second Resliltement may not be as worthless as
it seems. It does at least identify relevant considerations. If states simply used these factors,
sincerely and consistently, to create rules about which law prevailed, we would have a regime
quite like the one I will claim the Constitution imposes. See infra section VI.C.
96. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 71; Dane, supra note 48. It is odd that these scholars
seem to think that interest analysis necessarily opposes the idea of rights. See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81 , at 278. Brilmayer's rights lead to a personaljurisdiction-style analysis. See Bri!mayer, supra note 71 , at 1279. Consequently, I do not
endorse her account.
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something to say about choice of law. 97 I think it surely does, and
much of this article will be spent showing how two constitutional
clauses. taken seriously, can dramatically change the face of conflicts th eory.

E.

Methods and Objectives: What Interesr Analysis Is, What a
Conflicts Theory Should Be

Th e preceding sections have labeled the objects of their discussion "contlicts theories ," but this is not quit e acc urate. It is somewhat unfa ir to '---'urrie, and somewhat genero us to Beale.
Explaining why this is so requires a look at conflicts analysis from a
more structural perspective. The basic question in a conf1icts case , I
have said, is whether the plaintiff has an enforceable right. Later
sections will make the argument for this perspec tive. 9 R My aim here
is to give a more fully developed theoretical account.
A plaintiff's claim may fail for two reasons. It may be that the
plaintiff has no right - he might have pleaded a cause of action
that simply does not exist, or failed to allege a necessary element.
But a claim might also fail because the defendant has available a
defense that defeats the plaintiff's right. 99 This might be an affirmative defense, such as mutual mistake in a contracts case or consent
to a tort, or it might be something like oftl.cial immunity.
Deciding whether the plaintiff has an enforceable right thus requires two quite different inquiries. The first is the determination
whether the plaintiff has a right at all. This is a question of the
scope of the right the plaintiff invokes - whether the law he appeals to grants rights to people in his situation. The rules consulted
for this purpose are what I have called "rules of scope," following
Perry Dane. If the plaintiff does have a right , the court must then
perform a similar analysis of scope to determine whether the defendant has a contrary right. Only if the scope inquiry results in the
conclusion that both parties have invoked appropriate rights is
there a conflicts question. In such a case, the court must look to a
97. See, e.g., El y. supra note 73; Katze n bach , supra note 11. at 1093 (" Among th e United
Sta tes th ese are problems ultimately subject to Co nsti tuti ona l prescriptions. " ); Laycock ,
sup ra not e 73.
98. See infra Part IV.
99. TI10se troubl ed by the possibility of unenforceab le ri ghts might wish to alte r th e terminology here, perhaps distinguis hing " prima facie" rights, which can be defeated, from
"true" right s, which permit recovery. Cf Kramer, R ethinking Cho ice of Law, supra note 81,
at 293-304. I do not think such se mantic reticulation is necessa ry: where app ropri a te I will
characterize some ri ghts as "enforceable" without worrying about the implica tion that so me
a rc not.
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different kind of rul e to resolve the conflict - to what I will call a
"cont1icts rule.'' which specifies which righ t shall prevail.
O bviously, then, there are two ways in which a theory might
h andle the issues raised by multistate cases. It might eliminate conflicts by aggressive use of rules of scope, or it might provide conflicts rules to reso lve confEcts. Beale's theory is of the first sort.
The reason that it is genero us to characterize it as a conflicts theo ry
is that Beale's approRcb has no conflicts rules at all. 1 he territori al
principle is a rule of scope - state laws grant rights on ly with respect to in-state occurrences - and it eliminates coni1icts entirely.
Currie 's theory is similar, but less extreme. In place of Beale's
territorial ru les of scope, Currie uses the concept of governme nt al
interest to test vvbether rights exist. 10 ° Currie's rules of scope are
not quite as powerful as Beale's, and consequently some conflicts
do uise wit h his approach. But Currie has very little in the way of
cont1icts rules. He has, in fact, only one such r ule - for um law
always prevails. Th is is, as he readily admits, more a faute de mieux
stopgap than a real attempt to create a conflicts rule. 101
Currie had the misfortune to come up with a very tro ubling
stopgap, and the obviously discriminatory character of the rule that
forum law always prevails is the source of much of the criticism of
interest analysis. But this criticism - unlike Brilmayer's attack on
the notion of govern mental interes t - is somewhat misd irected.
Curri e conceded the jerry-built quality of his conflicts rule, and indeed did not claim to offer resolutions to conflicts; his aim instead
was to shmv that not all multistate cases feat ured conflicts. He believed, in fact, that true conflicts could not be resolved by th e body
of law called "conflicts." 102 What he hoped for was feder al legislation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, directed to particular
areas of substantive law.1 03 It is true, I think , that the prefe rence
100. 1l1is is not quite true to Cur ri e 's understandi ng of his theory. If inte rest a na lys is
we re tru ly a sco pe a nalys is, th e n unprovided-for cases (where ne ither stat e h as a n inte res t)
wo uld be cases in which th e plaintiff simpl y had no right. C urrie remained b linded by the
idea th a t the task in a multistate case is to find which law gove rns, n o t which ri ght p revai ls.
He was un willing to conclude that no law governs , and thu s fou nd it n ecessary to apply fo rum
law in unpro vid ed-for cases. Larry Kramer has redescribed unprovid ed-for cases from what I
think is th e correct perspective, making the p oin t that a lack of interest implies simply a lack
of rights. See Kr amer, Myth. supra note 81, at 1064. He m aintains (an d I agre e ) th a t this is
consistent with C urrie·s app roach.
101. See, e.g., CuRR IE. supra note 76, at 169 ("[The resort to forum law] is not a n idea l; it
is simply the best th at is ava ilab le.'").
102. See CuRRI E, Married Women 's Contracts: A Study in Conflict- of-Laws J'v!ethod, in
SELECTED EssAYS. supra note 14, a t 77, 107, 11 7-21; CuRR IE, supra note 22, at 18 1-83.
103. See, e.g.. CuRRIE. supra note 22 . at 183: CuRRIE, supra note 76, at 169-70. It is thus
not quite tru e that Cu rrie mainta ined that " [a)ll cho ice of law d ecisions shoul d be sim p ly

l
!
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for forum law is unaccepta bl e and must be rejected: Currie's conflicts rule is simply untenable. But the conflicts rule is not an essential conceptual part of interest analysis. Interest analysis is
fundamentally a scope-based theory, and its conflicts rule can be
discarded without compromising the me thodology.
Having made the distincti on between rules of scoue and confl.icts rules, we can describe the progress from Beale to Currie quite
simply. Beale eliminated conflic ts by territorial r ules of scope. Imputing th ese rul es to the states would have been im plausible, and he
stuck th em instead in th e twink ling heavens as part of the nature of
law. The rea list s, rig htly, did not believe that the " nature of law"
was much of a constrc.int on wha t states did . ·w ithout an effecti ve
metaphysical imprim atur , Beal e's rules of scope look ed silly and
wrongheaded , and C urrie se t out to show th at different rules of
scope were more sensible. The theories are first cousins: each relies on rules of scope to do all of its work. Neither B eale nor Currie
said anything useful about confl.icts. 104
Because of their close relation, the two theories face common
difficulties. 105 The problem with having rules of scope do all the
work is that the scope of state-created rights is first and foremost a
question of legislative intent (or judicial intent, with regard to common law rights) . Bu t if the intent of state officials is the whole
story, then a scope-centered theory is normatively toothless: judicial or legislative statements about the scope of state rights are authoritative, and while the interest analyst may find them misguided,
he cannot claim that they are wrong. To have prescriptive force,
rules of scope must draw on some source external and superior to
the authority of the states. 106 Beale relied on the nature of law, but
that gambit is no longer plausible. Currie purported to uncover interests via the conventional process of statutory interpretation, but
this required him to defer to legislative or judicial statements of
~

1

substantive decisio ns about the substantive rule s' prope r reach. " BRILMA YER, sllpra note 8.
at 108. First. Currie did distingui sh be tween scope an a lysis a nd conflicts an a lysis even within
his theory - th o ugh adm ittedly, since an interested forum will a lwa ys apply its own law, th e
scope analysis ends th e matte r if it unco vers a forum intere st. Seco nd, a nd more importa ntl y,
Currie reali zed - and hope d - that fe deral conflicts rules wou ld displace his rul e of prefe rence fo r fo rum law. This latter point shows quite clearl y his aware ness of th e di stinctio n
be twee n sco pe decisions and conflicts decisions.
104. Please d o not quote this out of context.
105. Brilmaye r m akes this point we ll in her ex te nd e d critique of interes t ana lys is. See
BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 2.5. My discussion here is inde bted to hers on several points,
most not ably th e tension be twee n obje ctivity and subj ec ti vity in the nature of governme nt a l
interes ts.
106. See id.

I

l
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scope even if those conflict ed with his stand ard domiciliary-focused
approach to interests. Metaphysics and impotence are the Scylla
and Charybdis of scope-centered theories. Beale' s succumbs to the
first while Currie's wavers be tween the two. 107
Modern theory h as advanced, of course, and we now have a
we alth of suggestions for conflicts ru les. 10s Many of these are good ;
a n um ber are quite inge ni ous. 10'! It is fortun ate tha t scho lars have
turn ed their attention to co nflicts rules. One of th e argum ents this
articl e will make is that conflicts are more prevalent th an Currie's
rul es of scope suggest. 1 10 In co nsequ ence, co nflicts rul es are where
th e action is. 111
Unfortunately, modern suggestions for cont1icts rul es sh are
something with scope-based theori es: they are normatively weak .
The rules they offer, if foll owed by all states, would probably make
all better off; coordination can often be mu tually beneficia l in multiparty interactions. The problem lies in achieving coordination in
the absence of external constraints. 112 As Larry Kramer has
pointed out, conflicts presents a sort of Prisoner's Dilemma: states
may do better by cooperating, but defection is a danger. 11 3 The
existing suggestions for conflicts rules lack prescriptive force in that,
if states decide instead to pursue narrow or selfish interests, the
scholarship is merely hortatory.
This article will not attempt to prescribe particular conflicts
rules, but will instead show how the Co nstitution constrains the
states in their crafting of such rules. (It will not construct a building
so much as give a perspicuous vi ew of the foundations of possible
buildings.) Beale and Currie both thought that conflicts were too
107. Currie's waffling is reflected in the alte rnately objective and subj ecti ve nature o f
governmental interests. Brilmayer's ex te nded discussion of inte rest a nalys is revea ls this we ll,
although I thin k she goes too far in fa ulting Curri e for not trea tin g sta te choice-o f-law rul es
as rul es of scope . See infra section IIT. B.2.
108. See supra section II.D.
109. Baxter's comparative impairme nt principle, in pa rticul ar, has th e e lega nce a nd good
sense that typica lly prompts scholars to think th at we 'd have come up with that idea if we'd
though t about it first.
110. See infra section VI.B.
111. More ge ne rally, th e conflicts problem is th a t state asserti o ns of legislat ive jurisdiction overlap. Telling states tha t th eir ri ghts do not exte nd as far as th e legislature has sa id
they do is pointless . In fact, I will a rgue, the Constitution tends to e nla rge, ra th e r than contract, th e scope of state-created rights. What a co nflicis th eo ry must do is manage the compe ting claims of authority; it must ove rsee th e conllicts be twee n rights. 1l1is is obviously a
matter of conflicts rules , not rules of sco pe.
112. See generally M ANCU R OLSON , THE L oG I C OF CoLLE crrvE A c TION (1971).
113. See Krame r, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra no te 81 , at 339-44. Kra me r also sugges ts that coordination may na turall y e merge , see id. at 343 -44, although th e history of co nflicts should give optimists pause .
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hard to resolve. 114 Tney are hard, and the task of deciding which
interests are more important lies properly wi thin the authority of
the states. The Constitution does not prescribe uniqu e conflicts
rules, but rath er restricts the permissible grounds on which states
may assert that their interest in regulating a transaction prevails
over the in terest of another state. By so doing. the Consti tution
cre ates a situ ati on in which mutually be ncfl.ci al coordination is
likely. Tne proper role of the Constitution has been obscured by
the rhetoric of choice and the concomitant personal-jurisdicti onstyle analysis. If we think about the issue in terms of conflic ts ~
which is to say, if we think about it as a conve nti onal legal questio n
~ things become much clearer. But to mak e th e case fo r this
claim , I nee d to develop what I have been calling the co nven ti onal
legal perspective.

III.

R E T HI N KING THE TH E ORY:

FROM CH OI C E TO CONFLI C T

The goal of this article is to provide a workable framework for
resolving conflicts of law, one that looks at them as conflicts and
applies principles appropriate to their resolution. Neither the
vested rights theory nor interest analysis fits th e bill because both
are scope-centered: neither makes a real attempt to deal with confl icts.1 15 This sole reliance on rules of scope is both mistak en and
unnecessary. A theoretically sound approach to contlicts can be
constructed, an d these theories give us the raw materials to do so.
The fra mework proposed here will not be built from scratch; nothing in conflicts is at this point. The concepts I will deploy can be
id entifie d q uite easily as originating in either vested rights theory or
interest analysis. The aim of this Part is to show what each approach has to offer, as well as what must be discarded.
A.

Rights and Their Critics

Legal realism utterly destroyed Beale's carefully constructed edifice. The revolution was necessary; the vested rights theory was as
wrong as a legal theory can be. It was wrong, however, primarily
beca use it produced the wrong results, not because of any metaphysical taint. The realist assault went beyond criticism of Beale's
results, and in its more ambitious form it seriously overreached.
The realists' success in dislodging Beale's rights-based framework
114. See 3 BEA LE , supra note 6, §53, at 1929;
supra note 22, at 181-83.
115. See supra section II. E.

C u RR IE,

CuRRIE ,

supra note 102, at 107, 117-21 ;
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has led conJl.icts to its current straits. T he rejection of th e notion of
rights is responsible fo r both the eso tericisrn of cont11cts and, relat edly, its disconnection fro m ordinary legal discourse in general and
constitutional law in particular. 11 6 Rescuing the rights-b ased framework requires an eval uati on of the legal realist criticisms.
TI1e re are two quite different components to the realist attack
on Beale 's approach. T he first is practical and shows that the territorially based vested righ ts the ory does not work , ei ther pos iti ve ly
or normatively. The second is theoretical an d aims to elimina te the
very notion of rights from lega l discourse. The fo Jlm,v ing section
co nsid ers th e first compon en t, which is sound ; th e next add resses
th e second , which is not.
1.

The Failure of Ves ted Rights I Territorialism

From a normative perspective, the most obvious prob lem with
territorialism is its tendency to produce arbitrary results. Territori al
connecting fact ors, triggered by the crucial last act, often point in
odd directions. For example , if one resident of state A poisons another state A resident within the borders of state A, common sense
political philosophy does not suggest that state B 's law should govern merely because the victim happens to have crossed into state B
when the poison takes effect. In compensation for this ar bitrariness, territorialism is gen erally supposed to offer predictabi lity.LL 7
However, it turned out to be much less determinative th an its propon ents claimed. In part this was a consequence of the need to
characterize actions and their elements. Courts nee ded to decide
whether the suit sounded in tort or in contract before they could
invoke the appropriate rules. Similarly, since the forum would apply its own procedural law regardless of whether it applied foreign
substantive law, the characterization of particular issues as substantive or procedural co uld be dispositive. The related distinction between rights and remedies also allowed courts some latitude
because under Beale's theory, forum law governed questions of
remedy even when the rights were foreign. 118
U nderdetermination may not be a critical defect; indeed, territoria lism's arbitrariness stemmed from its rigidity, and the elasticity
provided by these "escape hatches" gave judges freedom to re ach
116. As Kr ame r succinctly puts it , " Our entire legal system res ts on the conce pt of veste d
righ ts." Larry Kramer, Rewrn of th e Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979, 990-91 (1991).
117. See 1 B EA LE , supra note 6, S 1.3: see also ScoLES & HA Y , supra not e 7, § 2.6, at 15
n.lO.
11S. See, e.g., Oceanic Stea m Nav iga tion Co . v. Mellor, 233 U.S. 71 8 (19 14) .
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sensible results. ]',,1ore senous \S the problem that territorialism
works oddly, if at all, in Ihe absence of subst antive legal uniformity.
T he elements of a to rt may differ across jurisdictions; si mil arly, j urisdictions m ay emp loy different rules to determine where a contract is formed. 119 Thus jurisdictions applying terri toriali st rules
rn ight still disagree about Yvhat the essential last act was, and consequently about where it took place. Beale attempted to smoo th over
these issues by ap pealing to general common law to determin e th e
Ioc~\tion of th e triggering events, but general common law is no
lcmger available . Since it is not even clear wha t results territorialisrn pn:~scribe s , it is hard to maintain that it reaches the right ones as
s normative matter .
Of course, Beale proposed the vested rights th eory not as a normative suggestion but as a positive statement of the law. From this
perspective , the greatest defect of territo rialism is th at it is not tr ue.
States regul arly assert the power to determine the legal conseq uences of events transpiring outside their geographical boundaries, and sometimes they succeed. 120 So too does the feder al
government. 12 1 In the fa ce of this widespread disregard , territorialism can be defended as a positive theory only by metaphysical arguments about the nature of law, suggesting that actual practice is
illegitimate, somehow " not law" despite the fact that everyone does
it. But this style of argumentation is no longer convincing, nor
should it be. 122 Law is a human practice , not an in de pendent entity
119. Fo r example. o ne jurisdiction mi ght have adop ted the " mailbox rule. " providing that
the contract is for med as soon as th e rec ipie nt of the offer se nds acceptance ; anoth e r m ight
hold that th e contract is form ed onl y upon receipt of th e acceptance. See BRI LMJ\ YER, supra
note 8, § 1.3. a t 26. § 1.5.2, at 40-41.
120. See, e.g., A llsta te Ins. Co. v. H ag ue , 449 U.S . 302 (1981) (upholding application of
M in nesota law to accident occurring in Wisconsin); Skiriotes v. Flo rid a 3 13 U.S. 69 (1941)
(upholdin g Florida prosecu tion o f Florida resident for actions on high seas); Lea Brilmaye r
& Cha rl es Norchi , Federal Exrralerrilorialiry and Fifrh Am endmenr Due Process, 105 HARV .
L. REv. 1217, 1241-42 (1992) ('' It is also fairly we ll es tablished that a sta te may regul ate its
residents , even when they are ac tin g outside the state .") .
121. See, e.g., U nite d States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (uph olding kidnapping of Mexica n national to be tried in U nited States for co nspi ra cy to tor ture United
States governme nt age nts in Mexico). See generally Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 120, a t
1229 (discussi ng rule s o n federal extra territorial criminal prosecution). Even th e ope rati o n
of fede ral law within the states would seem to pose problems for Beale's theo ry of a single,
territo rially sup reme sovereign. Beale admits no difficulty: he suggests that each state of the
unio n rema ins a "sepa rate legal unit ," 1 BEALE, sup ra note 6, § 2.2 (d iscussin g ann e xation of
Hawaii), and then explains that fed eral law is local law eve rywhe re , see id. § 2.3, a t 18 ("It is
perfectl y correct to say ... tha t th e la w of each of the states consists o f the consti tu ti on,
treaties, an d statut es of th e United States, the constituti on a nd sta tutes of the particular stat e,
a nd the common law of th a t sta te ."). This analysis allows his theory to ope rate b ut, cha racteristically, suppresses the possibilit y of co nflict betwee n sta te and federal law .
122. In fact, Beale attem pted to defen d territ o rialism aS a matte r of positive Jaw . " Since
the power of a state is supre me within its own terr itory, no other state can exercise power
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to which practice must conform. 123 Consequen tly, it cannot credibly be attacked for fa ilure to abide by metaphysi cal principles.
Criticisms of violations of territoriality must be made within the
law, but Beale has no tools with which to make those criticisms.
This should be enough to condem n Beale's versio n of the vested
rights theory. Territorial ism is neither normatively attractive nor
positively accurate. His rules of scope are simply wrong. Wha t we
are left with , then, is a machine missing a vita l gear. vVi th o ut the
territorial prin ciple, it does not run.
2.

So lvaging the Concept of Rights

Beale's theory aims to help judges ascertain parties' rights. In
criticizing Beale's res ults, legal realism left this as piration undisturbed; it merely pointed o ut that territorialism did a bad job. The
more ambitious aspect of the realist challenge consisted of the rejection of the go al itself, the denial of the concept of rights. This
broader attack on received wisdom was part of a widespread reaction against formalism and metaphysics. 124 In a classic statement of
the principles of realist jurispruden ce, Felix Cohen affiliated himself
with a laundry list of Like-minded philosophers - Charles Pierce,
·william James, Bertrand R ussell, and Rudolf Carnap , to name a
few - and linked the realist movement to sim ilar developments in
physics, mathematics, psycho logy, and even grammar. 1 25 The common thread binding th ese thi nkers, what Cohen called the "functional approach ," was "an assault upon all dogmas and devices th at
cannot be translated into terms of actu al exoerience. " 126 Cohen
thus demanded, with the pragmatism of Willi am James, that concepts pay their way , 127 and asserted, with the verificationism of the
logical positivists, that " [a ]11 concepts that cannot be defined in
L

the re," he wrote. 1 BEALE, supra not e 6, § 61.1. H e th e n turn ed for support to C hi ef Jus tice
Marshall's opini o n in Rose v. f-lim ely, 8 U.S. (4 C ranch) 241 (1 808), but the quotation in fact
s ugges ts that personal and te rrit o r ial traditions mingle: " It is conceded th a t th e legisla ti o n of
every co untry is territorial; th a t beyond irs own territory, it can only affect its own subjecrs or
citizens." 8 U.S. ( 4 Cr anch) a t 279 (emp hasis added ) . L aw h as ne ve r been purely territori al
in practice .

123. Cf PHILIP BoBBITI, CoNST ITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1991) ("Law is something we do, not somet hin g we h ave as a consequence of some thing we do.").
124. See LAURA K ALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT Y ALE , 1927-1960, at 14-15 (1986).
125. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsens e and the Funclional Approach, 35
CoLUM. L. REv . 809, 822, 826 (1935) .
126. !d. at 822 .
127. See WrLLI AiVi J AMES, Whar Pragmarism Mean s, in PRAGMATISM AN D THE M EAN ING
OF TR UTH, 27, 31-32 (1978) (" Yo u m us t brin g o ut of each word its practical cas h- va lu e ... " ).
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terms of the elements of actual experience are meaningless. " 128
Armed with th ese principles, the rea lists went after the no tio n of
rights, arguing, for example, that assertions of ri ghts were no m ore
than predictions of official behavior. 12 9
The attack has been und e rstood in two different ways . First, it
can be seen as a denial that rights exist. 130 Thi s arg umen t is deeply
o ut of tune with th e philosophies Cohen in vo ked. for a denia l of the
existe nce of rights is just as m etap hysic al as th e affirmation it opposcs. 131 It is just as much an atte mpt to ca talog the furn iture of the
unive rse, to provid e a description that is not mere ly useful for particular purposes but, in the most ro bust se ns e of the word, true.
Claiming that rights do not ex ist independ ent of their enforcem en t
(or, equivalently, that law is " made '" by judges , rather tha n
" found") merely em broils law in the sort of ontological qua rrel that
has troubl ed philosophy for centuries- in philosophy of mind, be tween be haviorists and mentalists ; in philosophy of science , between re alists and antire alists; in epis temo logy, be tween realists and
rela tivists.13 2
When philosophical disputes have gone on for so long, with so
littl e in the way of resolution, it is a good bet that there is something wrong with the terms of th e debatc. 133 Rud olf Carnap's di agnosis sugges ts the problem is tha t qu es tions a t this leve l of
generality are not ontological at all , but rather practical.l 34 That is,
within Beale's fr amework it makes sense to ask whe ther a particular party has a right. Asking whether rights exist a t all, on the other
128. Coh e n , supra note 125, a t 826. Th e logica l positivis ts maint a in e d that the meanin g of
a se nt e nce co nsis ts of its met hod of ve rifi ca ti o n . See, e.g., Mor itz Sc hlick , Posi1ivism and
Realism, in L OG ICAL P os mv1sM 86-88, 106-07 (A .J. Aye r ed. & D av id Rynin tra ns., 1959). It
fo ll o ws immediate ly that an unverifiab le proposition - one with no e mpirica l co nseque nces
- is meanin gless.
129. See, e.g., CooK , supra note 57 , at 33; O li ve r We nd e ll H o lm es, Th e Pmh of rh e Law,
10 H ARV. L. REv. 457 , 461 (1897) .
130. See, e.g., BRILMA YE R, supra note 8, § 1.5.2, at 37 ("[TI1 e realists] be li e ve d, in add iti o n , t hat th e re simply were no such things as ves ted rig hts." ); D ane, supra no te 48, at 1225
(commenting tha t reali sts " have spent a good de al of ink de n yin g th e metaphysical reality of
legal norms or rights 'existing' indepe ndent of their enforceme n t" ).
131. Th e logical positivists, at leas t, were clea r that th ey were not de nyin g the e xisten ce of
anyth ing but simply abandoning m ea ningless di sco urse . See, e.g. , Schlick, supra note 128, at
106-07.
132. Law has, of cou rse, endured this debate, though cu rrent th eory wisely te nds to characte r ize it as a waste of tim e . See, e.g., Dwo RKIN, supra not e 48, at 225; Rich a rd H. Fallon , Jr.
& Dan ie l J . Me lt ze r , New Law, Non -Relroacliviry, and Consrirwional Remedies, 104 H ARV.
L. REv. 1731 , 1764 (1991).
133 . See P .M.S. H ACKER, WtTTGENSTEIN's PLACE IN TwENTIETH-CENTURY ANALYTI C
PHILOSO PHY 100-03 (1 996).
134. See Rudolf Carnap, Empiricism, Semamics, and Onrology, in MEANI NG AN D NECESsrry : A STUDY IN SEM ANTICS AND MoDAL LOGIC 207, 207-08 (1 956) .
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hand. is either trivial or nonsensical within the framework. 135 Answering that broader question, in a meta physical sense , requires a
true and singular description of the world, an idea! language among
whose terms the disputed entities will or will not be found. However, we do not have such a language; what we have are different
sets of linguistic practices adapted to different purposes and circumstances. We are dealing not with entities but wit h ways of tal king.136 Consequently, the decision whether to talk in terms of rights
must be made on practical grounds. 137
The better understanding of the realist attack th us takes the ultimate question to be not whether rights exist. but rDther whether
they arc theoretica lly useful. From this perspective. the realist
claim is that talking in terms of rights does not advance the ball.
Tnat claim is wrong, and demonstrating its error is the vvork of this
article.
I obviously cannot argue here for the proposition that thinking
in terms of rights is useful. I can only attempt to show it, and that is
the task of later sections. I can say, however, that realism's attempt
to bring scientific methods to bear on conflicts did not succeed in
producing clarity. What it did succeed in doing was to cut conflicts
loose from the remainder of legal discourse , which pervasively employs the concept of rights. That should be a prima facie reason to
doubt the realist contribution. 13 8

135. Cj. J.L. Austin. The Aieaning of a Word, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 55, 57-58 (3d ed.
1979).
136. Cf LUD\VIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

~§

400-01 (1958) .

137. Cohen certainly seemed to understand this point. See Cohen , supra note 125, at 835
("A definition of law is useful or useless. It is not rrue or false ... '').
138. Another reason is the fate of the related movements to which Cohen pointed.
Cook's realist approach to conflicts linked itself quite closely to the logical positivists; he
identified himself explicitly as a "scientific empiricist," CooK. supra note 57, at 46 , and took
as his epigraph for Chapter III a restatement of their central principle of verification, attributing it to the Marxist and pragmatist philosopher Sydney Hook. See id. at 71. Logical positivism was a dramatic failure; when A.J. Ayer was asked for the chief difficulty in a television
interview, he is reported to have responded, "I suppose its main defect was that it wasn't
true." See Shusha Guppy, Tom Stoppard: The Art of Thearer Vll, reprinted in ToM STOPPARD IN CoNVERSATION 177, 187 (Paul Delaney ed., 1994); see also id. (describing criticism
of logical positivism as "attacking a dodo"). For a concise philosophical evaluation of logical
positivism, reaching essentially the same conclusion as Ayer, see HACKER, supra note 133, at
64-65. Both positivists and realists, I suggest, erred by embracing a dogmatic reductivism
rather than a sensitive analysis of the actual use of language. Realism's value lies in its skeptical contributions , not in any attempts to create a general theory of law. and it may be better
understood as consisting simply of the former. See JEFFRIE G. MuRPHY & JuLES L.
CoLEMAN , PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 35 (1990).
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Governmental Interests and Th eir Critics

B.

What I want to draw from Beale's work, th en, is th e principle
that the basic task in conflicts is to determine whether the plaintiff
has an enforceable right. As discussed above, 139 this dete rmination
require s a two-step inquiry. First, the court must analyze the scope
of the laws invoked by plaintiff and defendant to determine
whether a conflict exists. If it finds a conflict, it must e mploy conflicts rul es to re so lve it. The ques tion at this point is how to arrive
at the appropriate scope and conflicts rules. For that e nterprise I
will enlist parts o f inte rest analysis, and before coopting the theory .
I mus t eval uate it.
The rea lists attacked Beale's approach on two leve ls, faulting
both its resu lts and its theo retical orientation. In te rest analysis has
been subjec ted to the same dual challenge . At the leve l of re sult.
the charge is that Currie erred in his creation of rules of scope and
co nflicts rules . At the level of theory, put forth most forcefully by
Lea Brilmayer, 140 the realist argument is that the governmental interests Currie purported to identify are not part of a realist or functionalist analysis, but rather a metaphysical construct akin to
Beale's vested rights, imported for a similar deus ex machina solution to conflicts questions. Once again , I will consider the specific
criticisms before moving on to the general ones.

1.

The Weakness of Currie's Approach

A s a normative matter, Currie's rules are not very attractive.
His examples are complex, but the tendency that emerges is unabashedly parochial. Generally speaking, as a matter of scope,
state lavv grants rights only when to do so favors a local; and whe n
rights conflict, forum law always wins.l 41 Neither of these
domiciliary-centered rules seems a good recommendation.
Like Beale, however, Currie advanced his scope analysis as a
positive statement of the law. It is , he claimed , simply interpretation of the substantive laws at issue. 142 The utility of the concept of
governmental interests depends on this claim, and I consider
Brilmayer's challenge to it in the next section. The practical weakness of Currie 's approach is more obvious, and it has to do with his
conflicts rule.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See sup ra sectio n !I.E.
See so urces cite d supra note 78.
See. e.g.. BRI LM-"''{ER. supra note 8, § 2. 1.2,
See, e.g .. C u RRIE. supra no te 102. a t 11 8.

at

65 .
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Currie did not purport to derive his preference for forum law in
true conflicts from analysis of state law. In fact, he advanced it with
some embarrassment as " not an ideal" but "simply the best available."143 It is not an attempt to resolve conflicts at all, and it produces a theory just as impotent as Beale's without the territorial
principle. Vested rights analysis worked only so long as its rules of
scope suppressed the possibility of conflict; without these rules,
conf1ict appears and cannot be resolved. Interest analysis, while no
longer working explicitly in terms of rights, confronted the same
problem. Currie 's rules of scope suggested that some multistate
cases did not present cont1icts. Because his rules of scope were
more plausible than Beale's, the approach had some practical value
- identifying false conflicts is generally considered a real contribution. But it did not even pretend to solve the fundamental problem.
In true conflicts, Currie suggested that courts should apply forum
law, not because it was appropriate according to conflicts principles,
but because such conflicts were at bottom insoluble. 144
This is not much of a conflicts theory. If we grant that state
interests are entities discernible by the methods Currie advocates,
the theory shows that some cases do not present the basic conflicts
issue: a clash between two sovereigns, each of which demands that
its law be given effect. Where such conflicts do exist, however, interest analysis offers no solution.1 45
The only reason that this confession of weakness seems anything
less than a confession of failure is that interest analysis employs
what I have called a personal-jurisdiction-style analysis. This approach conceives the task as choosing applicable law, not resolving
conflicts, and it suggests that choosing forum law does not imply
that the interests of other states have been deemed inferior. 146 If
choosing forum law is acceptable in true conflicts - Currie calls it
"sensible and clearly constitutional" 147 - then true conflicts do not
create a gaping hole in the heart of the theory. It is for this reason,
I think, that interest analysis is forced to characterize away the conflict, to adopt the personal-jurisdiction-style choice-of-law approach. If the conventional legal perspective reveals that the
143. See CuRRIE, supra note 76, at 169.
144. See CuRRIE, supra note 102, at 107, 117.
145. This is not precisely true; after all, Currie suggested that in true conflicts, courts
should apply forum law. But he did not see this as a resolution. See id. at 117-21. Nor should
he have; it is obviously discriminatory and, I will argue, unconstitutional.
146. See CuRRIE , supra note 22, at 181-82.
147. CuRRIE, supra note 102, at 119.
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interest analysis approach to tru e conflicts is ill egitimate - and I
wi ll show th at it does, tho ugh the demonstra tion is still a ways offthe recharacterization is unavailing. In that case , interest an alysis
fails because it cannot h andle conflicts.
2.

Sa lv aging the Co ncept of Interest

Just as Beale's rig hts-based fram ework can survive witho u t his
territori al r ule of scope, C urrie's concept of governmental interest
does not depend on his co nflicts rule. Nor. of course, d oes it depend on t he precise rul es of scope he derived . C urrie's admission
th at his analyses were on iy ten tative and "subject to modification
on the advice of those who know better" 1-"' - - na mely state courts
and legislatures - sho ws tha t the t he ory can acco mmodate a wide
variety of such rules .
B rilmayer's more am bi tious attack on the notion of governmental interest begins with Currie 's scope analysis. She rejects the ide a
th at scope can be determined simply by analysis of the substantive
law and faults Currie for ignoring state choice-of-law rules in his
determination of governmental interests. 149 If correct, the criticism
h as serious implications; it shows that the key concept of interest is
not something derived from sta te law but "an externally determined and objective concept that is imposed on state legislatures
and state judges by scholars ." 150 The criticism is not correct, however: it runs toge ther scope analysis and conflicts analysis. Choiceof-law rules are n ot rules of scope, and C urrie was right not to defe r
to them.
A functional analysis leads to this conclusion , for choice-of-law
rules simply cannot do the work of rules of scope. To the extent
that they might seem to grant or deny rights, they are trumped by
substantive law. First , ch oice-of-law rules will never affirmatively
produce a right denied by substantive law. If a Connecticut statute
grants rights explicitly only to those injured within the state, a
choice-of-law rule dictating the application of Connecticut law to an
extraterritorial injury will not expand the statute 's scope. Second,
choice-of-law rules do not withhold rights affirmatively granted by
substantive law. A state choice-of-law rule codifying the territorial
principle that the law of the place of the tort governs might seem to
indicate a lack of intent to grant rights to a domiciliary injured
148. C uRR IE , Th e Ve rdict of Quiescent Years, in
149. See BR rLMAYER , supra not e 8. §§ 2.5.1-.4 .
150. !d. § 2.5.5, at 110.

S ELECTED E sSA YS,

supra note 14, a t 592.
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outside its borders, but this is not in fact so. Eve n the territorialists
granted that if a tort occurred in a pl ace with no local law, at least
between two domiciliaries of the same state , th at sta te 's law would
determine rights and obligations. 151
Instead , choice-of-law rules typically prescribe v.;hich rights wi li
prevail when rights cont1ict. 152 (It is because there are no conflictin g rig hts that the law of common domicile appli es in tort cases occurring in lawless lands, des pite territorial choice--of-l<nv rules .)
They are, ge nerall y speaking, conflicts rules. Tne co nfusion over
their nature results presumably from the fact that choice- o f-law
rules are drafted to answer the question ''what law ap plies? '" This
question is part of the rhe toric of ch oice. and as r have suggested
before, it preve nts us fr om seeing clearly the structure of conflicts
analysis. 153 The question "what law applies?" runs together the issues of whether a party has a ri ght, and whet her that right prevails
against a conflicting right. It suggests that a choice-of-la w rule is
relevant to both . Thus Larry Kramer , maintaining that "choice of
law is a process of interpreting laws to determine their applicability
on the facts of a particular case," claims that consequen tly "the forum can never ignore other states' choice-of-law systems. " 1 5 4 But
if, as I have argued, choice-of-law rules are conflicts rules, not rules
of scope , the conclusion does not follow . A conflicts rule that local
rights will yield to foreign rights on a partic ular conste ll ation of
fac ts does not mean that the local rights do not exist.
Of course , the conclusion that ch oice-of-la w rules are conflicts
rules does not salvage Currie's positive analysis; the question remains why he did not defer to them instead of concluding that forum rights should always prevail over foreig n rights. It might seem,
however, to rescue his conception of governm ental interests as
things that an analyst can discern by analysis of substantive law. In
fact , there is another element of the cha llenge that must be faced.
151. See, e.g., Am e rican Banan a Co . v. United Fru it Co. , 2 13 U.S . 347. 355-56 (1909)
(Holmes, J .) ("No doubt in regions subject to no sove re ign ... [civil ized nation s] m ay treat
some relations betwee n their citizen s as govern ed by th eir own law , and keep to some ex tent
th e o ld no tion of persona l sove re ignty alive. " ); 1 BEALE. supra note 6. § 45.2 (discussing
jurisdiction over actions arising o n th e hi gh seas).
152. A rule looking to another state 's law m ay also reflect an inten tion to give th e same
rights as that state's substantive law would in a dom es tic case. 1l1is is the most natura l interpre tation of a rule that, for exampl e, provides th at the rights of he irs sha ll be det ermined by
the la w of th e testator 's domicile. Cf In re Anncslcy, 1 Ch. 692 ( 1926) (Eng.). Thi s is what
Pe rry D ane calls a " rul e of assimilatio n": it inco rpo rates th e te rms of foreign law in mu ch the
sa me way that fe de ral copyright la w looks to state law to de ter min e who are th e '·child re n"
e ntitled to share in renewa l rights. See De Sylva v. Ba lle ntine. 351 U.S. 570 , 580 (1956).
153 . See supra Part l.
154. See Kr amer, supra note 116. at 1005.
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Brilmaye r 's critique of Currie devotes much space to the clai m
that his "governmental inte rests " are obj ective, rather than subj ective - that is, that their existence is determined by a priori theo rizing , rat her than analysis of state law. 155 I have suggested that
th ey are subjecti ve, an d C urrie , to the extent that he addressed the
issue , said so explicitly. 156 Brilmayer's cr iti q ue of the concept of
govern menta l interests, however, is actually disjunctive . Like the
realist atta ck on rights , it maintains not th at these interests do not
ex1st out tnat tne concept 1s not use f u 1, regarcj l,ess o;£ tne nature o1
in tercsts . 157 If in terests are o bj ective , they are metaphysical fic tions
that J·ud ges may safely ignore . If they are su.bicct ive. then the-1v are
determined . in th e absence of legislative specifi cation, by the
judge 's own decision. Interest analysts m ay seck to free judges
from territorialist dogma by showing them a wider range of options,
but th at is the extent of their contribution. If the judge decides
upon refl ection that state law is nonetheless territorial in scope , the
interest analyst can only carp from the sidelines. 158
The horns of the dilemma converge on the same point: the concept of governmental interests cannot direct the resolution of cases.
Interest analysts have no footing for "normative critique of existing
case law. " 15 9 This is true -but it is also true of most current conflicts scholarship. Suggestions for conflicts rules or rules of scope
are always mere suggestions; states may decide otherwise . Still, this
hardly shows that the concept is useless; pro posals of be tte r law can
be invaluable. My analysis actually aspires to slightly greater normative bite: it seeks to show the constitutional limits on state contlicts practices. From this perspective, Currie's approach has great
utility. The methodology of interest analysis is useful because it
foregrounds the question of what states are attempting to do.
Currie 's particular suggestions are especially useful precisely because th ey are so parochial. Currie posits a maximally selfish state,
interested only in advantaging its domiciliaries. Starting from this
position and investigating the extent to which the state can achieve
its selfish ends produces a "bad state" view of conflicts, which is
what the field needs at this point. If states cannot be compelled to
1
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l55. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 2.5-2.6, at 99-119.
156. S ee Cu RRIE. supra n o te 148, at 592.
157. Brilmaye r actuall y concludes that Currie 's inte res ts a re objective a nd hence de ni es
their existe nce . See BRILM AYER, supra note 8, § 2.5.5, at 115. She does, however, gi ve a
quite co m ple te statem e nt of th e weakn esses of subjecti ve interes ts as we ll. See id. § 2.5. 3.
158. See id.

~

2.6, at 117-18.

159. See id. § 2.5.3. at 104 .
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take the high road, the important question is what barriers exist
along the downward pa th .
C.

Th e Positive Account

Despi te the criticisms of vested rights and interest analysis, conceptual building blocks remain. Joseph Beale posed the key question: D oes the plaintiff have an enforceable right? And Brainerd
Currie id en ti fied the correct way to begin the inquiry: apply the
tools of statutory construction to determine whether the law the
plaintiff invokes see ks to give him a right , and whether the law the
defendant invokes seeb to restrain th at right. This scope analysis
disposes of some cases - those in which the plaintiff pleads a law
that gives him no right. and those in which the defendant in terposes
a law th at gives him no defe nse. On its face , and as developed by
Currie, that is as far as it go es. Larry Kramer has taken interest
analysis somewh at furth er, l 60 in what I think is essentially the right
direction, and th e positive account I develop here is quite similar to
his approach.
The previous sections clarified some foundational points. The
id ea that rights must vest under one, and only one, law, to be identifi ed by appea l to a priori principles, is indeed misguided; but the
idea that analysis must eschew the concept of rights is no better.
Co nflicts scholarship has thus conformed (m etaphorically, of
course) to Newton's laws of motion: Beale's misguided metaphysics are match ed by an eq ual and opposite error in the rea:i st reaction. If there is progress in the scholarship, we might hope for ever
more gradual oscillations of the pendulum between vested rights
and realism. Such is, in essence, the aim of this article: to show that
there exists a happy medium. The two approaches are not incompatible but in fact have much to offer each other.
1.

Thinking in Terms of Rights

Both vested rights and interest analysis, I have said, suppress the
notion of conflict. The vested rights theory simply denies th e possibility; interest analysis hides it behind the idea of choice. U ltimately, both theories effectively resolve conflicts by invoking
principles- territorialism and forum-preference - that serve policies of conflicts jurisprudence accidentally, if at all. It would be better fo r everyone, I suggest, if we stopped hiding conflicts and
started thinking about how they are resolved. I will ultimately ar160. See, e.g., Kramer, R e1hinking Choice of Law, supra note 81.

J
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gue that the Constitution speaks to this point, but the first step is to
take cont1icts out of the shadows in which the choice-of-law pe rspective shrouds them.l6l
The easy way to do this is to return to the idea of rights. 1l1is is
a venture one might hesitate to undertake, given the amount of cri ticism the concept has absorbed , 162 but I have suggested that th e
criticisms are overstated. Nor am I alone in suggesting th at a
greater foc us on rights would benefit conflicts theorv. 163 Pe rrv
Dan e, in particular, bas de fe nded at length what he calls the
"N orm-Based " view of law - esse ntially, commitment to the rul e
of law t6 4 - and argued that it implies "vestedness" (the principl e
that a party's right s should not depend on the forum) . 16s \Vhil c f
sympathize with Dane's proj ect , I do not inten d to make a jurisprudential argument. 166 I suggest instead that a description that o pcr~

~

.;

161. Resolving confli cts is hard, and aba ndoning th e personal-jurisdiction-style analysis
will forc e us to co nfront so me new difficulti es . Currie simila rly found th a t hi s approach fa ced
proble ms th at the ves ted rights theory did not - notably, the iss ue of discrimination be twee n
citizens a nd noncitize ns of a s tate. His diagnosis was one we should keep in mind:
The fact that these problems come immediately into view when conflicts problems are
approa ched in this way does not m ean that they are genera ted by th e method. Indeed.
their prompt appearance is ground for an inference th at they have bee n present from th e
beginning. obsc ured and suppressed by th e traditional conflict-of-laws system.
CuRRIE, Unconslillllional Discrinzinmion in the Confiict of Laws: Privileges and lmnwni1ies,
in SELECTED EssAYS , supra note 14. at 445 , 448.
162. " Indeed, one may no w wonde r how any juristic const ruct such as ' ri ght' could have
been acce pted as fund amental in the explana tion of any important aspect of judicial activity.''
wrote David C<lVe rs. C<lVers. supra note 56. at 175-76: see also Juenger, supra note 28 , at 435
(vested rights theory is "shee r so phistry").
163. See generally Brilmayc r. supra no te 71.
164. See Dane, supra no te 48, at 1218.
165. See id. at 1245. I will claim that the Constitution re quires a ne utra lity quite simila r
to Dane's vestedness. See infra Part VI.
166. In particular , I do not mean to be endorsing a " deontological" rather than a "con sequentialist" approach to confl icts. Dane and Brilmayer, unlike Kram er, become philosop hicall y self-co nscious wh e n th ey talk of rights. See Dane, supra note 48, at 121 8-23;
BRILM AYER, supra note 8, § 5.2 (describing modern choice of law theory as instrum en ta list);
Brilmaye r, supra note 71, a t 1278 ("1l1ere is more at stake than semantics. Choosing to talk
in terms of rights rath er than policies o r interes ts represe nts a fundam ental jurisprude ntial
commitment which is re fl ecte d in the way that concrete problems are resolved."). The suggestion that the language of rights implies a deontological rather than consequentialist the ory
of law is, howeve r, o ve rstate d. Michae l G reen, for example, has shown that a realist a pproach (policy ana lysis) is in fact co mpa tibl e wi th d eonto logical principles. See Green , supra
note 12, at 968-86. A mor e obvio us obj ec tion is that th e " instrumental" goal that judges seck
to maximize might be vindication of parties' preexisting rights in genera l. More seriously,
Brilmayer begs the qu es tion by assuming th at whether application of a law will achie ve its
purpose is a different qu es ti o n from whether its application will vindicate preexisting rights.
See BRILMA YER, supra note 8, § 5.2 , at 225; see also Dane , supra note 48, at 1243-44 (suggesting that o nl y the "D ecisio n-Based" view of law would propose that co urts, in adjudica ting disputes, are " primarily charged " with advanc ing th e policies of th e ir states). As La rry
Kramer se nsibly suggests, these are ba sically the same qu es tion: if allowin g a party to appea l
to a particular law will no t e ffectuate the law's purpose, it is quite likely that the law do es not
give that party any right s. See Kram er, My 1h, supra note 81, at 1064; Kr amer, R ethinking
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right to win a judgment upon a showing of the reqttired element:; . t6 ;e;
A judgment is a judicia l determination t hat the sh owing has been
made. It also confers a right, name ly th e right to the damages
award ed. The next question is wh at happe ns to rights created by
one state when they meet th e rights of another.
2.

Thinking in Terms of Conflict

Whe n govern men ts create ri ghts. other governments may or
may not respect those righ ts. 169 For example, if th e law of a state
does not authorize recovery upon a shewing that ailmvs a right to
recover in another st ate , it gives people 2 right to engage in the
conduct for which the plaintiff ~ e eks cla mages. 170 V/e the n hav{~ <'l
co ntlict and must decide which right prevails. There is no reason to
describe this as a question of choosing which lav.; ap plies, and , as v.;e
shall see, this notion of choice does not comport vvith current conflicts methodology. 171 Further , speaking in terms of conflicts may
change the way we think about these cases. A conflict is not typically resolved by a personal-jurisdiction-style analysis that id entifies
a number of permissible options, but it is rather a legal question of
whether the plaintiff's or the defendant 's claimed right must
168. TI1ere is no need , for my purposes, to suppose th a t these rights vest at the time of
any partic ul ar action. A state tort law wi ll give certain peo ple a right to recove r damages if
they make th e re quired showing. Whet her a tort has been committed will obviously have a
bearing o n whe the r o r not th e showing ca n be made, b ut it need no t affec t o ur cha racte rizatio n of th e ri ght. B ea le, on the ot he r hand, did ne ed to ide ntify a uniqu e moment of vestin g.
TI1e te rritorial principle cou ld not ope rate witho u t a met hod of de termining in which sta te
the rights vest, a nd without the last act doctrin e , Bea le wou ld have bee n forc e d to confront
co nflictin g ri ghts. But m y point is exa ctl y th a t these co nfli cts exist , and tha t an analysis th at
hides th e m does us no fav ors.
169. With judgments, th ey typ icall y do; a j udgme nt ob ta ined in one stat e confers ri ghts
e nforcea ble in any state. See, e.g., Mats ushit a E lec. Indus . Co. v. Eps tein, 516 U.S. 367
(1996). There is nothing analytically special abou t judgments; they arc simply one instance of
state-crea ted rights. The differe nc e between rights based on ju dgments a nd those based on
legislatio n or co mmo n law is th a t there will se ldom, if ever, be a right th e d efe nda nt ca n
assert aga inst enforce ment of the judgme nt. Sta tes have not ad op ted laws giving their citize ns rights against for e ign judgme nts. Indeed , Co ngress has specified that th ey may no t, see
Fu ll Fa ith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) , and the Full Faith and Credi t Clause
prevents them from doing so of its own force , see, e.g. , Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U .S. 609 , 611 n.4
(1951) . In consequ e nce , cases in which a par ty asserts a ri ght de rived from a judgmen t tend
not to feature conflicting rights, a nd a sco pe -based analysis will suffic e.
170. See generally Wesle y Newcombe H ohfe ld , Some Fundam em al Legal Concep lions as
Applied in Ju dicial R easoning, 23 YAL E L.J. 16 (191 3) . To say th at one has a rig ht to eng age
in ce rt a in conduct mea ns (rough ly) th at the cond uct ca nn ot form the basis for recove ry or
sa nctions: to say th at one does not have a right means the cond uct may. (This is only ro ugh ly
true becaus e in some cases the exe rcise of constitu tion al ri ghts may allow recovery of da mages . For example, breachin g a pe rsona l services co ntract is co nstitution a lly protected in th a t
a state may'not usc its criminal law to com pel pe rforma nc e. See Bailey v. Alab ama, 219 U .S.
219, 238-44 (1911 ). But th e b reachin g party will still be liable in co ntract.)
171. See inf ra sec tion IV.C.
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ates in terms of rights is more consistent with ordinary legal
discourse , ancl that it will prove more useful in developing a jurisprud ence of conflicts. l'vly claim that both vested rights theory and
imerest an alysis hide real conflicts between laws is not meant as a
metaphysical assertion. It is not a claim that ''rights exist independent of their enforcement" - whatever that means. I d escribe confiicts decisions from a conventional legal perspective because they
are legal decisio ns. I ta lk in terms of rights becaus e that is how
lawyers and judges talk, and it is useful to talk in tha t way.
Th.e description I propose is, essentially, a rewor king of interest
analysis that op erates in terms of rights and there
makes explicit
the conflicts
had been hidden by the personal-jurisdiction-style
analysis of "choice of law." I will start with first principles. Tnese
need not be accepted , though I hope that they will be uncontroversial enough to arouse little opposition. The ultimate test of the theory should be its utility; whether it seems natural is not as important
as whether it handles conflicts effectively.
Law is an instrument of social organization, designed to allow
society to function and to resolve disagreements without resort to
private violence. 167 Consequently, law establishes constraints on
permissible behavior. Transgression of these limits may authorize
the government, if it can prove the proscribed conduct, to impose
civil or criminal sanctions to deter such conduct. It may also authorize other private parties, upon lesser but similar proof, to win a
damages judgment in order to be made whole. This authorization
of recovery may be characterized as the creation of a right: the
Choice of Lmv, supra note 81. at 291-303. Indeed, this is conventional statutory interpretation, see Kramer, Rerhinking Choice of Law, supra note 81, at 291-303. employing standard
reference to the intent and purpose of the drafters, see, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244 , 248-59 (1991).
Conversely, references to parties' rights need not suggest a deontological morality at
work. 1l1e language of rights may be used simply because determinate rules (which is what
rights talk leads to) maximize utility. That is, rights talk might just be rule-utilitarianism.
Legal scholars are baft1ingly blind to the existence of this approach and tend to think that any
invocation of a rule is deontological. The blindness is the more surprising because the law
and economics movement has devoted much ingenuity and more ink to showing that particular allocations of rights are or are not efficient, i.e., utility-maximizing according to the
willingness-to-pay metric. See generally RIC!-IARD PosNER, EcoNol\rrc ANALYSIS OF LAw 1217 (1998). Brilmayer does at least mention rule-utilitarianism. See Brilmayer, supra note 71,
at 1291 n.53. Perry Dane suggests that commitment to the rule of law implies a commitment
to the idea that a norm has an importance as " a goal in and of itself," and that vindicating
that norm at a cost to its underlying purpose has "a special nobility.'' Dane, supra note 48, at
1219. But rule-utilitarianism surely is not committed to that proposition; rule-utilitarians
may simply believe that rules are more efficient in general even if their tit is not perfect.

167. Larry Kramer starts from a very similar picture of civil society. See Kramer, Myth,
supra note Sl, at 1052.
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yield.l 72 vVhat the law is th at resol ves this question I must leave for
late r. 173
I therefore suggest the following analysis. The plaintiff may
plead whatever law he desi res. Courts arc simp ly not in the business of amendin g complaints sua spont e. They are in the busin ess
of judging th ei r suffi ciency. 174 The defendant might argue that the
law pl ea ded gives the plaintiff no rights at all - that it does no t
even purport to give a right to one in the pla intiff s situation. 17 5
T his is the claim tha t the action falls outsid e the reach or the plaintiff's chosen law - it is an appeal to a rul e of scope .
Such would ordina rily be the case, for exa mple, if, in a suit between tvvo Connectic ut domiciliaries over a car acci dent in New
York , the pl aintiff cl aims a right under O regon law. It is very unlikely that Orego n intends to give the plainti ff a right in this situation. This is, however, just a question of interpret ing Oregon law.
A bsent so me sta tement to the contrary, it mak es sense to presume
that a state's tort laws are intended to apply at most to torts involving its citizens and to torts committed within its borders. Quite possibly the intended reach is narrower, though this is more difficult to
ascertain. My point here is simply that if the plaintiff invokes a law
that has no applicati on to him, the defen dant ca n defeat the claim
o n that basis.
Suppose , however , that there is a generous Oregon stat ute
claiming to give rights to all persons inju red wi thin the U nited
States. If the plaintiff invokes this statute, the defe ndant cannot
rely on the rule of scope argument that no right exists . He might ,
however, argue that some other law - pres umably the law of either
New York or Connecticut 176 - gives him a defense against the
right asserted under Oregon law.
Both New York and Connecticut law satisfy the broad conditions set out above for presumptive applicability of law. The defe ndant is a Conn ecticut domiciliary, so Co nnecticut may well
172. Cf La ycock, supra note 73, at 259.
173. I wi ll claim that although the de termination of th e prevailin g righ t lies with in th e
legitimate authority of the states, th e Constitution sets out parameters wi thin which state
co nflicts rules must be draw n. See infra Part VI.
174. With regard to this po int - that what happe ns in a co nflicts case is that the plaintiff
files a complaint alleging vi o la tion of some right and th e court assesses it s sufficiency - I am
in co mplete agreeme nt with Kra me r. See Kramer, R ethinkin g Choice of Law, supra note 81,
a t 282 .
175. Kramer cha racteri zes this question as whether th e law gives a prima facie right , presuma bl y to indicate that prima facie rights may no t be e nfo rceable. As disc ussed supra note
99, I think we may speak simply of rights. But of cou rse nothin g turn s o n th e termin o logy .
176. Or possib ly fede ral law . I consider state-fede ral confl ic ts in infra sec ti on !V.B.
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desire to protect him. And the tort occurred in New York, so New
York may well intend to determine the situa tions under which people acting in New York will be forced to compensate those they
injure. To determine whether the defense the defendant invokes is
appii cable, we need again to take a cl oser look at the law.
Le t us consi der a few possibilities. The defendant may argue
that his driving met the standard of care esta blished by Connecticut
law, and that this absolves him o f liability. It is unlikely, howeve r,
that CDrm ccticut intends its domiciliaries to carry with them Connectic ut 's rules of the road. Generall y speaki ng, rules directed to
so-cal lcJ "prim ary conduct" - the actions forming the basis for the
lawsttit -- should be presumed to have a territori al sco pe .
A lternatively, the law at issue might not focus on primary conduct. It might be a rule that has very little effect on the conduct
forming the basis for the lawsuit, such as a rule providing that tort
claims abate on the death of the tortfeasor. 177 Again, both New
York and Connecticut laws meet the test of prima facie applicability. But would New York likely intend to prevent one Connecticut
domiciliary from recovering against the estate of another, when this
restriction would have so little impact on their actions within New
York? Probably not; the defendant will have an easier time invoking the abatem ent rule if it is a provision of Connecticut law.U 8
Rules that do not focus on primary conduct should generally be
presumed to be intended for domiciliaries.
Let us suppose, fmally , that the defense invoked is one that the
state intends to offer to the defendant- it comes from a New York
statute setting the standard of care for its highways. If the Oregon
law at issue purports to hold the defendant to a higher stand ard of
care, we have what my framework sees as a true conflict. How this

177. A di stinction is ofte n drawn betwee n "conduct-regulating" and " loss-alloca ting"
rul es. See, e.g., Schul tz v. Boy Scouts of Am., In c. , 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985). Currie draws
a simi lar line between " ru les of conduct" and " rules of decisi o n. " See CuRRI E, On rh e Displacem.enl of rh e Law of the Forum, in SELECTED EssAYs, supra note 14, at 3, 68-69. I av oid
the te rminology beca use I doubt th e distinction is te nable as a general matter. Ch aritable
imm unity, whi ch Schu/r z treats as loss-a llocating, will surely ha ve some effect o n how careful
chariti es are; im munities obviously eliminate the dete rre nt effects of liability. Still, rules are
directed at pa rticular objects, tho ugh they may have broader e ffe cts. The qu estion a t thi s
point is simpl y which parties an d transac tions a legislature intends its law to cover. A n a bate ment rule will lift liability only from the dead, a nd death is ge ne rally an unimprovabl e deterrent. Thus its effect on primary conduct should be minimal , and its applicabili ty
presumpti ve ly dom icilia ry-foc used.
178. It may be , of course, that N ew York cannot withhold from th e defe ndant d e fense s
made ava ilab le to its own domiciliaries. See infra sect ion VI.B.2 .
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conflict is to be resolved is a differe nt questio n, and I claim it is a
legal one, to which con ventional legal reaso ning applies. 179
IV.

DEFEN DI NG THE T HE ORY :

Two

ExAM PLES

My argument is that a confl icts case presents a con ventio nal
legal q uestion. The plaintiff asserts a right , grounded in some law ;
the defend ant asserts a contrary right , groun ded typically in a different law. The court must decide wh ich right prevails, an d this is a
legal question , to be determined by state conflicts rules ope rat ing
within constitutiona l constrai nts . \Vhe n a co urt " chooses " the "a pplicable law" it is re ally determining that one rig ht will be recognized and the o ther subord inated . tso
G iven my disavowa l o f jurisprudential in tent, it might be wondered how much force the word "reall y" can muste r. Ge nerally
speaking, I think that claims about what " re ally" h appens are arguments in favor of a particu lar description, to be judged by the utility
of that descripti on. If others prefer a different description, co unterarguments may be persuasive, but they are n ever conclusive. Still ,
there should be a presumption in fav or of the conventional legal
perspective. If conflicts cases depart fro m this and employ a novel
vocabulary to d escribe q uite ordinary q uestions, we should ask why.
Moreover, the p rinciple that com peting descriptions are essentially
equals does no t always hold in law; relativism com es to an end
somewhere. The Cons titution eventually ta kes over, in that if a description that sees a constitutional violation is suffic iently pl ausible,
states may no t defend their conduct by offering an altern ate d escription on which there is no violatio n. That, finally , is wh at I
claim happens here . The conflicts, or convention al legal, p erspective m akes the violation so clear that the Constitution forbid s us
from hiding be hind the r hetoric of choice of law. This is a familiar
point from conflicts jurisprudence ; fo r example, states may not
subordinate federal rights by claiming m erely to h ave applied their
own law.
179. This asserti o n may seem so obvio us as to be unnecessary. The qu estion is resolved
by the court, and cou rts reso lve lega l q ues ti o ns. Bu t in making this claim I am n eith er fl ogging the choir nor preachin g to a dea d ho rse . Currie's inte rest an alys is seems to suppose that
it is not a legal questio n. See, e. g. , CuRRIE, supra no te 22, at 182.
180. If th e court actua ll y decides that o ne law governs (to th e excl usio n of th e o ther), it
has like ly award ed victo ry to a cluster of ri ghts. This is a n unfortun a te conseque nce of the
choice-of-law voca bulary. There is lit tle reason to suppose th a t an intellige nt conflic ts rul e
woul d trea t bodi es of law as indi visib le units. It mi gh t ma ke good sense to look to th e law of
th e place of a car acciden t for rul es of the road but to ano th er law for othe r purposes . In fa ct,
curre nt ap proaches to co nflicts, whil e claiming to se lect " the appli cable law," do n o t pick a
law that governs in this sense . See infra section IV.C.
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1\vo examples belp substa nti ate th e arg umen t that m ultistate
conflicts cases raise no distinctive legal issues. Both fea ture circumstances in which a conflict betwe en laws can not be denied , in which
the court cannot invoke the id ea of a '·choice of law." Neither, consequently, is typically consid ered as raising a "choice-of-law" issue.tRl This is advantageo us fo r my p urposes: it sugges ts precisely
th at ''choice of law " is an attempt to avoi d confl icts rathe r than a
sensible method of reso lving them.
1\.
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cas es

T oe c::monical cont1icts cases are . wit hout exceptio n, cases th at
h ave cont acts with mo re than one juri sdiction. From the perspective that takes conflicts cases to be about choice of law , this makes
sense: if there is no possibili ty of choosi ng the law of another jurisdiction, there cannot be a ch oice-of-la w issue. But there are purely
domestic cases in which laws conflict, or seem to .182 These cases,
like the more conventional multistate conflicts cases, require courts
to determine which law prevails, 'Nhich right will be vindicated. An
examin ation of such cases is fruitful because it tells us some thing
abo ut what conflicts an alysis is. It lifts th e veil of choice-of-law
rhetoric and allows us to see what goes on when courts resolve conflicts between laws.
The first sort of domestic conflict arises from transitions between legal regimes. 183 When a state enacts a new statute, creating
new rig hts or obligations, there will be cases in which the relevant
trans actions took place before the en actment of the new statute.
Courts must then decide whether the new rights or obliga tions will
be recognized in such cases - whether , for example, a defendant
whose conduct met the old stand ard of care should be held liable
because a new statute imposes a greater duty.
18 1. The no ta ble exception he re is Larry Kramer , wh o argues that domes tic cases and
multistate cases raise similar "choice-of-law" iss ues. See Kra me r, Rethinking Choice of La w,
supra note 81 , at 283.
182. In purely domestic cases, co urts must also pe rform a scope a nal ysis to de termin e if
the law at issu e grants the parties ri ghts. See Cu RRI E, supra no te 22, at 184. Tha t is no t very
surprising, since sco pe analysis is just sta tuto ry in te rpreta ti o n. The presence of sco pe analys is
in do mes tic cases might sugges t th at th e re are some simil ari ties be twee n conflicts cases and
domesti c cases - after all, Beal e's the ory had nothin g mo re than rules of scope . It might
also sugges t th e correctn ess of the initial scope a nal ys is in co nflicts cases. Mo re significant
for present purposes is the fa ct th a t courts actu all y e mplo y conflicts rul es in domestic cases.
They do so rarely, beca use th e de tection of a co ntlict is frequ e ntl y taken as an in dicati o n that
th e scope ana lysis has go ne wro ng - courts pres um e tha t legisla tu res do not inte nd to create
conflicting ri ghts. Bu t the co nflicts rul es are the re if we look for th em.
183. C urrie also noted th e presence of scope a nalys is in re troacti vity jurisprude nce. See
id. Again, my point is sligh tly di fferent: courts also perfo rm conllic ts an alysis .
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This is, or may be, a conflicts issue; ind eed , the Supreme Court
has characterized it as a matter of intertemporal "choice of law. '' 18 4
T he process o f decision, however - at least where the new law is
created by statute185 - is no complex and murky choice-of-law
calculus. Instead , the court engages in the conve ntional process of
stat utory interpretation to ascertain whether th e new l<:nv purports
to grant rights to , or impose liability on , the parties . 1:s 6 J. his is , of
course , the scope-based first step of interest analysis: determining
whether there is a con flict. Ordinarily, stat utes ope rate only prospectively. The rights the y create may no t be invoke d \Vith respect
to transactions occurring before their enactment, and so lhere is no
confl ict between old and new law. The legislature may also specify,
however, that the new statute is to have retroactive effect. I n this
case, there will be a conflict: both the old and the new statute purport to grant rights . Such conflicts are easily resolved : the n ew law
prevails, unless the Constitution restrains it. 187 That is the application of a conflicts rule; there is no reason to describe it as a choice
of law. 18 :s
Thus it can be seen that at least som e purely domestic cases involve conflicts, and the analysis performed in such cases fits comfor tably within the approa ch I advocate. Retroactivity cases are not
the only ones. In fact, the potential for a co nflict exists i n all cases.
This may seem co unterintuitive. A ft er all , in purely domestic cases,
once the plain tiff has made a claim that some law entitles him to
relief, it usually does not matter what other !av1s say. For exa mple ,
if the plaintiff makes out a tort claim , it does no t m atter that the
defendant has avail able an adequate defense in contract. It will do
him no good to arg ue that contract law appli es to the case, unl ess
the point is that the plaintiff has actually pleaded in contract and
184. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia , 501 U .S. 529, 535 (1991) .
185 . The issue of th e retroactive effect of a judicial decisio n, rath e r th a n a new statute , is
q uite murky. Oddly, th e a nalys is no w favored by the Co urt resemb les Jose ph Beale's vested
righ ts theory: it hides co nl1icts between ea rly and la te r law via th e premise th at o nl y the law
in effect at the time of th e pa rties' actions can confe r rights. See Ke rmit Rooseve lt III, A
Lillie Theory is a Dangerous Thin g: Th e My1h of Adjudicarive Rerroactivity, 31 CoNN. L.
REv. 1075, 1080 (1999). This is not an encouraging sign, and I have argued th at curren t
re troactivity jurisprudence is th e unfortunate legacy of an ea rli e r mistake. See id. at 1087-91.
Matters would be much clearer if the Court simply co nfronted th e existence of conflict and
adop ted, as a conflicts rul e, the prin ciple that later rights prevail ove r earlier rights, as it has
done in the statutory co ntex t.
186. See, e.g., Landgraf v. U .S.!. Film Prods. , 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (engaging in comp rehensive interpretation of the Civil Rights Act § 102 to de te rmin e whe th er plaintiff, wh o argued for retroacti ve app lica tion , had a cause of action).
187. See Landgraf, 51 1 U.S. a t 280.
188. Legislatures do, of course, choose whe th er their statutes apply re tro ac tivel y o r no t,
but th a t is a matte r of choosing the scope of th e ri ghts.
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not in tort. Th e contract defense the state has created does not
interfere with th e plaintiff's right to recove r in tort ; the two statecreated rights do not, so to speak, touch each oth er. They coexist
perfectly happil y; the defense does not ap ply to the right to recover,
nor does it purport to. This is, again, what scope analysis revea ls.
B ut such is not always the case. The state may. for example .
ha ve created immunities. The que stion then is wh et her the imnlllnity ap pli es to the case at hand, whether th e defendant's right interfen:~s with the plaintiff's. It may or may not: this is a matter of scope
analysis - that is, interpre ting the law. Suppose, for example. that
the piaintitl mak es out a tort claim, but the defendant claims to be a
state officer acting within the course o f hi s duties. The stat e may
have immunized such officers, or it may have placed a limit on clamages recoverable in such actions. l89 The court must decide whether
the state immunity may be invoke d by the defend ant - whether it
grants him a right. If it does, the scope analysis has revea led a confli ct. The court must then determine wheth e r the immunity defeats
the plaintiff's claim: it must decide whether the immunity prevails
over the plaintiff's right to recover in tort.
This is , it should be evident, analytically identical to th e issue
that arises when a plaintiff relies on one state' s law for his right to
recover, and a defendant asserts a de fense created by the law of
another state . The court must decide if there is a cont1ict betwee n
the rights asserted and, if so, which prevails. Again, there is no obvious reason to describe this as a choice between laws.t9o
The suggestion that pure ly domestic cases may involve conflicts
of law , lik e the analysis of the preceding section, bears an obvious
similarity to some of Larry Kramer 's work. 1 9 1 Kramer a rgues that
all cases involve a choice of law. 1 92 I think this is an important insight, and correct, but I would phrase it some what diffe rently: no
cases involve a choice of law. Of course, this sounds rather more
lik e a den ial than a rephrasing. Kramer's point, however , is that
cases in which courts perform an explicit "choice-of-law" calculus
189 . See generally, e.g., Bott v. D eLand, 922 P.2d 732 (Uta h 1996) (d iscuss ing Ut ah Gov.
ernmental Immunity Act).
190. This does not mean th at it could not be desc ribed as a choice of law -- th o ugh, as
section IV. C shows , it cannot be des cribed as a choice o f which law applies. But the f::~ct that
in th e dom es tic context there is no temp tati on to do so should suggest that some thing odd is
going o n in th e realm of conflicts. My techniqu e for re vea ling that oddit y is bas ica ll y to
recl escribe contlicts cases from the conventional legal perspective. I will argue that from thi s
perspec tive , conve ntional conflicts ana lys is is fatally 11awed, and th at con11i cts cases are desc ribe d as in vo lving choice precisely in orde r to m ask these flaws. See infra sec tion IV.C.
191. In particular, see Kr amer. Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81. at 280-83.
192. See id.
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do not differ in any fundamen tal way from those in which they do
not; the same process goes on in determining whether the plain tiff
has a right to relief. I cla im that this determination does not require
a co urt to "choose " wh ich law to "apply." Now, of course, this
cl aim is a bit hard to sq uare with the practice of courts , and from
the descriptive perspect ive. Kramer has things rat her e asier. It
must seem more plausible to suggest that a similar process to the
exp li cit choice of law goes on in all cases than to suggest that the
explicit choice of law does not occur. I do not - an d cannot deny th at courts o ften cha racterize their analysis as choosing between competing laws. I claim that "choice of law" is a misnom er:
it is more accurate to say that when a court "chooses' ' one state's
law over another's, it has act ually rejected a claim of right based on
the nonselected law. 1Y3 It has refused to honor a right created by
th at law, and thereby determined th at rights based in the law it
"selects" prevail in a contlict between rights. 194 Courts find no need
to talk of choice in the ordinary case, and there is no need to do so
in multistate cases either.
Before moving on to the second example, I want to draw three
points from the consideration of purely domestic conflicts. First,
there are potential conflicts even where th e law is all from one
state. These conflicts are no t considered to raise a choice-of-law
issue because th ey are resolved by rules. And they go away fairly
quickly - they do not persist as troubling questions. A gain, this is
193. It is m ore accurate because. among other things , it makes clear that a court might
e nforc e rights created by more th an one state. rath e r than determin ing that one sta te's law
"applies" to the entire case . Because co nflicts th eory historically tri e d to determine which
la w gove rns, this possibi lit y appea rs anoma lous and receives th e app rop riately exotic name of
"depec;age." See, e.g. , ScoLES & HAY , supra note 7, a t 38. More significantly, thinkin g in
terms of co nflicts focu ses at ten tion on the conflicts rul e that de termines which right preva ils.
Interes t ana lysis reli es on the cho ice -of-law vocab ul ary precisely to deflect atte nti on from its
co nflicts rules.
194. For a desc ripti o n o f this si tu a tion we mi gh t turn aga in to Beale, who in th e confli ct
be twee n law and equity had to confront a situation in which - much as th e current situat ion
un de r interes t anal ys is - two co urts disagreed abo ut whi ch right prevaile d.
[I n co mm on law jurisdictio ns J the theory up on which courts proceed is the theory of
separate and independent systems of right. The court of Jaw regards the eq uitable ri ght
as subordinate to th e lega l right, whi le the court of equi ty takes the opposite view .... It
is clear, however, th at there ca nnot be two separate and di stinct laws prevailing in th e
same place at th e same time; a nd therefore in fact , whateve r may be the theory of the
courts, one of th e conflicting rights must be valid and th e o th er invalid.
1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 4.8, at 41. I do not quote thi s passage for the correctness of its
conclusion. In a conflict between ri ghts o f co-equal sove re igns such as sister states, I see no
reason why the re should be what philoso phe rs call a "fact of the matter'' a bout which right
" really" prevails. Th e Co nstit uti o n does not resolve confl icts o f its own force, a nd, abse nt
fede ra l legislation , th ere is no ot he r superior a uth o rit y to m ake th e decision. Th e point is
rath er that Beale co rrec tl y sees not a choi ce be twee n laws bu t a co nflict be twee n ri ghts re qu iring th e subo rdi nat ion of o ne to th e o th er.
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because they are resolved by rules. The extent to which statutes
can retroactively alter common law rights might once have been a
difficult question - it was litigated 195 - but the rules are now established, and they govern.
Second , the conflicts rules for purely domestic cases are we ll
established: statutes beat common law, and recent statutes beat
earlier ones. Courts fo llow these rules as legal principles. They do
not suggest that a choice must be made , whereby different results
wo uld be eq ually legitim ate .
Fin all y. this ana lysis suggests that resolving a conflict between
two laws does not amount to a de termination that one law governs
the transac tion to the exclusion of the other. If the state offl ce r
defens e applies. it may bar or limit recovery; this does not mea n,
however, that the tort cause of action is somehow excluded, that it
is part of a body of law that does not apply. This observation b ut tresses my claim that a conflicts case does not require a court to
identify the law that governs. The question is which right prevails.
Of course, where both contending rights originate from the same
sovereign, it is not clear what it would mean for one body of state
law to apply to the exclusion of the other. This point will be made
somewhat more strongly by th e next section.
B.

The Easy Conflict: State Law vs. Federal Law

Contlicts between state and federal law are easy: federal law
wins. 1 96 They are so easy that conflicts scholars tend to them give
little attention , 197 presumably because they pose no choice-of-law
question. 198 My argument, however, is that no case presents a
195. See, e.g., tvlunn v. Illin o is, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) (rej ecting th e idea of vested rights
in common law rul es): see also Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Prods .. 511 U.S. 244, 271 n.25 (1994)
(collecting cases discussing ret roacti ve a lte ra ti o n of prope rt y a nd contrac t rights) .
196. That fede ral la w defe ats contradictory state law follows directly fr om the Supre m acy
Clause of Article VI , which provides that th e Constitution and federal laws "shall be th e
supreme Law of the Land ... any TI1ing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to th e
Contrary notwithstanding. " U.S. Co NST. art. VI.
197. By " state-federal con flicts " I mea n pree mption of sta te law by federa l law. Ne ithe r
Brilmayer;s trea tise nor th e Scoles and H ay hornbook discusses preemption as a choice -oflaw issue - presumably for the reason th at there is no choice. They do disc uss state attempts
to withdraw jurisdiction fo r federal causes of action, which I see as a some what more refin ed
attempt to subo rdinate fede ral rights.
198. It mi ght of course be sugges ted th at th ere is no iss ue of choice becau se federal law is
literally loca l law e ve ryw he re . See, e.g., Claflin v. H o use ma n, 93 U.S. 130, 137 ( 1876). Bea le
took this tack:
There cannot be two indepe ndent laws within a territory, even though that te rrit ory be
subj ec t to th e legislative jurisdiction of two independent so vereigns. The law of the territory, resu ltin g from the legislative action o f both sovere igns, is a single law. TI1e law of a
single lega l unit mu st be one law , th e o ne and undivid e d law of that te rritory .
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·'choice of law," and for this reason I think that state-federal conflicts are importantly illuminating. Federal law wins, and the conflict cannot be denied - it cannot be hidden behind the choice-oflaw veil. Consequently, as with domestic conflicts. we gain the opportunity to see what is really going on.
There are two different types of federal-state cont1icts, depending on whether it is the plaintiff or the defendant who appeals to
federal law. \Yhere it is the defendant, analysis rather obviously
follows the conventional legal model that I set out above. 199 The
court must determine whether the laws invoked grant rights to the
parties invoking them, whether those rights cont1ict. and which
right prevails - all ordinary legal questions. CSX Transportation,
Inc. v. Eastenvood 2 ( 10 illustrates this model.
That case featured a wrongful death suit brought by the widow
of a man killed when a train collided with his truck at a Georgia
crossing. The widow alleged that the railroad was negligent under
Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the
crossing and for operating the train at an excessive speed. The
complaint stated a claim under Georgia law, or at least, no one suggested that it did not. The Court assumed that Georgia law had
standards governing the duties of railroads with respect to train
speeds and the safety of grade crossings, and that the plaintiff had
alleged a violation of those standards. 201 Rather than challenge the
sufficiency of the complaint under Georgia law, however, the defendant appealed to federal law, arguing that the Federal Railroad
Safety Act (FRSA) gave it a defense against state law tort claims. 202
The Court started with a scope analysis. Whether federal law
preempts state law is a question of congressional intent, to be determined by an examination of the statute's text, structure, and legislative history - the ordinary tools of statutory construction. 203 The
FRSA preemption clause stated that "laws ... relating to railroad
safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State
1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 2.4, at 17-18. This seems more like definition than argument, however, and of course there are obvious senses in which federal law is not local law. Most
patently, it cannot be changed by the will of the state legislature. Equally significant, successive prosecutions under state and federal law are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause
precisely because the laws emanate from different sovereigns. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121, 121-24 (1959). At any rate, I have already suggested that purely domestic cases
may present conflicts.
199. See supra section III.C.
200. 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
201. See CSX Transpor/alion, 507 U.S. at 666.
202. See CSX 'Ji-ansporlalion, 507 U.S. at 665.
203. See CSX Transporrarion, 507 U.S. at 664.
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may adopt or continue in force any law ... relating to railroad
safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, reg ulation , order, or standard covering the subject matter of such State
requirement." 204 Thus the existence of federal regulation provided
a defe nse to any state-law claim on the same subject. As it turned
out, the Court determined that federal regulation barred the negligence claim based on excessive speed, but not the claim relating to
the warning devices.2os
Th is resolution might seem inconsistent with the suggestion th at
federal law provides a defense against state-created rights, or at
least the defense might seem to be of an odd type. In the example I
turned to in section III.C.2, the defendan t appealed to t·~ew York
law not as a force that displaced the Oregon tort action but rather
as the so urce for the standard of care. The effect of that maneuver,
if success ful, would have been to allow him to argue that he had
met the applicable standard of care, not that no cause of action
could be maintained . The federal preemption in CSX Transportation, by contrast, did not change the question to whether the train
company had complied with the federal speed limit, but actually
prevented a state tort suit based on excessive speed regardless of
how fast the train was going. 206 Thus it might seem that federal law
actually governed the suit.
That would be a misinterpretation. It is one of the axioms of
federal jurisdiction that federal law is interstitial,2° 7 and the claim
that federal law "preempts" state law is not fundamentally different
from the appeal to a defense created by sister-state law. rThe complete preemption of the excessive speed claim was a consequence of
the statutory language; federal law frequently works only to alter
the standard of care and not to prevent the assertion of state tort
claims. 208 Some federal laws are even more permissive, preserving
all state laws that do not proscribe actions permitted, or require
204. See CSX Tran sporwtion, 507 U.S. at 662 n.2 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1970)).
205. See CSX Tramp onation, 507 U.S. at 673, 676.
206. This is not entirely true; it might have been possible for the plaintiff to bring a sta telaw claim based on failur e to comply with a (federal) stat utory speed limit. See CSX Transportation, 507 U.S. at 677 (Thomas, J. , co ncurring and dissenting). H er co mplaint conceded,
though, that the federal speed limit had not been exceeded. See CSX Transportation, 507
U.S. at 672.
207. See, e.g., RI CHARD H. FALLON, J R. ET AL., H ART AND WECHSLER's THE F EDERAL
CouRTS AND THE F EDERAL SYSTEi\·t 521-22 (1996).
208. For exam ple, th e National Highway Safety Act allows states to enforce laws whose
safety sta ndards are identical to th e corresponding federal standard . See 49 U.S.C.
§ 30103(b)(2) (1994). It a lso preserves all claims at comm on law. See Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, 514 U .S . 280 , 284 (1995).
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actions forbidden, by federal law. 20 <J This is also the result where
Congress has not specified the scope of preemp tion. Without an
explicit congressional statement, the rules of ·'implied conflicts preemption" direct that state law is nullified only to the extent that an
actual conflict exists. 210 Moreover , appe als to sister-state law do
sometimes prevent a particular cause of action from being maintained at all. If the cause of action the plaintiff invokes does not
exist under sister-state law, it may be wiped out j u ~'t as if it had been
preempted by federal reguiation. 211
This, then , is what happens when the defe ndant app eals to federal law: the court must decide whethe r Congress inte nd ed that the
d efense be available. If it did, the defense prevails over the statecreated right. Sometimes this is a relatively easy q uestion: a federal law explicitly authorizing certain conduct clearly bars the imposition of liability for that conduct under state law. 212 Similarly, a
federal law placing a cap on tort damages would create a right available to defendants in any state tort suit. The difficult questions are
ones of preemption, when the extent of preemption will not always
be obvious. Plaintiffs seeking to circumvent federal defenses can
thus argue that the preemption is narrow and permits the state law
cause of action. All of the action in state-federal conflicts takes
place at the level of scope, because the conflicts rule is clear.
When the party appealing to federal law is the plaintiff, avoidance seems more difficult. No defendant could suggest that a statelaw defense vitiates a federal cause of action; this would run directly
counter to the Supremacy Clause. Consequently, a defendant must
find some way to deny the conflict, to suggest that only state law
applies to the action. Phrasing the issue as choice of law is one way
to do so - I have suggested that this is currently done with interstate conflicts. But the characterization as a choice, rather than as a
conflict, will be effective only if a choice-of-law rule points away
from federal law. This requirement created some problems for defendants. Our canonical state-federal conflicts cases come from the
territorialist era, and the defendants seeking a territorial choice-of209. Title VII expressly preserves state laws that do not conflict.

See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(7) (1994); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 101 (1983).

210. See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 287. For this reason , I think that ''preemption" is a somewhat unfortunate term. What happens is simply that federal rights defeat state rights.
211. In such a case , the law's denial of the cause of action should be seen as granting
parties a right to engage in the conduct at issue.
212. See Hamm v. City of Rock HilL 379 U.S. 306, 309-11 (1964) (describing availability
of federal defenses to prosecutions for attempts to obtain service in places of public
accommodation).
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law rule selecting state law will have great difficulties: federal sovereignty extends through every state , and acts anywhere in the
Un ited States thus create rights under applicable fe deral laws. Fortunately for such a defendant, the territorial choice-o f-law sys tem
was replete with escape de vices that all owed judges to mitigate the
rigidity created by the last act doctrine . A defendant trying to use
cho ice-of-l aw analysis to privilege slate rights over feder al rights
could th us e xp loit the fle xibility of the :1ystcrn to argue for the application of sta te law.
Appeal to these escape devices by defendants is exactly what we
see in state-federal conflicts. In lWon do u v. Nevv York, Nnv Haven
& Hartford R.R. Co., 2 13 the defendan t vmn in state court with the
claim that the fe deral statute was contrary to the public policy of
the state of Connecticut and could not be en forced in its courts. 214
This is, of course, a conventional choicc-of-lav,r maneuver. States
have traditionally declined to permit ca uses of action based on sister-state law on the grounds that the causes of action offe nd their
public policy. 215
If the choice-of-law perspective were valid -if describing cases
as involving a choice somehow meant there was no confiict216 this approach would have been satisfactory. But the Supreme
Court was not fooled; it rejected th e suggestion that contrary public
policy could lead to the application of Connecticut law.2 17 Wit h the
public policy escape hatch closed , defen dants tu rned to oth e rs and the Supreme Court shut them as quickly as they opened. 21 8
Employing a choice-of-law method ology will not allow states effectively to decide that their rights prevail in conflicts with federal
213. 223 u.s. 1 (1912).
214 . See iv!ondou, 223 U.S. at 55-56.
2 15. See, e.g., M ertz v. Mertz, 3 N. E .2d 597 (N.Y. 1936) (rejecting interspousa l tort
cla im). Oddl y, the in voca ti o n of th e public policy exce ption does not seem to correla te with
the repu gnance of th e for e ign law - th e New York Court of Appeals used it to reje ct th e
Co nnecticut law of interspousal tort liability but acce pted Hitler's Nuremberg laws. See
Lar ry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Confiiu of Laws, and rh e Un conslillllional Public Policy
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1975 (1997); see also Monrad G. Paulsen & Mich ael I. Sovern,
·' Public Policy ·· in rhe Confiicl of Lmvs, 56 CoLuM. L. RE v . 969, 980-81 (1956).
216. See, e.g., CuRRIE , supra no te 22, at 181 -82: Sco LES & HAY, supra note 7. a t 2.
217. See iV!ondou, 223 U.S . at 57-58.
218. See, e.g., Tes ta v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (rejectin g th e argum e nt th at th e fe der al
statute was ·' pe nal" ). Ea rl y cases such as Mon dou an d Tesw do. inte restingly. stay within th e
choice-of-law paradigm. M ondou holds not th at pu blic po licy must yie ld to the Supre ma cy
Cla use but rat her th a t because fede ral policy is local policy eve rywhere . there is no co ntr ary
loca l policy . See Mondou, 223 U.S. at 57. Tesra simil arly relies on the a rgume nt th at, while
the fed era l statute might be penal , it is a local penal statute . See Testa. 330 U.S. at 392-94.
Jlvlo re rece ntl y. th e Co urt has also co nsid ered such cases from the co nflicts pe rspective , noting
th at stat e law must yi e ld to federal rights. See Howle tt v. Rose . 496 U.S. 356, 375-81 (1990).
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rights. This comports with what I have been arguing: "choice of
law" is a flight from conflicts that redescribes, but does not substantively alter, the underlying issue. This is the main lesson I want to
draw from the consideration of domestic and state-federal conflicts.
Additionally, these cases show that deciding a particular law
prevails in a conflict does not mean that law governs the action.
Consider a federal law that imposes a cap on tort recoveries, providing every defendant with a resource against state-created rights.
The result, in a case where the plaintiff wins, will be that the federal
defense imposes a limit on the permissible recovery : the state law
right is restricted by the federal defense. Tnis does not mean the
transaction is governed by federal law, however: federal law gives
no right to recovery, and if the entire case were really governed by
federal law, the plaintiff would get nothing. It is not clear why a
similar approach would not make sense in multistate cases- why it
should not be the case that nonconflicting rights from both states
are recognized. 219 Saying that the court's task is to "choose" the
law that "applies" obscures this possibility; choice-of-law theory exoticizes the ordinary by calling it "depec;age. "22o
C.

Back to Choice? State Law vs. State Law

The preceding section has argued that there is nothing analytically special about multistate cases. Purely domestic cases, or statefederal conflicts, may raise the same issues. These latter two types
of cases, however, are not generally considered to raise choice-oflaw issues. This is so, I suggest, because the results are clear, and
choice-of-law rhetoric will not change them. Attempts to use
choice-of-law methodology to reach prohibited conflicts results the defeat of federal rights by state rights- have been consistently
rejected. Choice-of-law rhetoric may have a use , though, if the conflicts results appear unacceptable but the appropriate solution is not
clear: it may mask the illegitimacy. That, I believe, explains its continuing allure in multistate cases. The correct way of implementing
constitutional restrictions on state conflicts rules has not yet been
discerned, and the rhetoric of choice makes the constitutional
219. In fact, Currie sugges ted that while a state would apply its "rules of decision" to a n
accide nt between two clomiciliaries, it would determine negli gence by looking to the "rules of
cond uct " (such as speed limits) of the place of the accident. See CuRR IE, supra note 177, at

68-69.
220. The Second Resuuement, to its credit, explicitly contemplates depe'<age; it advocates
choice of law calculus for each issue in a case. See R ESTATE!I.I ENT (SECOND) oF CoNFLICT
OF LAws§ 145, cmt. d (1971).
a
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problems with th e Supreme Court's current laissez-faire approach
less obvious.
Describing the Court's failed attempts and uncovering the appropriate methodology is the task of th e subsequent Parts of this
article. 111e point here is simply that if conflicts results are ill egitimate, re sort to a choice-of-law description will not save them. That
is th e lesson of sta te-federal conflicts. G iven that prem ise, interest
analysis ca n be rejected if the co nflicts perspective reveals that it
reaches unacceptable results. This section will attempt to show precisely th at. But first I want to make a more ambitious claim: in terest analysis is incoherent on its own terms. It simply is not a
method of determining what law applies to a case. The confl.icts
perspecti ve is not just more useful; it is the only intelligible choice.
Imagine a married couple with different domiciles . H usb and's
domicile (say, Connecticut) has interspousal tort immunity; Wife 's
domicile (say, New York) does not. Driving in separate cars, they
collide; both are injured , and both are arguably at fault. Husb and
sues \Vife in Connecticut, and she files a counterclaim. According
to interest analysis, what law applies to this case?
The result is relatively easy to discern. Connecticut has an interest in affording Husband the protection of interspo usal immunity,
so it will. Connecticut law applies to Wife's counterclaim, and she
canno t recover. But Connecticut has no interest in affording Wife
the benefit of that immunity, and it does have an interes t in compensating Husb and. Husband will recover from Wife, under the
law of New York.22 1
Thus interest analysis directs application of one state's law to
Husb and 's claim and another state's law to Wife's counterclaim. (It
parcels out these results so as to favor its domiciliary, but let us
ignore th at for the momen t.) Yet not only are both these claims
part of the same case, they both arise from the same collision. It is
untrue th at one state's law applies to this case, or even to this accident; consequently, it is untrue that interes t analysis allows courts
to choose which law to apply. 222
22 1. TI1i s exa mpl e is analytica lly similar to the married wome n's co ntracts case di sc ussed
by Currie; I have tink e red with it a bit in o rd er to gen erate a counterclaim a rising fr om the
sa me transac tion. For Currie 's similar conclusions, see CuRRIE, supra note 102, at 90-91
(fmding th a t a co urt in a state with married women 's disability should appl y local law to a
cla im by forei gn creditor against do mestic married wom an but sho uld apply foreign law to a
cla im by dom es tic cred ito r against foreign m arried wo ma n).
222. The exa mpl e works with rega rd to inte rest analysis, but it sho uld be clear th a t simila r exampl es ca n be generated for a ny conflicts th eory that is no t jurisdiction-selecting.
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It is true, of course, that interest analysis chooses the law that
applies to a particular claim, but at this point the choice-of-law rhetoric is idling. Tnere is really no difference between "choosing" law
claim··by-claim, <md accepting or rejecting the rights undergirding
each particular claim. Under even modest analytical pressure, the
choice-of-law ce rsoective seems to collapse into the conflicts
perspective .
A modern intersst an alyst such as Kramer might h ave an answer
here. O nly one: ' N applies, he might say, and it is forum law; the
law just do es nDt give the same rights to V.!ife as it does to Husband.223 Tnat :.1cco unt rescues the claim that interest analysis
selects a law to ap ply, but at some cost. Interest analysis not only
directs that for:.Jm la\v prevail against foreign lavv, it alters forum
law to disfavor foreigners . That raises the q uestion of discrimination, which is
main focus of this section. 224 I have said that if
the conflicts res ults of interest analysis are unacceptable, the rhetoric of choice will not save them. It is time to consider those results.
Interest analysis is biased in two distinct ways: against foreign
domiciliaries, and against foreign law. I will use two hypotheticals
to highlight these different forms of discrimination. For the first, I
can do no better than an examp le contrived by Douglas Laycock. 225
Laycock asks us to imagine two acquaintances, Mary from Maryland and Del fr om Delaware. They drive together, taking turns behind the wheel, and each is injured in an accident with the other
driving . (I will suppose, though Laycock is not explicit on this
point, that the accidents take place in the same state.) Mary sues
D el in Delaware, and Del files a counterclaim. D elaware has a statute preventing guests from suing hosts for injuries in auto accidents,
and Maryland does not.
According to interest analysis, Mary's claim will be barred but
Del's will not. Delaware has an interest in applying its guest statute
to protect its domiciliary Del, so it wil l. But it has no interest in
protecting Mary, and it does have an interest in compensating Del,
so the guest statute will not prevent Del's suit.
What does this mean from the conflicts perspective? Delaware' s guest st atute grants drivers of automobiles rights against
their guests: it grants them the right not to be held liable for their
guests' injuries. This right is not given to everyone driving in D ela'

i

223. Cf Kramer. Myth , supra note 81 , at 1054-55.
224. In fact, K ramer finds that selectively granting rights to forum domiciliaries but not
others will sometimes violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See id. at 1065-74.
225. See Laycock. supra note 73, at 276.
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ware , however
according to the interest ana.lvsfs scoue--hased
approach, the right is not extend ed to out-of-st ate~·s at all. D ~l can
assert it , but Mary cannot. Local lr:nv gives rights to locals but no t
to out-of-staters, simply because they arc from out of state. This is
discrimination against foreign domici liaries.
vVhat of the discrimination against for eign law? Suppose that
A!. from A labam a, is driving near his house when he collides with
Georgia resid ent George. A l sues George in A labama . Suppose
further that Geo rgia has a dc._magcs cao limitinuU recovery to
$50.000, while A labama has a more generous $75,000 cap. Under
interest analysis, the court will app ly A labama law and reject th e
Georgia damages cap. Novv suppu:sr:: tr: at Lou. from Louisiana, has
a similar run-in with Al, this time in Lou isiana, vvhich has no damages cap. Lou sues Al in A laba ma . Under interest analysis, the
court will again apply A labama law, giving A l the benefit of the
damages cap .
vVhat has happened here'? Conflicts analysis works, in theory,
by examining the contacts that an action h as with different jurisdictions. Standard factors for car accident cases, according to Currie,
are the location of the accident, the domici le of the parties, and the
location of the forum. 226 Leave aside for the moment the location
of the forum. A! v. George, from the perspective of the Alabama
court, has the following arrangement of contacts: local plaintiff,
foreign defendant, local accident. The result is that local rights pre vail. Lou v. Al has the opposite 21rrangement of cont acts: foreign
plaintiff, local defendant , foreign accident. The two suits are what I
will call "mirror-image" cases. If there is any reason, based on
these three contacts, why local rights as to the available damages
should prevail in the A! v. George suit, it can be mustered in favor
of the corresponding foreign rights in L ou v. A l. If the conflicts
rule is neutral between local and foreign rights, each should prevail
in one case. 227 But of course under interest analysis, foreign rights
prevail in neither. The location of the forum is dispositive; the forum applies local law because it is local law. Foreign rights are disi

~

~

L

226 . See CuRRI E, supra note 76, at 141.
227 . A common law judge eva luating precedents with no knowled ge of intere st analysis
mi ght well think that a decision in favor of local rights in AI v. George compelled a decision
fav orin g for eign ri gh ts in Lou v. AI. If there is such a thing as the nature of law, it might be
e ncapsu lated in Cardozo's adage: " It will not do to decide th e same question one way between one set of litigants and the o pposite way between another. ... If a case was decided
aga inst me yesterday when I was de fendant , I shall look for th e same judgme nt today if I am
plaintiff. " BE NJAMI N N. CARDOZO, TH E N ATURE OF THE JuDICIAL PRocEss 33-34 (1 921).
From the classic common law perspect ive. int e rest analys is ha rdly app ears a legal theory a t

alL
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favored in true conflicts not because of some arra nge m ent of
contacts that can be applied in mirror-image cases, but simply because they arc foreign. Without the principle of rejecting foreign
rights because of their origin, interest analysis is t1atly incoherent;
the rul es it pre scribes are self-contradictory.
C urrie su gge sted that in true conflicts, " [aJ court nee d never
hold the interest of the foreign state inferior; it can sirn ply appl y its
own law as su ch. '' 2 28 This m ay be true from the ch oice -of-law perspective : the co urt has not attempt ed to we igh int erests , and so , a
for tiori, it has not fo und the foreign interest infer ior. B ut what th e
mirror-image
A l v. Geo r0°e and Lou v. AI ca se~s sho w.. fro m the cono
t1icts pe rspective, is that the co urt has indee d held fore ign interests
inferi or - not in the sense th at it has foun d the forei gn state to be
less interested, but in the sense that it has taken foreign interests
less seriously than Alabama interests. If Alabama ca n mak e an argum ent that Al abama rights should prevail in Al v. George for any
reason other than that they are local rights, Louisiana can m ake the
same argument for Louisiana rights in Lou v. AI. If Alabama is
deaf to those arguments in Lou v. Al, when it found them convincing in Al v. George, it has not given rights created by Louisiana law
the same respect it gives Alabama rights.
Are these forms of discrimination constitutional? State-federal
conflicts are so easy because the federal government is superior to
the states. Interest analysis derives its plausibility from the claim
that the coequal status of the states makes things different. No
state can forc e another to apply its law; hence an interested state
may always apply its own law to a case in its courts. This makes
some sense from the choice-of-law perspective, using a personaljurisdiction-style approach. But the conflicts perspective shows that
assertions of legislative jurisdiction involve the rejection of foreign
rights, and that interest analysis makes these assertions in a discriminatory fashion.
The basic problem with interest analysis is that it does not direct
states to treat each other as equals. It prescribes, quite candidly,
that foreign law should be rejected in conflicts simply because it is
foreign, that scope analysis should withhold rights from out-ofstaters simply because they are not locals. The coequal status of
states is not an explanation of this approach - it is an indictment.
If the principle of state equality has any force at all, it prohibits
228.

Cu RRI E ,

s upra note 22 , at 181-82.
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interest analysis. 22 9 The next Part argue s th at even th e weakest
reading of the relevant constitutional pro visions lea ds to thi s conclusion, laying the groundwork for Part VI, which shows the constitution al consequences for conflicts more generally.
V.

C o NFLICTS AND THE Co NSTIT U TI ON

Two constitutional provisions will have relevance to this di scussio n: the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Privileges an d Immunities Clause .230 I will offer here what I thi nk is a very modes t
readi ng o f these Clauses, and then show th at eve n th e weak reading
has quite dramatic consequences for coni1icts theory . Before the
textu al exegesis, however, a bit of historical analys is is in ord e r.
The Supreme Court has done almost nothing with the Privileges
and Immunities Clause in the conflicts arena ,2 3 1 so there is no history in need of recapitulation. There is a long series of F ull Faith
and Credit decisions, and these are worth revisiting.
A.

Introduction

If the current conceptual approach to conflicts has any virtue, it
is that it spares the courts from confronting a difficult constitutional
issue: the extent to which the Constitution requires federal interference with state prioritization of interests. Deciding what sorts of
contacts with a state are important enough to justify a claim of legislative jurisdiction is quintessentially a matter of local concern; this
is a matter of deciding how important are the various state policies
implicated by different contacts. But these assertions come at the
expense of sister-state legislative jurisdiction, and that is quintessentially a matter of federal concern. If the "choice-of-law" question is conceived of in terms of interstate recognition of rights and I hope to have shown the correctness of that conception - it
becomes immediately apparent that the Constitution has obvious
relevance. TI1e problem is how to accommodate both local and federal aspects of the issue. 232 This is hard, and I think the Supreme
Court's abandonment of the conflicts field follows from a recogni229. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 73; Laycock , supra note 73.
230. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, §§ 1-2. Additionally, I will make some fleetin g references to
Due Process. The Commerce Cla use is also importa nt , but not for prese nt purposes .
231. See th e sparse disc ussion in Sc o LES & HAY, supra note 7, at 104-07.
232. See Robert H. Jackson , Full Faith and Crecli1: Th e La wyer's Clause of th e
Constiwtion, 45 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 28 (1945) (" How to de te rmin e wh e n [fede ral co nside rati ons] require the la w of th e forum to give way to th e law of an other state seems to me an
un se ttled question .. .. The ultim ate answe r, it seems to me, will have to be ba sed on conside ra tions of sta te rel ations to each other and to the federal syste m.").
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tion of the difficulty and a choice to err on the side of feder alism
rathc:r than nationalisrr1.
l\!Iany scholars have suggested that the Constitution has a good
deal to say about conflicts of law. 23 3 This is hardly surprising. The
great aim of the Constitution is to knit the discrete sovereignties of
the states into a fede ral union, and this purpose obviously req uires
rul es governing the treatm ent of the laws, and the citizens, of sister
states . H the states related to each other as foreign sovereigns ,
these would be po litical questions , to be answered perha ps by treaties. pe rhap:-; by princip les of comity. B ut states do not relate to
each other in that way.234 T.<1ey can not make treati es among themsel ves.23-" Q1..1.estions that were political have been made legal ~
which is to say, constitutionaL As Laycock puts it, "How Texas
court · treat the law of a sister state is a matter of law, not com ity,
and the choice is no longer voluntary. For this purpose Texas is not
a sovere ign state; it surrendered this portion of its sovereignty when
it joined the Union .'' 2 36
·w hat is surprising, then, is not the suggestion that the
Constitution should supervise state conflicts rules but rather the extent to which the Supreme Court has ignored the suggestion.
Closer an alysis reveals an explanation, though: changed understandings of conflicts have created serious federalism challenges to
constitutional supervision, and the current Court is receptive to fed eralism concerns.23 7 The Co urt did try to develop a doctrine of constitutional conflicts law, at least under the F ull Faith and Credit
Clause; its early conflicts cases suggested that the vested rights theory had constitutional for ce. 23 8 This made sense, from Beale's perspective ~ laws, being territorial, did not conflict. The only
~

~

233. Most notably Douglas Laycock , see Laycock, supra note 73 , on whose historical argume nts this secti o n relics quite heavily. See also Ely, supra note 73; Jackso n . supra no te 232:
Katzen bach. supra no te 11; Ja mes R. P ie lcmeic r. Why We Should Worry A bow Full Failh and
Credit 10 Laws, 60 S. CAL L. REv. 1299 (1987).
234 . See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (statin g that the
Full Faith and Cred it Clause "altered th e status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligatio ns created und er th e laws or es tablished
by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each a n integral part of a single nation ").
235. See U.S. CoN ST . art. I , § 10.
236. Laycock, supra note 73, at 259; see also Jackson, supra note 232, at 30.
237. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S . 898, 918-22 (1997); Sun O il Co. v.
Wortm a n 486 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988) ("If we aband on the currently app lied, traditio nal notions of [legitimate state legislative jurisd iction J we wou ld embark upon the ente rprise of
consti tutio nali zi ng choice-of-l aw rules, with no compass to guide us beyond our own pe rcepti ons of what seems desira ble. ").
238. See, e.g., A ll geyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 , 587-90 (1897); C hicago & Alton R.R. v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1877); Green v. Van Buskirk , 72 U .S. (5 Wall.) 307 , 31314 (1866); see also Pielemeier, supra note 233, at 1303-04 .
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qu estio n v;as 1vhether Fur:::ign rig hts would be recogn ized, and F ull
Faith an d Credit prescribed tha t th ey wo uld. The erosion o f the
territorial conception re'iea1ed the possibility o f conflict between
laws, howe ver, and th e Co urt accordingly began to discuss co nflicts
in terms of evaluating th e compe ting interests of the states.n 9 Application of Fu ll Faith ancl Credit became more difficul t, but the
Court still suoo osed that the Cla use resolved confl icts m favo r o f
the state with suoe rior interests. 240
B ut to tell a state tha t its inte rests are inferior is a se rious infri nbo-ement on its oower to dete rmine th e relative imoortance of
particular po licies. Surely it is for each state to de cide which in terest ~; are mo re im por tan t w it. The federal judiciary would understand ab ly hesitate before entering so deeply into the intc rn ul
workings of state government , and th e Full Faith and Cred it Clause
gives no guidance as to what makes an interest superior. 24 1 Cons equently, th e Court quite swift ly abandoned the idea that F ull Faith
and Credit determined unique solutions and fell back to a safe di stance from which to oversee state conflicts rules: a baseline test for
legitimate application of forum law.
1

·'

l

l

l

[T]he full faith and credit clause does not r equire one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to pe rsons and events within it , the
conflicting statute of anot her state, even though that statute is of controll ing force in the courts of t he state of its en actment with respect to
the same persons and events.24 2

That at least hewed to a territorial line, invo king the state's interest in regulating " perso ns and events within it." But territorialism was on the wane, and th e Co urt soon retreated farther , ruling
239. See, e.g. , Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accide nt Commn., 294 U .S. 532, 547-58
(1935).
240. See A laska Packers, 294 U.S . at 547-58. I think th at at this point the Co urt was not
far wron g. -n1e Alaska Packers Court seeme d to suppose that the Full Faith and Cred it
Clause co nt ained th e " rati o nal"' rul es de termining which sta te 's interest was superi o r. TI1at
was a mistak e: the se ttin g of priorities is indeed a matter for the states. But this does not
mea n that th e Clause has no thin g to say. It requires that a state base its assertion of legislati ve jurisdicti o n on a claim that its interes ts are sup erior: this is th e only way to afford for eign
law the appropriat e respect while still determining that local rights prevail. It further requires that the inte res ts not be supe rio r merely because another sta te 's interes ts are we ighed
less he avily. See infra section VI.B.l.
241. Justice Jackso n noted, "Nowhere has th e Co urt atte mpted, although faith an d cred it
opinions have been written by some of its bold est-thinking and clea rest-speaking Justices. to
define standards by wh ich 's up erio r sta te inte rests• in th e subj ect matter of co nfli cting statut es are to be we igh ed.'. Jackson, supra note 232, a t 16. The reluctance to impose par ticular
substantive standard s, I will sugges t, was entirely cor re ct. Full Faith and Credit does not se t
out standards by which a co urt may determin e which state's interest is grea te r; it simpl y
demands tha t states res pect each ot her 's laws. What I try to show here is how th e principle of
res pect for sister-state law translates into res trictions on sta te conflicts rules.
242. Pacific E mployers Ins . Co . v. Industria l Accident Commn. , 306 U.S. 493, 502 (193 9) .
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that F ull Faith and Cred it did not require displacement of the forum state 's iaw if th e state had a "substantial connection " to the
action. 243 The retreat has by now become a rout. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 2 '-l 4 the Co urt announced that the only restriction
the Constitution placed on state conflicts rules was the requiremen t
that the choice of law be " neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. " 245 Hague was a Wisconsin domiciliary who died when th e
motorcycle on which he was a passenger was struck by a car. 111e
accident occurred in 'vViscons in , and the drivers of both vehicles
were V/isconsin domiciliaries . Ne ither driver carried valid insuran ce , but Hague held an insurance policy, issued in V/isconsin, th at
offe red up to $15 ,000 for loss incurred in accid ents with uninsured
motorists. He owned three cars, and the policy covered each. Wisconsin law would have limited his recovery to $15,000; Minnesota
law, however, allowed the coverage on each car to be "stacked,"
raising the limit to $45 ,000. Hague 's widow moved to Minnesota
after the accident (for what the Court called "bona fide" reasons246 )
and brought suit there seeking the more favo rable terms of l\1innesota law, which the Minnesota courts gave her. The Supreme Court
stated that "if a State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or transaction, app lication of its law is unconstitutional."247 It nonetheless affirmed, finding that the widow's
new domicile, and the fact that the decedent had worked in Minn esota (and commuted to work there), created an interest sufficient to
justify application of Minnesota law. 24s
The "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" language of
A llstate is the language of due process, and as a construction of the
D ue Process Clause, it makes perfect sense. But the Due Process
Clause is about the rights of individuals, and conflicts cases raise
other issues. Parties may resist application of a particular law on
the grounds that it is unfair, but more often their argument is that
they may not be subjected to the liabilities of one law because another law operates to shield them. This is no longer simply a question of individual rights or due process, but one of the respect due
243. See Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. los. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947).
244. 449 u.s. 302 (1 981) .
245. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 320.
246. See Allstale, 449 U. S. at 319 o.28.
247. Allstate, 449 U .S. at 310-11.
248. Allstale requires th at a state ha ve " a significant con tact or significant aggregation of
contac ts." A lls ta£e, 449 U.S. at 313. 1l1is does mean so me thin g; th e Court has rul ed that a
state ma y not apply its law to suits to which it has no connect ion. See Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 -22 (1 985).
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to sister-state law; that is, it is a question of Full Faith and Credit.
Ye t ALlsrate holds th at the answer is always the same. 2 4 Y
It is disappointing - though , I have suggested, not incomprehensible - that the Court has merged the limitations imposed by
Due Process and those of Full Faith and Credit, because the two
Clauses could not be more different. Apart from the fa ct that Due
Process governs relations between states and individuals. while Full
Fa ith and Credit governs interstate relations , there is an imp ortant
conceptual difference. Due process analysis sets a minimum threshold ; beyond that threshold , there are no restriction s. Con se qu ently ,
a clue process analysis often leads to the conclusion th at a number
of different states' laws may apply. (ll1is is , of course , th e personaljurisdiction-style analysis whose presence in the co nflicts realm I
have been deploring.) Full Faith and Credit, by contrast, demands
that each state accord the greatest degree of respect - fidl faith
and credit - to the laws of sister states. This may be a baseline
requirement in some sense, but the baseline is set as high as it possibly could be.2 50 To suppose that such a forceful command results in
the same threshold test as Due Process - in particular, the toothless Allstate test - is to suppose that the Constitution cares very
little about the resolution of conflicts between laws.
That supposition is of course false. Discrimination in choice of
law can easily become discrimination against for eigners - this is
precisely what Currie's interest analysis shows - and discrimination against sister-state citizens is one of the most obvious threats to
the Union. The Framers were quite clearly aware of this. For evidence we need look no further than the Federalist Papers, where
Alexander Hamilton invoked the " horrid picture of the dissensions
and private wars" that wracked Germany before the creation of an
impartial court to decide questions between members of different

249. See Allsrme, 449 U.S. at 308 n.lO. This portio n of the opinion was onl y a p lurality,
see 449 U.S. a t 320-22 (Stevens, J. , concurring) (distinguishing betwee n th e cla uses). but the
Court has shown no subsequ e nt inclin a tion to distingui sh b etwee n Full Faith a nd Credit and
Due Process a nalyses.
250. See Laycock, supra note 73, at 296. Laycock is esse ntially correct to s ugges t th a t
since " full faith and credit" is what state courts giv e their own laws, the C lause de mands
equality of trea tment. See 3 JOSEPH STORY , COMMENTA RIES ON TH E CONST ITUTION OF THE
UNiTE D STATES § 1304 (1833) (s tating that th e Frame rs' int e nt was to give for e ign laws "full
faith a nd cred it ... so that they cannot be de nied, any more than in the sta te, wh e re they
origin a ted " ).
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sove reignties.25 1 Indeed the Constitution is replete with provisions
inte nded to restrain geographical fav oritism.2 52
A lthough the m ost textually obvious candidate is the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, which Hamilto n "esteemed the basis of the
Un ion," 253 Full Faith and Credit is no insignifica nt pa rt of this design. Tne Framers most lik ely suppose d that the Fu ll Faith and
C redit Clause prescribed unique an swers to choice-of-law q uestions. regardless of th e for um in which suit was broug ht, a nd thus it
was not the source of a personal-jurisdiction-style analysis. which
produces several acceptab le , nonuni que answers. They thought this
not because they had a stronger reading of Full Faith and Credit
than we do now, bu t because they drafted it against th e backdrop of
a particular understanding of conf1i cts of Jaw. 25 -l
·while the precise contours of this understanding are prob ably
impossible to recover, and different Frame rs quite likely had differen t understandings,2 55 they seem to ha ve shared some variant of the
classic territorially oriented theory. 256 Story's authoritative trea tise,
fi rst published in 1834, comments in its "Introd uctory Remarks "
that " [i]t is plain that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic
fo rce , propria vigore, except within the territorial limits and juris251. See
JWi l ).

T HE

FED ERALI ST No. 80, at 477 (Alexander H am il ton) (Cli nton Ross iter eel. ,

252. The Full Faith a nd C red it a nd Privileges a nd Im m uniti es C la uses a rc th e obv ious
examples. Fede ra l div ersity jurisdiction is also ta rge ted at inte rstate d iscrimination. See, e.g.,
id: Bax ter. supra note 92; Henry J. Friend ly, Th e Hisroric Basis of Diversify l urisdiCiion, 41
H ARV . L REv . 483 (1928): Laycock , supra note 73 . at 278-83 ; Pie lemeie r. supra note 233. at
13.16-22.
253. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 251, at 478; see also Pa ul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
168, 180 (1868) (" [N] o provision in th e Constitution has tended so st rongly to constitute th e
citizens of the United States o ne people as this. "). Wh y the Supre me Court's fairly robust
Privileges and Immuniti es Clause jurisprudence, see, e.g., Supreme Court of New H ampsh ire
v. Piper, 470 U .S. 274 (1985); Austin v. New Hampsh ire, 420 US. 656 (1975), has exe rted so
litt le influence on its contlicts jurisprudence is a mystery. ln Allstare, for exa m p le , a Privileges a nd Immunities arg ume nt co uld have been made th at Minneso ta co urts wo uld sure ly
not have decided th e case th e sa me way if the widow had been a Wisco nsin d o miciliary , and
he nce th e co urts were awa rdi ng to locals benefits withhe ld from fo re igners. See E ly, supra
note 73, a t 185-89 (notin g tension between Allstate and Aus1in). It m ay be that th e rhetoric of
choice obscures things here too, by avoid ing talk of the rights on whi ch Privileges and Im munit ies case law focuses.
254 . See Laycock, supra note 73, at n.276.
255 . See Jackson, supra note 232, at 6.
256. See Laycock, supra note 73, at 289-90. Future Chief Justice John Marshall apparently gave a quite clear statemen t of th e ves ted rights con tract theory in the Virginia ratifyin g
convention. See id. a t 306-07. In 1797, the Supreme Court had quo ted Ulrich Huber's (the
Co urt referrin g to him as Huberus) territorialist m ax ims. See Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S . (3
DalL) 369,370 n. '' (1797). It was applying a te rritorial th eo ry to decide torts cases as ea rly as
1842, with no sugges tion th at it was creatin g a new app roach o r rejec tin g an earlie r unde rstanding. See Smith v. Cond ry, 42 U.S . (1 Ho w.) 28, 33 ( 1842).
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diction of that country. " 257 He repeats the principl e as ·' [t]he first
and most general maxim" of international jurisprudence.2 ss Nor
was Story innovating in this regard; he derived his general theory in
large part from the Frisian jurist Ulrich Huber , who published in
the late seventeenth century. 259 Story claimed that Hub e r's te rritorial principles had " been sanctioned both in E ngland and America
by a judicial approbation, as direct and universa l as can fairly be
desired for the purpose of giving sanction to it as auth ority, or as
reasoning. " 260
Under a te rritorial approach, as explained ab ove , th ere is no
question of laws conflicti ng. Only the territo ria ll y ap p ropri a te law
cre ates a right. The question, from the Framers' pe rspective, would
sim ply have been whether rights created by the icl\V of one state
would be recognized by the courts of another. To an swer that ques tion, one could h ardly draft a more emphatic pro vision th an the
F ull Faith and Cred it C lause. Rights acquired in one state must be
respected everywhere, regardless of whether other states disagree
with the substantive law creating those rights. 26 1
That, then , is the most plausible original understanding: conflicts cases h ave unique resolutions because the only question is
whether sister-state rights shall be recognized or rejected , and the
Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the former. Indeed, the
Supreme Court 's early ventures into conflicts jurisprudence consisted exactly of the constitutionalization of the vested rights theory.262 Things have changed since the Framers ' days, however, and
the changes have weakened some of their devices for national
unity. Under the Framers' understanding, parties in federal court
by reason of diversity jurisdiction would have been guaranteed an
unelected, life-tenured federal judge, presumably less prone to parochialism than an elected state judge. This guarantee has survived.
Those parties would also have been guaranteed the general federal
common law, however, applied by a decisionmaker not bound by
the decisions of state courts, a decisionmaker who would " never
257. STORY, supra note 30, ~ 7, at 8.
25 8. ld. ~ 18, at 2 l.
259. See ScoLES & H AY, supra note 7, § 2.2, at 9, § 2.4 , at l 2.
260. STORY , supra no te 30, ~ 38, a t 36. For a listing of largely te rritori a list sta te co urt
cases roughl y co nte mporaneous with the drafting of th e Constitution , sec Laycock , supra
note 73. at 307 n.340.
261. See Fa untl e roy v. Lum , 210 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1 908) (Holmes, J.). 1l1e rights th at
ves ted und er the te rritoria ll y appropri a te law were no t too di ssim il ar fr o m th e ri ghts created
by judgments. Se e 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 8A.l0. The significa nt point he re is that th e re
we re no opposing ri ghts.
262. See supra note 238 .

•
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immolate truth, justice , and the law because a State tribunal has
erected the a ltar and decreed the sacrifice." 263 With th e general
federal common law died one of the antidiscrimination tools of diversity jurisdiction. 264
Time has similarly e nervated Full Faith and Credit. The Cl a use
was not drafted in an era th a t saw the possibility of interstate co ntlicts of rights. If the qu es tion is only whe ther rights acquire d und e r
the law of o ne state shall be respected , when no oth er rights oppose
them, the Claus e provides a clear affirmative answer; but once
there is th e possibility of conflictin g rights , or doubt about whi ch
law is the law producing th e rights , things get hard er. \Vhat cou [ci
F ull Faith and Credit m ea n in this context? Th e Supreme Co urt has
suggested that a lite ral reading would mean that in conflicts cases,
forum law must always yield- that "the statute of each state must
be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own "'=' 65
- an obviously absurd result. Consequently, where cases feature
competing rights , the Court has said essentially that forum law may
always prevaiJ.266
Douglas Laycock characterizes this approach as embodying the
belief that "the phrase cannot be taken literally, and therefore it
need not be taken se riously at all. " 267 This is fairly accurate on Laycock's part, and total nonse nse on the Court's. Full Faith and
Credit must be taken seriously, and it can be taken literally. We no
longer have the backdrop of territorial rules of scope, but Full Faith
and Credit can do a lot of work without that jurisprudential background. D e monstrating the power of even a weak reading of the
Clause requires that I give that reading , and it is time now to begin
the textual exegesis.
263. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206-07 (1 863 ).
264. See Pie le meier , supra no te 233 , a t 1316-19. On diversity as antidiscrimination , see
gene rall y Friendly, supra note 252 . Litiga nts might also have gotte n federal conflicts rul es, a
hope slain by Klaxon v. Stentor E lectric Manufa cturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (194 1) . I do not
believe that fed e ral conflicts rul es are necessary, provided that we pay a ttention to constituti onal restrictions on state conflicts rul es. It is tro ublin g that unde r Klaxon the federal co urts
act as ve ntriloquists' dummies, re producing the very parochi alism and bias th eir diversity
jurisdictio n exists to co unte r. Th e Seco nd Circuit 's experience with New York la w is especiall y notab le and unfo rtunat e in this rega rd. See, e.g., R ose nth al v. Wa rre n , 475 F.2d 438 (2 d
Cir. 1973); Pearso n v. N ortheast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.1962) (en bane ). It is the
substantive bias of state choice-of-law rul es that is the real problem, th ough , and if attentio n
to the Constitutio n will e radica te it, the re is no harm in having federal courts fo llow sta te
co nt1icts law.
265. A laska Packe rs Assn. v. Industri al Accide nt Commn ., 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
266. See inj i·a text acco mpanying notes 276-80.
267. Laycock . supm note 73 , at 295.
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The Two Clauses

Tn e F ull Faith and Credit Clause, as discussed above, dictates
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
A cts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every othe r State. "26:s
The Pr ivil eges and I mmunities Clause provides that " [t]he Citizens
of each Sta te shall be entit led to all Privileges and Immunities o f
Citizens in the several States." 269
These are clea rly bo th nationalizin g Clauses, intended to bind
the several st ates into a uni on .27° They are also both cleariy <lntidiscrirnination Clauses . F ull Fa ith and Credit governs discr1rnination
again st fore ign law, Privi leges and Imm unities d iscriminat ion
against fore ign people. To put the point slightly differen tly. Full
Fait h and Credi t de termines when parties must be accorded the
rights gran ted by foreign law; Privileges and Immunities when they
must be accord ed rights gran ted by forwn law. The Clauses demand eq uality of treatment, but what is th e cash value of this equality? 271 1 do not want my argument to rely on dubious or overstrong
interpretations of the Clauses. The reading I offer is thus a minimalist one - the weakest I can come up with.
My reading is th e fo llowing. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
means that a state may not refuse to recognize rights created by the

*

268. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, 1.
269. U.S. Co NsT. art. IV. , § 2.
270. See. e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 n.9 (1951) ("[1l1e Fu ll Fa ith and Credit
Cla use] 'altered th e status o f the several states as inde pendent forei gn sovere ignt ies, eac h
free to ignore rights and obliga tions crea te d under the laws o r esta blishe d by the j udici a l
proceedings o f the o th ers, by makin g each a n integra l pa rt of a single nat io n." ·· (quot ing
Magnoli a Pe tro le um Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943))); Toomer v. Witse ll, 334 U.S. 385 ,
395 (1948) ('"The primary purpose of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause] .. . was to he lp
fuse into one Nation a collection of indepe nd e nt, sovere ign States.").
271. Differe nt noti ons o f e qua lity compete in conflicts theory. One direc ts that people
acting in th e sa me jurisdicti on be trea ted th e sa me regardless of whe re they a re from (eq ua lity across do mi cile, power arrange d te rrit o ri a lly), th e othe r th a t people fro m the same sta te
be treat ed the same rega rdl ess of where they ac t (equality across territory, powe r arranged
person ally). See Mark D. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 Io w A L. REv. 893,
902 (1988). Gergen sugges ts there is no clear reason to prefer a territoria l arrangem en t of
state powe r to a perso nal one, so that scholars should simply accept "that any approach or
policy will trea t people un eq uall y for re aso ns that may seem a rbitrary to so me people," id. at
902 , b ut ad mits that th ose urging a te rrito ri al ordering have " a [constituti o na ll y] stro nge r
argum e nt," id. at 906. The Cons titution indeed seems to have a te rrito ri a l orie ntation: at
least, the Privi leges and Immunities Clause entirely rejec ts th e idea of o rde ring powe r on a
person al bas is.
Peter Wes ten has sugges te d that equa lity is an "empty" idea that shou ld be elimin ated
from legal di sco urs e. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 H ARV . L. RE v . 537
(1982 ). Wes ten claims th a t appea ls to e qu a lity require so me und erlying notion of a re leva n t
differen ce , and that equa li ty arguments can be paraphrased as arguments about th e relevance
of the d iffe re nce. Th e move is reminiscent of the realist at tacks on th e concept of rights. I
have doubts ab out whe th er the paraphrases do avoid reli ance on equality norms , but in a ny
case I do not think th at lega l theory would bene fit from e liminating th e conce pt.
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Bank, that justification must be something more than that the rights
are foreign. 281 That is all I claim. The antidiscrimination reading is
thus at least implicit in the cases, even where rejection takes the
form of "applying local law" instead of rejecting the cause of action.
The more recent Allstate decision suggests that a state may reject foreign rights in favor of its own on the basis of extraordinarily
slender justifications, which clearly do not embody a consistent policy.282 Basically this amounts to the principle that one state may
always reject another's law if it disagrees sufficiently to have enacted a different law. l11at is an absurd reading of F ull Faith and
Credit; if it commands respect for sister-state law merely when the
states agree , it does nothing at all.2 83 Allstate is in tension with the
Hughes line of cases, and also with the Court's Privileges and Immunities jurisprudence. 284 More bluntly, it is wrong. 285 VVhy has
the antidiscrimination principle of Full Faith and Credit emerged
strongly with respect to judgments and jurisdictional limitations,
but remained only implicit with respect to conflicting local law? If
we take the jurisprudence at face value, the answer seems to be that
policy disagreements trump Full Faith and Credit; but this is a
wildly implausible reading, given the Clause's history and aspirations - policy disagreements are obviously one of its chief concerns.286 If it were the case that conflicting local law trumped
another state's law, the Court has never explained why it would not
for the other or to project its laws across state lines so as to preclude the other from prescribing for itself the legal consequences of acts within it."). TI1e absence of similar territorial
reasoning in Hall (which, oddly enough, quotes the above sentence , see Hall, 440 U.S. at 42324) provoked a three-Justice dissent. See Hail, 440 U.S. at 428 (Btackmun, J. , diss enting)
(contrasting majority opinion to territorial reasoning of lower court).
281. See supra note 273.
282. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-20 (1981) (upholding application of
Minnesota law based on decedent 's working in Minnesota, widow's after-acquired Minnesota
domicile, and Allstate's "presence" in Minnesota).
283. Cf Kramer, supra note 215.
284. The tension with Privileges and Immunities arises because it seems unlikely that
Minnesota would have applied its law to benefit a Wisconsin domiciliary in similar straits.
Indeed , if the domiciliary status of one party is the only reason a state has for applying its
law, Due Process will forbid it from extending similar rights to out-of-staters, as Phillips
Petroleum holds. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 815-22 (1985). But the
Court's Privileges and Immunities cases suggest that out-of-staters may not be denied the
rights granted locals merely on the basis of their foreign domicile. See supra note 273.
285. It is wrong because, were the contacts reversed, Minnesota would surely not have
held that Wisconsin rights prevailed with respect to an accident between Minnesotans occurring in Minnesota, where the plaintiff moved to Wisconsin after the accident. Consequently,
Minnesota must have rejected the Wisconsin rights because they were foreign and thereby
violated Full Faith and Credit. See infra section VI.B.l.
286 . See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 521 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("The whole purpose and the only need for requiring full faith and credit to foreign law is
that it does differ from that of the forum.").
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equally allow rejection of sister-state judgments. A more realistic
explanation is that the Court has simply bee n unable to come up
with a reading that allows it to handle conflicts between rights.2S7
The jurisdictional lin e of cases 2 8 8 did not raise this iss ue. When
a state closes its courts to a foreign cause of action, it is simply rejecting a foreign right. It is not (superficially) resolving a conflict in
fa vor of a local right , and therefore condemning the door-closing
practice does not mandate subordina tion of local rights. Similarly,
interstate enforcement of judgments poses no question of confli cting rights because our approach to judgments still resembles that of
Joseph Beale. The law of the state of rendition determines the effect of a judgmen t,289 and when a plaintiff sues to enforce a judgment in another state, he is asking simply th at rights created by the
law of the state of rendition be respected. There will seldom be
even a prima facie right that a defendant can invoke against the
enforcement of the judgment.
The situation with rights to recover, rights which have not been
reduced to judgment, used to be much the same: the plaintiff invoked the rights created by the territorially appropriate law, and
the defendant had available no contrary rights. But with the death
of vested rights, the picture changed dramatically. Instead of
Beale's no-conflict world, courts confronted cases in which the
plaintiff urged a right created by one law while the defendant appealed to a defense created by another. (Another way of putting
this is that it became uncle ar which state's law was the source of the
plaintiff's rights. 290 ) Where rights conflict, or laws contend for application, the meaning of Full Faith and Credit is much less clear,
and the temptation for courts is to hide behind a personal-jurisdiction-style analysis th at suggests the issue is one of choice , rather
than of conflict. I will later explain how a straightforward application to conflicts may fulfil the aims of the Clause. 291 What should
be already clear is that it cannot be ignored. It do es require that
287. More charitably, th e Court 's retreat may reflect th e realization that constructing a
hierarchy of inte res ts is the legitimate prerogative of the states. But this does not mean that
Full Faith and Credit has no role to play. Its goal is to "guard th e new political and econo mic
uni o n against th e disinteg rating influence of provincialism in jurispr ud ence, but without aggra ndizemen t of federal power a t th e expe nse of the states." Jackson, supra note 232, a t 17.
The qu es tion is how to balance the fe de ral an d local interests, and leaving everything up to
the states is not the answer.
288. See supra note 273.
289. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein , 516 U.S. 367 , 375-59 , 386-87 (1996).
290. This is the more pop ul ar description. As discussed above , see supra section lll. C, I
think it is more useful to talk in terms of conflicting righ ts.
291. See infra section VI. B.
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both statutory and

Privileges and fnzmunities

U ncertainty also exists \Vith respect to the scope of "privileges
and immunities ." The counterpart to the (foolishly) literal reading
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is the supposition that the Privileges and Immunities Clause requires out-of-staters to be granted
all the rights of locals, including the t ight to vo te and pay in-state
tuiticYD for public schools. The Supreme Co urt, however, has not
similarly emasculated the Clause in the face of such an absurdly
expansive reading, but has suggested instead that it applies only to
"fund amental" rights. 293 Some pri vil eges granted to locals - such
as the elk-hunting license at issue in Ba!cll-vin - are not fundamental. Nor is the Clause absolute in its proscriptions. States may treat
out-of-staters differently if they have a "substanti al" reason that is
"substantially advanced" by the discriminatory treatment.2 94
This restriction, by itself, is not a full explanation. The right to
vote is surely fundamental, but no court has suggested that it is one
of the relevant privileges and immunities. I think a satisfactory answer is that the idea of discrete states presupposes the distinction
between members of the polity and outsiders. If all federal citizens
could vote in all state elections, we would no longer have politically
distinct states. This sort of discrimination is required for the Privileges and Immunities Clause to have meaning; it cannot be a violation of the Clause. Relatedly, Ely suggests that if outsiders could
vote, they would be able to protect their interests, and there would
be no need for the Clause.29s
The more serious question is how privileges and immunities re late to conflicts rules. Laycock casts this in terms of "choice-of-law
rules that prefer local litigants" and avoids the "fundamental
rights" limitation by noting that equal treatment in court is surely a
fundamental right.2 96 This is a tempting argument, but it fails because it operates at too high a level of generality. All of the discriminations against o utsiders that the Supreme Court has
292. See Jackson, supra note 232, at 12; Laycock . supra note 73, at 290-95.
293. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 387-88 (1978) .
294 . See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S . 274, 284 (1985). A mere
desire to benefit locals does not count as a substantial inte rest.
295. See Ely, supra note 73 , at 190.
296. See Laycock, supra note 73, at 265-66. Currie similarly talks about " [t]he right of
access to courts, ge nerall y stated. " See CuRRTE. supra note 161 , at 467 n.70.
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approved as not implicating fundamental rights do involve the
question of equal treatment in the courts, and th ey all involve
choice-of-law rules that prefer locals. That is, when the out-ofstater goes to court to get his elk-hunting permit, he is asking for a
right that local law gives to locals. vVhen the court denies his request, it is withholding fro m him rights granted to locals; it is (in a
sense) refusing to apply local law to his claim. This i3 the paradigmatic Privileges and Immunities discrimination , anal ytically identical to a determination that out-of-staters have no right to recover
fo r in-state batteries. If we are to give meaning to the ·'funda rn.ental rights" restriction, we have to go case-by-case .
Tnere is a sense, however, in which Laycock is right. Earlier I
distinguished between rules of scope, which determine the extent of
state-created rights, and conflicts rules, which prescribe which rights
shall prevail in a conflict. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
(unlike Full Faith and Credit, which ap plies only to conflicts rules)
governs both sorts of rules. 'With respect to rules of scope, it demands that states extend to out-of-staters all the rights that they
extend to locals - or rather, all fundamental rights, unless there is
a substantial nondiscriminatory justification. With respect to conflicts rules, it demands that out-of-staters asserting rights not be
treated differently fro m locals asserting the same rights simply because they are out-of-staters. 297 That is, if the state' s conflicts rule
provides that a local right will prevail in a particular case when asserted by a local, that ri ght must prevail when asserted in the same
case by an out-of-stater, unless there is some nondiscrim in atory reason why it should not. Equality of treatment under conflicts rules is
clearly fundamental, and Laycock is correct to say so.
If eq uality with respect to conflicts rules is to be meaningful,
however, there must be equality with respect to rules of scope . If a

state can limit the scope of a right to locals, then a nondiscriminatory conflicts rule will do nothing to remedy the discrimination.
The question then is whether states , by restricting the scope of
nonfundamental rights, may affect the outcome of the classic conflicts cases. It seems unlikely. These cases are usually ones in
which a local would be able to avoid liability as a defendant, or
recover damages as a plaintiff, und er local law; and for some reason

297 . This is, in a sense, just another way of saying th at equal tre a tment in the courts is a
fund a menta l right. I think it is somewhat clea re r, th o ugh. to dis ti nguish betwee n rules of
sco pe and conflicts rules.
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these rights seem to be regarded as funclam ental.2 98 Perhaps there
is 5omething about the adversarial nature of civil litigation that elevates the interests involved, such that the rights an individual possesses against other individuals are more likely to be deem ed
fun damental than his rights to governmental largesse. Or perha ps
the interes ts protected against infringement by other individuals arc
typically more important than the interest in a hunting li cense.
Ne ither of these rationales is entirely clear, but I ha ve see n no seri ous sugges tions that the rights at issue in conflicts cases will fre quen tly not be fundamental for Privileges and Immun ities
purposes. 299
The minimalist reading I advocate can thus be ap plie d to the
cl assic con11icts cases. The Supreme Court, which accepts this reading,300 seems to think that it has no serious consequences. The next
section will show, however , that such consequences exist: thi s rea ding is in irreconcilable tension with Allstate, with interest analysis,
and with the personal-jurisdiction-style approach to conflicts more
generally.
VI.

TowARD A CoNSTITUTIONAL JuRISPRUDENCE
OF CONFLI CTS

This Part aims to show that even a weak reading of the Co nstitu tion imposes real limits on state conflicts rules and rules of
scope. 301 1l1e method will be to start with Currie 's conception of
governmental interests and then to show how the Constitution
reconfigures his approach. I start with Currie 's vision not because it
seems accurate, or even plausible, but because it exemplifies the
excesses the Constitution reins in. Brilmayer is undoubtedly right
that it is dangerous to impute to legislatures policies they seem explicitly to disavow. States may refrain from pressing their legisla298. See Ely, supra no te 73, a t 182-83 (" Baldwin or no Baldwin, it is not like ly to be
sugges ted that (decisio ns about liability] implicate rights so unimpo rtant that th ey ca n be
dismissed as beyond the cove rage of the Privileges and Immuni ties Clause.") .
299. 1l1e right of access to courts is acknowledged as fundam ental. See McKnett v. St.
Louis & S.F. Ry. Co ., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934). The refu sal to gra nt the benefits of loca l law
is not precisely a denial of access, but surely the right of access is meaningless if, havin g once
go tte n into court, the out-of-stater the n faces discrimination as to substantive rights.
300. See supra note 273.
301. As mentioned earlie r, I think that "choice-of-law rul es" are misleadingly named.
What th ey actually do is describe when foreign-creat ed rights will be res pected. The appropriate way to invoke a foreign -created right is not to sue und er forum law and ha ve th e forum
co urt decide which law appli es to the claim; it is to sue und er for eign law. If the forum court
th e n decides th a t local law " a pplies," it has decided either that th e law th e plaintiff pleads
gra nts him no right (a sco pe decision) or that the for eign ri ght yields to whatever loca l defense th e defendant in vokes (a conflicts decision) .
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tive jurisdiction to the limit; th ey may also be more solicitous of
sister-state domicili aries than classic interest analysis supposes.
Currie, of course, recognized both of these facts. 302 His aim was to
show what states could do, and what it was appropriate for judges
to do in th e absence of legislative guidance.
That is also my aim , though my conclusions are quite different.
The import of th is Part is that states cannot do much of what Currie
thought they could. In particular, the Constitution preve nts them
from following the discriminatory polici es of interest ana lysis. One
way to express this co nclusion would be to say that state policies are
not discriminat ory. Because federal interests are local in terests
everywherc ,303 the antid iscrimin ation policies of the Privileges and
Immunities and F ull Faith and Credit Clauses are the true policies
of the states, whatever th eir legislatures may in fact desire. 30 -l
It will be clearer, however, to talk in terms of state interests according to the Currie mode l and to consider the Constitution as an
external constraint. I will also largely ignore statute-specific rules
of scope. It is important to ask if a particular right is intended to be
granted to those in the particular situation of the party before the
court, but at the level of generality at which this section works , that
inquiry can be sensibly performed only in terms of state interests.
One more introductory point remains. The reason I fin d the
Constitution so effective in constraining choice-of-law rules is that I
approach "choice of law" from the perspective of conflicts. That is,
I see a "choice-of-law" qu estion as a question of which right will
prevail. State conflicts rules articulate a hierarchy of rights by establishing factors that determine which right prevails. The
Constitution limits the acceptable factors. In particular, Full Faith
and Credit prevents consideration of the fact that a particular right
is a local one, and Privileges and Immunities similarly prevents the
fact that a party is (or is not) a forum domiciliary from having
weight. Beyond these two restrictions, states may construct what
hierarchies they will. As we shall see, however, the restrictions
suffice.

302. See C u RRI E, supra no te 22, at 186.
303. See Mondou v. N.Y. , New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 55-57 (1912).
304. See John K. Beach, Un iform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J.
65 6, 665 (1917) ("Surely the Constitution expresses the real and co ntrolling ' policy ' of the
states in this regard. " ). In a sen se. th e Constitution thus provides the objective state interests
whose abse nce Brilmayc r beli eves dooms Currie 's theory.
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Rules of Scop e an d rhe Constitution: Two Myths

Currie's analysis is sup posed to show that some cases cre ate no
real problems, that they pose no issue of choice of law - namely,
false conflicts and unprovided -for cases. In the last analysis, my aspiration is much the same. Like Currie, I do not think that co nflicts
theory has much to say about tru.e conflicts - situations in which
both states claim priority for the rights created by their law. A s
long as the rule that prioritizes lo 1:al rights is constitutionally sound,
there is no reason why the fo rum should not apply it. My point is
rather that this will very seld om happen . I do not mean that th ere
will be few cases in which righ ts conflict - I actually find more
conflicts than does Currie - but it will be a rare case in which
stat es disagree on which right should prevail. Explaining why disagreement will be rare requires an analysis of the limitations the
Constitution places on state conflicts rules, but that is the task of
the next section. TI1is section seeks to illustrate the application of
the Constitution to the permissible scope of state laws. The issues
are distinct: scope questions are about whether a given law creates
a right or not , conflicts questions are about when one right prevails
over another. This section will show that what interest analysis
terms false conflicts and unprovided-for cases are actually true
conflicts. 305
1.

The lWyth of the Unp rovided-for Case

The title of this subsection is the same as the title of an article by
Larry Kramer. 3 06 It was that article that started me thinking about
conflicts in the way developed here , and this section unsurprisingly
shows his influence. My analysis does, however, differ in some important respects, most notably my und erstanding of the effec t of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Recall that Currie fo und an unprovided-for case when
" [n]either state cares what happens. " 307 This situation obtains, generally, when the law of the defendant 's domicile permits recovery,
the law of the plaintiff's domicile bars it, and the tort occurs in the
nonrecovery (plaintiff's) state.308 In such a case, the plaintiff's state
305. It is doubtl ess not obvious how this result wi ll be helpful. Tbe discovery of fa lse
conflicts is generally considered th e grea t achievement of interest analysis; rejectin g this insight does not seem like an advan ce. I will argue, however , tha t an ab undance of conflicts is
not a bad thing. See infra secti on VI.B.
306. See Krame r, Myth, supra note 81.
307. CuRRIE, supra note 76, at 152.
308. Lea Brilmayer suggests that o nly domicili ary fact ors were ge nerally releva nt to
Currie. see BRILM AYER. sup ra note 8, § 2.1.2, at 65-66, and hence that a n unprovid ed -for case
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has no interest in generating a recovery for the p laintiff; its domestic law does not do so . Nor does the defendant's state have an interest in granting re covery for an o ut-of-stater, against its own
domiciliary, for a tort that occurred outsid e its borders. If state interests are thought of as interests in the application of state law, it
seems th at the lack of an interested sta te create s a troubling lacuna:
no state wants its law applied. Interest an alysis thus seems to suggest that no law applies lo the case , and this is a prospect from
·which conventional legal thinking recoils.
Two basic insights drive Kramer 's revisionarv- ap oroach.
First,
<
he conceives of interest analysis as simply a method of determining
when positive law confers righ ts on th e pa rties.309 Th at is, he sees
the detection of interests as a matter of rules of scope.31 0 The determination of interest must thu s be mad e with respect to each
claim of right-3 11 For example, a decision that California tort law
gives the plaintiff a right to recover does not necessarily mean that
defenses created by California law should be available to the defe ndant. To say that California law "applies" in this sense is not to
say that the transaction is governed by California law. The case is
not decided as though it were a purely Californian case , as though
~

arises whenever the plaintiff's h ome law bars recovery and t he d e fe nd a nt 's p er mits it, see id.
§ 2. 1.2, at 63. This is so me what o f an ove rsimplifica t ion , as sh e la te r ac knowl e dges. see id.
~ 2.1.2 , a t 67. and only true with resp ec t to C urri e's a nal ys is of ma rri ed wome n 's co ntracts,
see C uRRI E, supra note 102, at 108 . If a to rt occurs in the pro-recove ry sta te , C urrie fo und an
inte res t: the state '·may in cur respon sibili ty to the pe rso n injured in the sta te ." CuRRIE,
sup ra no te 76, at 148: see also id. a t 157 (constructing tabl e of per mutations, finding d iffere nt
inte rests based on te rritori a l fact o rs): id. a t 149 ( " Ca lifornia's inte rest in the injured plaintiff
is based solely o n th e fac t tha t he was injured here , bu t th a t ha s bee n rega rd ed as a subst ant ia l basis."): id. at 150-51 (" [T]h e fa ct that t he injury occurred in Ca liforni a suggests though it does not necessa ril y follow - th a t Califo rni a m ay become ve ry d eeply conce rned. "). In his an a lysis of m arr ied women 's contracts. the starting point fo r Brilmayer 's
d iscussio n, Cu rri e in fact fo und no unprovide d -fo r cases. See C u RR IE, supra note 102, at 95
(eva lu ating effect of application of law of th e pl ace of co ntracting on stat e interes ts, a nd
llnding an interest in eac h pe rmutat io n) .
This res ults from his rat her comple x a rticul a tion o f th e inte res ts at stake. It is not unfa ir
to say that Cu rrie te nded to find interes ts th at prod uced congenial res ults. B rilmayer sugges ts th at diffe re nt, equall y plausible inte rests m ay be constru cted , see B RILMA YER, supra
no te 8, § 2.1.2 , at 61-62, and this is quite true. To ge neralize interes t an a lysis sufficie ntly th at
it becomes dete rmin a te , rather th an retaining enough flexibilit y to produce whatever result
t he judge wishes to reach , it is probabl y ne cessa ry to disto rt Currie a bit. Tackling C urrie o n
hi s own terms is like havin g a fi stfight with a fo g. Attributing to him a fo cus o n domicili ary
fac tors is one way to do so. K ramer produces a slightly m ore cha ritabl e gene r alization, supposing tha t states generally have interes ts in reg ul at in g cond uct e ither occurring within th eir
borders o r affectin g their do mi ciliarie s. See Kram er, Myth , supra note 81, at 1065 .
309 . See Kram er, J',;lyth, supra note 81, at 1064.
310. It m ay be th at at this p oint m y re ading of Kramer is to o stron gly colored by my own
perspective; in later work he casts the qu es ti on in te rm s of which law applies. See supra note
154 and accompanying text.
311 . See Kramer , Myth, supra note 81, at 105 1-55. 1l1is is o f co urse th e procedure followe d in ordinary case s.
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only California law (and the entirety of California law) determines
the rights of the parties. This is the same lesson I urged that we
take from the coexistence of state and federal rights; it is also the
reason I claim that interest analysis does not in fact select the "applicable law." 312
Kramer's second, and related, insight is that a determination
that no state is interested means that no state's law grants any
313 The olaintiff loses·, he has failed to state a claim on which
rii?hts.
~·
<
r elief may be granted.
'vVhat do these insights mean for " unprovided-for" cases? Such
cases occur only when the plaintiff's home law does not permit recovery in a purely domestic case. There are tvvo ways in which recovery might be restricted. First, on the facts of the plaintiff's case,
the law may create a defense to the cause of action. Kramer believes that this sort of case is not truly unprovided-for because the
plaintiff's state has no interest in extending the defense to a nondomiciliary defendant. Therefore, the result in such cases will be
that the plaintiff recovers under his home state's law even though
he could not recover against a codomiciliary.
Kramer has two examples from this category. Having surely
taxed the reader's patience already, I will consider only one, a variant of Grant v. McAuliffe. 314 Both Arizona and California have
wrongful death actions, but Arizona abates its action upon the
death of the tortfeasor. The unprovided-for case arises when an
Arizona plaintiff sues the estate of a California tortfeasor for an
accident that occurred in Arizona. The Arizona defense would ordinarily apply, but Arizona has no interest in extending it to a Californian. Thus, Kramer finds, the plaintiff can recover under
Arizona law.
But this is shockingly discriminatory, and Kramer subsequently
recants. The Privileges and Immunities Clause, he says, will not allow states to decompose their "no recovery" rule into rights and
defenses and deny the defenses to out-of-staters. If the plaintiff's
home state does not permit recovery against its own domiciliaries, it
cannot tinker with its law to disadvantage out-of-staters. So in the
Grant variant, the plaintiff loses.
312. See supra section IV.B. One thing Kramer's article thus shows is how far astray the
notion of choosing an applicable law led Currie. Oddly, Kramer at times seems prone to the
same mistake. See supra text accompanying note 154.
313. See Kramer, i'v!yth, supra note 81, at 1062-63.
314. 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953). Grant is the occasion for another of Currie's extended
analyses of possible permutations of contacts. See CuRRIE, supra note 76.
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The seco nd way in which th e plaintiff's h o me la w might "not
p erm it recove ry" is by sim ply not co nferring a right to recove r a t all
(rathe r th an crea ting a right but subordin a ting it to a defe nse) .3t5
Here, Kra me r find s. the " unprovid ed-for " as pect of the case sim ply
m ean s th a t the pl a intiff has no ri ght.3 16 Kramer 's examp le of this
sort o f case is ErH1in v. Thomas, 317 in which a Was hingt o n resid e nt
was injured by an O regon resid e nt in Washingto n. The victim "s
wife sue d to re cover fo r loss of co nsortium , an ac tion recog nized by
Orego n but not by Washin gt on law. Oregon law gives nu righ t be cause it is not interes ted in allowi ng recovery, and W8sh in gto n law
gives no right beca use it sees no inj ury. Thus, once again . the pl aintiff loses. In sum , un pro vi de d-for cases arc simply ones in wh ich th e
pl ai ntiff ca nn o t state a cl aim und er his own la w.
A ll this is d e ad o n, as fa r as it goes - the law of th e plaintiff's
state will no t help him in an unpro vide d-fo r case. But what a bo u t
the defend ant 's ho m e law? The defend ant 's home law, rem em be r,
p ermits re co very. Interest analysis says that it confers n o r ight , because the defend an t's home state h as no interest in allowing re covery b ased solely o n the fa ct that the defendant is a local. 318 B ut
perhaps Privileges and Immunities has something to say here as
well , and in fac t, Krame r thinks that it d oes. In his a nalysis o f
Envin, h e initially concludes that th e plaintiff loses : neit he r st ate 's
law gives her a right to recover. When Privileges and Immunities
ente rs the picture , however, Kram er find s that O regon ca nnot justify withholding th e benefits of its law fr o m a nonresid en t plain tiff
when it wo uld le t an Oregonian recover. 3 19 Consequ entl y, th e
plaintiff can re cover under Oregon law - at least, in an O regon
court.
315 . Distinguish ing between these two cl asses of cases may be diffic ult. It is not impossible, ho wever, a nd is som etimes easy. If a state does not pe rmit suit fo r loss of consortium , its
law clea rly confers no ri ght. If it does have a wro ngful dea th action but aba tes it on th e deat h
o f th e to rtfeaso r, its law confers a right but subo rdin a tes it to th e defe nse. (Th ese exa mples
ar e drawn from the facts of Grant and E rwin v. Th omas, 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973), which
Kra mer considers in My1h, supra no te 81, at 1048-56 (G rant), 1060-63 (Erwin).
316. See Kramer , JV!yLh, sup ra no te 81, at 1062-63 .
317. 506 P .2d 494 (Or. 1973).
318. The tort, in th ese examples, ta kes place in the plaintiff's state. See, e.g., E rw in, SOil
P .2d at 495.
319. See Krame r, J'vfy£h, supra note 81, at 1073. This may no t be th e correc t read ing of the
Clause; it is at least arguab le that it app lies only to tre atment of out-of-sta ters wit h respect to
in-state occurrences. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1 948) ("It was des ign ed to
insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privil eges whi ch th e citize ns
of Sta te B e njoy. "). Whe th er th e Cla use is tr igge red whe n a State A citize n "ventures in to
State B" to litiga te an out-of-state transa ctio n is not entirely clear.
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If this is so, why should the result be different in the Gram vari-

ation Kramer considers? 'Nhy does Privileges and Immunities not
likewise com pel California to extend the benefit of its law to the
Arizona plaintiff, entitling him to recover under California law? It
presumably wo uld were the plaintiff a Californian 320 - in that case,
both parties would be from California and the case would be a
"false conflict" because A rizona would have no interest. 321 Th us
the withholding of the right to recover under California law doe s
not seem significantly different from the discrimination forbi dden
to Oregon.
Kramer 's reasoning here is hard for me to discern. It seems tha t
the location of the forum makes the difference. Currie 's unpr ovid ed-for variant of G rant has the suit occurring in California. b ut
K ramer's Privileges and Immunities analysis considers an A rizona
court. 322 He further suggests that courts may deny their own residents the benefits of sister-state law without violating the Clause.
Thus while an Oregon court cannot deny a Washingtonian the benefits of Oregon law, a Washington court could. Similarly, an
Arizona court can deny an A rizonan the benefits of California law.
This reasoning is not entirely satisfactory. The Privileges and
Immunities Clause is partly about the permissible actions of state
courts, but it is also about the permissible content of state laws. It
means, in particular, that as a matter of positive law, C alifornia
must extend to A rizonans the rights it extends to its own domiciliaries.323 Thus when the Arizona court refuses to allow the plaintiff to
rely on California law, it rejects a California right. After we use the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to reconfigure the scope of the
state laws, we find that both states are interested, in the sense that
both attempt to confer rights.
That leads to the main point of this section. The determination
that the Erwin plaintiff has stated a claim under Oregon law is just a
matter of scope analysis. The question remains whether the de320. Whether it would or not is the crucial question for Privileges and Immunities, and I
will consider it in more detail later. See infra part VI.B.l. At this point, we may simply note
that if it followed the prescriptions of interest analysis, it would. As a matter of historical
fact, of course, California did apply its law, see Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (Cal.
1953), but I am considering how interest analysis operates.
321. The presence of an Arizona interest will not prove essential to my analysis. With a
law directed to primary conduct, Arizona presumably has an interest in deterring dangerous
activity within its borders. The abatement of a tort suit upon the death of the tortfeasor has
only marginal effect on primary conduct, however, so the claim that Arizona has no interest
in applying that rule to two Californians is at least plausible.
322. See Kramer. lV!yth, supra note 81, at 1073.
323. Subject, of course, to the qualifications noted above. See supra section V.B.2.
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fendant has a defense available. Of course he does - Washington
law recognizes no cause of action, and thus privileges the conduct
complained of. ·washington obviously extends this right to loc als
acting in \Vashington; following Kramer's analysis, Privileges and
Immunities requires it to extend equally to Oregonians acting there.
So while the plaintiff has a claim under Oregon law, recovery is not
a foregone conclusion- the defendant has a defense under Washington law. That is as far as rules of scope take us.
This should be a startling conclusion. It may still be that
Kramer gets the results right - though eyebrows will raise at the
suggestion that what should ha ppen in "u nprovided-for" cases is
that the olaintiff sho uld win if and onlv if he sues in the defendant's
home court, a result troublingly similar to the overstrong reading of
Full Faith and Credit. My point here is simply that these cases are
not easy to res olve, even after Kramer's reworking; the outcome is
not as clear as his optimistic assertions. 324 He is right that they are
not, in fact, unprovided-for, but he does not go all the way: they are
actually true conflicts. 3 25
1

.;

2.

The Myth of the False Conflict

The preceding section concluded that the Constitution turns
unprovided-for cases into true conflicts. The conclusion of this section, with respect to false conflicts, will be the same.
Take as a first example the actual facts of Grant v. McAuliffe: a
collision in Arizona between two California domiciliaries. In this
case, Currie said, "Arizona had no conceivable interest in the application of Arizona law to the case. " 326 This is true enough, according to Currie's construction of interests. But again, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause will change things. What happens when the
California defendant (that is, his estate) invokes the Arizona abatement rule? The way to perform this analysis, as intimated above, is
to ask whether Arizona would assert an interest if the party asking
for the benefit of her law were a domiciliary. The answer is yes,
according to Currie's analysis; with a California plaintiff and an Arizona defendant, the case is a true conflict, where both states are
324. See Kramer, Jvlyth, supra note 81, at 1047-48.
325. Perhaps these should be called ·'reverse true conflicts" since they feature the unusual situation in which each state is asserting an interest in disadvantaging its domiciliary.
(This is the reason Kramer believes that the plaintiff wins by suing in the defendant's home
court.)
326.

I

CuRRIE,

supra note 76, at 161.
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interes ted. If Arizona grants this right to its own clomiciliaries,
must it not offe r it on equal terms to out-of-staters?
Kramer suggests not; he argues that in such a case Arizona may
defer to Califo rnia's interes ts by withh olding the benefits of Arizona law. Such deference, he claims, will reduce inte rstate friction ,
and thus better serve the aims of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. 327 But interstate friction is not cl early the so le target of the
Clause. By its words , aft er all. it grants rights to individuals, not to
their states , and the Supreme Co urt has neve r suggeste d that states
may waive the rights of the ir citi ze ns to the privileges and immunities of other states' laws. If the Clause aims to promote national
unity, conceptually as well as instrumenta lly, it seems likely th at the
creation of a class of outsiders with fewer rights against each other
than against local citizens offends the principle of equality of individuals within states.
Admittedly, the facts of Grant v. M cA uliffe len d themselves to
the proposition that rights created by the law of the common domicile should have priority, primarily because the law at issue has so
little effect on primary conduct. The idea that a Californian can
invoke such an Arizona rul e against another Californian is odd; it is
not clear why Arizona would want to make the law available to
Californians inter se, nor why the Constitution should require it to.
And I do not mean to suggest that the Constitution compels the
application of Arizona law. After all, the California plaintiff can
surely point to a California law that gives him a right to recover, so
the result would be at most a true conflict. Arizo na may be able
constitutionally to adopt a conflicts rule deferring to California's
regulation of its domiciliaries, and if it can do that, it can probably
also simply withhold rights with such a marginal relation to primary
conduct. I suspect, though , that the Constitution prevents Arizona
from declaring as a general matter that Californians, inter se, do not
have the rights of Arizonans.
Suppose that instead the law focuses on primary conduct; suppose Arizona has a cause of action that California law lacks- say,
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. There is something
plausibly wrong with a legal regime under which a Californian in
Arizona does not enjoy the protections that Arizonans do, so long
as the tortfeasor is also a Californian. Finally, suppose that the law
is a speed limit - clearly directed to primary conduct. In an accident between two Californians, it seems intolerably odd tha t one
327. See Kramer, Myth, supra note ol , at 1069-70.
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wo uld not be able to defend against an allegation of negligence with
the claim that he had complied with the Arizona speed limit, regardless of what California's is.
These ex am ples do not show that situs rights should alvvays defeat those created by the law of the common domicile - it makes
sense only in some cases - but rather that depe<;age may be most
sensible . California rights prevail with respect to some issues (such
as the abatement of the cause of action), and A rizona rights \Vith
respect to others (such as the applicabl e spee d limit). This is common in state-federal conflicts, and we have seen no reason vvhy multistate conflicts should treat it as anomalous.
The larger point thus is not that all fals e con11icts are necessarily
tru e confl icts, but that some must be . D eference to the policies of
the state of common domicile may be a sufficient nondiscriminatory
reason to withhold local rights not affecting primary conduct though I think this will be quite a small set. But Currie's conception of the category of false conflicts goes further, because he believes that states generally have no interest in granting rights to
recover, or defenses against liability, to out-of-staters. 328 This is the
discrimination I claim Privileges and Immunities blocks. "False
conflicts" that are false simply because the situs state has no interest in compensating or defending out-of-staters, where it does have
such interests with respect to locals, are made true conflicts by the
Constitution.
B.

Conflicts Rules and the Constitution

Thus far I have suggested that, taking the Constitution seriously
and thinking in terms of conflicting rights, unprovided-for cases and
false conflicts are often true conflicts. This is not an auspicious
start; it undoes most of the advances of interest analysis. This section 'Nill take some steps forward by arguing that the prevalence of
true conflicts is nothing to worry about. Conflicts arise because
rules of scope tend to be broad enough that more than one state
will often create rights with respect to a particular transaction.
Broad rules of scope are not the problem, however; we have seen
that the Constitution works primarily to enlarge, not to constrict ,
the scope of state-created rights. The problem lies rather in the
discriminatory manner in which conflicts are resolved. If states are
328. Generalizing about Currie's approach is difficult, and this characterization may not
be entirely fair. Currie did, after all, suggest that a state may have an interest in allowing
recovery to out-of-staters so that they can pay their in-state hospital bills. See CuRRIE, supra
note 76, at 145 n.64.
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prevented fr om discriminating, they will usually agree on which
rights sho uld prevail ; where they do not, they act within their a uthority by reso lving conflicts according to their own ru l e ~~ Whatever th eory is invok ed, courts resolving th ese conflicts do
hierarchize rights : they recognize foreign righ ts or refuse to do so.
Because the se are legal decisio ns, there must be a legal rati onale a rule specifying which rights prevail and which must yie ld, v.;h at I
ha ve called a confli cts rule . ril1e range of permissible con !Ji\~ts rules
is not infi nite , howe ver: th e Constitution imposes c on ~·: t raints .
1.

Co nfl icts Rules an d Law: Full Faith and Cre dit

Full Faith and Credit req uires tha t th e conflicts rule a state
adopts not disfavo r for eign rights simply because they are for eign.
Wha tever th e conflicts rule may be, it may not provide th at local
rights defeat fo reign rights simply by re ason of their origin. T'ne
reason must instead be neutral, in that it canno t be con ditione d on
the origin of the rights. (I will describe this as the requirement th at
the state must assert a greater interest in the suit; the characterization is useful but not essential.)
R eturn to the example of luckless driver A l. Al collides v;ith
G eorge in A labama and with Lou in Louisiana. In both cases, A l
prefers Alab ama law; Alab ama, if it is interested in the fi nancia l
we lfare of its do micili aries, and certainly if it adheres to inte rest
analysis, might thus want to draw both cases wit hin its legislative
iurisdiction. But it cannot.
A l v. George and Lo u v. A l are wh at I h ave called mirror-image
cases, essentially identical (both are car accidents, and the law at
issue in both cases determines the damages available), with the exception that th e relevant contacts have been switch ed. 329 From the
perspective of Alab ama, A l v. George has a local plaintiff, a foreign
defend ant, and a local accident. Lou v. Al has a fo reign pl aintiff, a
local defend ant, and a for eign accid ent. A ny reason that can be
given in fav or of A labama rights in A l v. George can be given for
Louisiana rights in Lo u v. A l, and therefore no conflicts rul e th at is
J

329. Se e sup ra te xt accompanying no te 226. I use here the co nt acts tha t C ur rie se ts o ut as
poten tiall y relevan t, though I o mit th e loca tion of the forum. See C uRR IE, supra note 76, at
141. It shou ld be emp hasized t hat th ese a re no t the onl y contac ts a con fl icts ru le ca n co ns ide r
- states ha ve th e fr eedo m to o rie nt th e ir rules a ro und whate ve r co nt ac ts the y des ire. D epe nding on th e contacts de emed relev ant, AI v. G eorge a nd L ou v. AI mi gh t no t be mirro r
images as I have co nstructe d th e m. Fo r example, it might be re levant wh e th e r the parties
know eac h o th er and were trave ling to th e sa me des tination in sep ara te ca rs. It shou ld b e
no net he less cle a r tha t mirro r-im age cases can be co nstructed , usin g wha te ve r co nt acts are
taken as re leva n t.
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ne utral in the required sense can provide that A labama rights prevail in both cases. A labama can adopt a conflicts rule privileging
A labama rights in one case; that amounts to the assertion that its
interest in that case is greater. But this assertion im mediately impli es that its interest is inferior in the other case, because the other
case is a mirror image. 330
Tnus Full Faith and Credit wi ll have a real effect on the de velopment of state confl icts rules. If states abide by the principle of relinquishing the rn irror im ages of cases in which they hold that their
rights prevaiL the system will develop appropriately, either by statute or bv" com:non law. B ut state comn< liance need not be 'Nillinsz.
If Alabama decides that its rights prevail in Al v. George and then
reaches the same conclusion in Lou v. Al, Lou's Full Faith and
Credi t argument has already been made for him. He can demonstrate "on some rational basis" (to use the short-lived A laska Packers for mulation) that A labama's interest is inferio r, fo r Alabama
has said as much. Even if no mirror-image cases exist yet, states are
unlikely to cheat, because an insincere assertion of greater interest
will come back to haunt t hem when the mirror-image case arises.331
~

This use of Full Faith and Credit does not require the federal
judiciary to interfere with a state 's establishment of priorities. 332 If
Alabama 's conflicts rule provides that Alabama rights prevail in A I
v. George, a fe deral court directing that Lo uisiana rights prevail in
Lou v. Al has not imposed its conception of interests on Alabama
or even deemed Alabama's interest inferior. It has simply listened
to A labama 's analysis of what makes an interest superior and taken
the state at its word. If a state asserts legislative jurisdiction over a
case and its mirror image , it has violated the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. What's sauce for the goose must be sauce for the gander.

330. Cf Jackso n, supra note 232, a t 25-26 ("' It will not do to decide the same questi o n
o ne way between one se t of litiga nts a nd the op posite way betwee n another. . .. If a case was
decide d aga inst me yes te rd ay whe n I was d efe ndant, I shall look for the same judgment today
if I am plain tiff. "') (quotin g CARDOZO, supra note 227, at 33 (altera ti o n in o riginal) (quoting
WILLIAM GoLDSMITH MIL LER, TH E DATA OF J uR ISPRUDENCE 335 (1903) (internal quotation
marks omitt ed))).
331. With this particular example, Alabama would probably op t for a rule privileging its
rights in A I v. George and subo rdin at ing them in Lou v. AI, prim ar ily because the accident in
AI v. Geo rge occurred in Alabama . Fo r the sa me reason, Louisiana 's con fli cts rules are likely
to privilege its rights in Lou v. AI. A gene ra l preference for te rritorial sovereignty will lead
to in terstate agree ment about whose rights sho uld prevail. 1l1is is nice, but not essential.
332. I speak of the fed e ral j udi ciary beca use sta te courts have played a role in creating
discriminatory conflicts rules. Of course , the co nstitutional limits I identify bind state cour ts
as we ll.
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Conflicts Rules and Domicile: Privileges and Immunities

The Privileges and Immunities Clause, I have said, operates at
two levels. As a restriction o n rules of scope, it requires states to
extend to out-of-staters the same rights they do to locals. As a restriction on conflicts rules, it requires states to grant those rights the
same force. These conditions may seem modest , but they h ave substantial effect.
Return to Laycock's example of hapless friend s Mary and D eL
They are involved in two accide nts toge th er; in each accid ent a different friend is drivin g. Ass um e furth er that the accidents both occur in the same state and are substantively identicaP 33 Del sues
Mary in Delaware, and Mary counterclaims; Delaware has a guest
statute, and Maryland does not. If Delaware is interested simply in
helping its domiciliarics, it will want to use the guest statute to bar
Mary 's claim but not Del's. This is precisely what interest analysis
directs. But it violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
There are two ways in which Delaware can regulate the effect of
its guest statute: rules of scope, and conflicts rules. Neither offers a
way to distinguish between the two claims. If the scope of the guest
statute extends to Del, it must also to Mary, because the only difference between the two claims is the domicile of the parties. For the
same reason, if the guest statute in Del's hands defe ats the right to
recover, it must also do so in Mary 's hands.
This example may suggest a linkage between rules of scope and
conflicts rules, and it bears repeating that they are distinct. Consider again Erwin v. Thomas. An Oregon domiciliary injures a
\Vashington husband in Washington , and his spouse sues for loss of
consortium, an action existing under Oregon law but not (for wives)
under Washington law. Oregon may not want to grant recovery to
the Washington plaintiff, and I will show that it need not, contra
Kramer,3 34 but it will probably have to employ a conflicts rule to
achieve this end.
With regard to rules of scope, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause will probably require Oregon to extend the loss-ofconsortium cause of action to the Washington plaintiff because it
would likely grant the right to a similarly situated local. If no other
law interferes, a state will often give its law extraterritorial force for
333. Laycock does not specify th ese conditions, see Laycock, supra note 73, at 276, but
they are essential to my an alysis.
334. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1073; see also supra text accompanying note
319.

·J
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transactions between two of its domiciliaries. 335 Consequently, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause will require the state to grant
rights to similarly situated nondomiciliaries. This is how the Clause
creates the true conflict. But granting the right and prioritizing it
over a competing right are two different things. 330 The defendant
can appeal to Washington law for a defense - V/ashington does not
recognize the cause of action - and to allow this defense to defeat
the Oregon right, the Oregon court need only apply the conflicts
rule that in tort cases, rights (and defenses) created by the law of
the place of the wrong have priority over other rights. 337 The Privileges and Immunities Clause, as a restriction on con11icts rules, does
not bar this rule, for the rule docs not disfavor rights because the
party invoking them is a foreign domiciliary.
As a last example, let us return to the example of Grant v.
McAuliffe, a collision between two California domiciliaries occurring in Arizona. Interest analysis identifies this as a false conflict,
but we have seen that it is actually a true one, in that Arizona cannot, as a general matter, withhold the benefits of its local law. The
scope and conflict requirements of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause imply that, if Arizona provides that its rights will defeat foreign rights in a suit over a local tort involving one of its domiciliaries, it must also provide that its rights defeat foreign rights in a
similar suit where neither party is a domiciliary. Otherwise, its conflicts rule favors rights asserted by a local over rights asserted by a
similarly situated out-of-stater. The result seems to be that, in false
conflicts, the Constitution requires that out-of-staters be able to invoke local law. This makes sense in some circumstances; for example, it seems natural that a Californian must be able to defend
against an allegation of negligence by showing that he complied
with the rules of the road applicable to Arizonans.
In comparison, the idea that Arizona must provide that its
abatement rule controls a suit between two Californians is harder to
335. Cf American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U .S. 347, 355-56 (1909) (Holmes,
J.) (pointing out that national states- i.e., countries -often seek to apply their own law,
even to acts within other jurisdictions).
336. Again, conflicts rules are not rules of scope. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
operates as both a rule of scope and a constraint on permissible conflicts rules. As a rule of
scope, it requires state laws to extend rights to nondomiciliaries on the same terms as it
extends them to locals. As a conflicts rule constraint, it prevents states from applying rules
that honor those rights helpful to local domiciliaries.
337. For this to work, it must be the case that Washington grants the defendant a right. A
rational attempt to promote state interests would lead it to do so, since otherwise it loses the
ability to control transactions taking place within its borders. TI1at is, if it grants no right to
the Oregon domiciliary, it cannot grant rights to its own domiciliaries in similar cases without
violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause .
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part it is just a matter of demanding they apply their laws as written
-the conflicts rule says the rights yield, and yield they must. A nd
in part it is a matter of Full Faith and Credit. A conflicts rule providing that local rights yield unless foreign rights also yield impermissibly discriminates against foreign law.
V II.

C oNCLUSION

The approach I have developed allows us to draw so me general
conclusions about what conflicts rules will look like . 111e P rivil eges
and I mmunities Clause destroys the domiciiiary-centere d conception of governmental interests. 342 If a state grants rights to its clomiciliaries, it must grant them to nondomiciliaries in the same cases.
Its conflicts rules must similarly provide that rights that prevail in
the hands of domiciliaries will also prevail in the hands of
nondomiciliaries. The Privileges and Immunities Clause thus prevents the crudely selective exercise of legislative jurisdiction to
favor domiciliaries.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has a similar, though more
subtle effect. A state may surely regulate transactions occurring
within its borders and involving its domiciliaries; that is, it may
adopt conflicts rules providing that in such cases, local rights prevail. But if it tries to draw within its regulatory field other cases
involving its domiciliaries, the mirror-image requirements of Full
Faith and Credit will start to sap its territorial authority. For every
extraterritorial case it claims, it must yield the mirror image, which
will necessarily be a case arising within its borders.
It thus seems likely that territorial factors will play a large role
in conflicts rules,3 43 but this does not mean a return to the bad old
days of Joseph Beale. Beale's system produced arbitrary results not
because of its territorialist orientation but because of its rigid devo342. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 73, at 180; Laycock, supra note 73, at 251 ("[A] state's
interests in enriching local citizens ... simply should not count."). The significance of a
domiciliary connection, I think, is not so much that it gives states a reason to extend rights as
that it gives them a justification for imposing penalties. See Brilmayer, supra note 71, at
1297-1303. If a state is truly concerned about what its domiciliaries do outside its borders, it
can probably impose criminal sanctions. See supra note 339.
343. This should not be surprising; the Framers were working within the Anglo-American
tradition that saw law as a territorial entity. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 255-60.
Beale notes the two conflicting traditions of "personal" and " territorial" law and pronounces
that " [t]he conception of the common law has always been the conception of a territorial
law." 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 5.2, at 52. Even today, federal laws are presumptively territorial in their scope. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-59 (1991).
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tion to the last act doctrine. 3 44 More sophisticated verswns of the
territorial approach are possible. 345
Nor must territorialism be the whole story. Comparative impairment is a permissible approach, either by itself or as a supplement to terri torialist rules; so too is a rule that the law that validates
a contract prevails.346 There is substantial .flexibility, and it is impossible to predict what rules states would ultimately select. Shared
conceptions of interest (for ex ample, territorial sovereignty) , however, would pro bably lead to substantive convergence, thereby producin~ the beneficial effect of a reduction in forum shopning.
rn1e
>
constitutio na l restrictions I have examined essentially require states
to be consistent in their conflicts rules, and therefore prevent states
from favoring their own laws and domiciliaries. States may structure the rules so as to promote their own interests, but only by deciding which factors are most important. This is clearly a decision
within the legitimate authority of the state - it is a matter of internal policy. 347 Having asserted the importance of these factors,
though, they must yield control over cases in which those factors
point to another state. Consequently, states will probably be sincere in their hierarchization of rights: they will lay claim to those
cases that are most important to them, and cede control of cases
they believe are more important to other states. 348 There is no way
for a state to extend illegitimately the reach of its laws. The system
0

~

344. See Laycock, supra note 73 , at 322.
345. Laycock sugges ts a territorial approach that looks to the location of the relationship
betwee n the parties. See id. at 323-27. This is an inte resting idea, although it seems odd that
if on e Californian commits a tort against another in Texas, the parties ' rights will differ depending on whether they know each other or not.
346. The basic constitutional concern of conflicts jurisprudence is discrimination against
foreign domiciliaries or, as a lesser and probably derivative matter, against foreign law. The
mod e l I sketch here does not do much to address problems of discrimination in favor of
plaintiffs generally, which may occur if litigation brings benefits to the forum. A state probably could then adopt the rule that th e law favoring th e plaintiff prevails. The constitutional
concern is that this would lead to privileging pro-plaintiff substantive law, since plaintiffs pick
where to sue. Similar concerns arise with a preference for the generally ad op ted rule .
347. Brilmayc r puts it this way:
Particularly where the Court is assessing state interes ts, it should not impose an idea l
definition of interest but only ask whether a reasonable state might think it has an interest under these circumstances. State preferences are likely to differ, in part because of
diffe re nce in va lue choices and in part because of div ergent e mpirical assumptions. That
is what state lawmaking is all about.
BRILMA YER, sup ra note 8, at 165. I agree with the caveat that the Court should ask whether
a nondiscrimin a tory sta te mi ght think it has a greater interest.
348. This surrender of cases in which the conflicts calculus points to anoth e r state is precisely what inte res t a na lysis refuses to do, and that is why I be lieve it is unco nstitutio nal.
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cannot be gamed because states are, in a sense, playing against
themselves: each 25sertion :) f pO\ver implies a retraction.:H<J
The federal judiciary's role in this system would be to oversee
state conflicts rules and invalidate them when they violate one of
the constitutional constraints. Federal courts would not dictate the
substance of confiicts rules or tell states which factors are to be
deemed more important. 350 They woul d ensure only that when a
state asserts that 2. particular arrangement of factors gives it the
greater interest in a case , it acts consistently and concedes that a
mirror-image array of factors gives another state a greater interest.
Tnis could be done simply by surveying other state con flicts decisions. 'n1.e common mistake of the Court and conflicts scholars has
been to focus on individual cases, in which results can almost always
be justified, rather than on patterns of state decisionmaking, which
may reveal discriminatory conflicts rules. Tne suggested approach
allows states to set their own priorities, but then holds them to their
words. This seems the appropriate role for federal courts implementing antidiscrimination norms: ensuring that when one state rejects the claims of another, it does so because it sincerely believes
that its interest in regulation is greater, not because it counts its
interests more heavily than those of sister states.
This approach has applications beyond the field of conflicts of
law, and is, in fact , almost identical to the approach Guido
Calabresi and A llison Moore have proffered as an important,
though neglected , form of judicial review. 351 According to this approach, the defense of fundamental rights is a role appropriately
given to an independent judiciary, but the identification of such
rights - rights society deems important, not necessarily rights de349. The retraction docs not mean that the state's rights wiil never be enforced. It means
only that they will yield to sister-state rights, and if there are no opposing rights, there is
nothing to which to yield. It is for this reason that a state's law may govern interactions
between its domiciliaries in places with no local law. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909) (Holmes, J.). TI1e difference between the absence of a right and its subordination explains why broad scopes of rights help in keeping
states honest. If rights generally had narrow scope. states could try to game the system by
structuring their conflicts rules so that cases in which their rights yielded tended to be cases in
which no contrary rights existed. That would give them cheap wins in such cases, since their
rights would be enforced without the sacrifice of the claim to authority over mirror-image
cases.
350. On this point I disagree with Laycock, who believes that "[w]hether sister-state law
applies is a federal question, and each state is obliged to give the same answer to that federal
question." See Laycock, supra note 73, at 301.
351. See Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term- Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), lOS HARV.
L. REv. 80, 91-103 (1991 ); Allison Moore. Loving's Legacy: The Other Antidiscrimination
Principles, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 163, 173-74, 178-82 (1999).
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rived :from the Constitution --- is a task better suited to the democratically ele cted legisla ture. 35 2
C alabresi's appro ach is an elegant way of taking advantage of
these two institution al competencies. He suggests that states be
permitted to make cho ices between fundamental values, with courts
reviewing essentially the sincerity of the choice. To subordinate
one im portant value in the name of ano th er is a legitimate democratic decision; it is illegitimate on ly when the disfavored value is
weighed ligh tly because of who is 2sserting it. 353 To determine this,
Calabresi suggests, the court must firs t ascert ain whether the burden of a challenged la v; falls up o n a class whose interests the legislature may hold more lightly th an their own . If so, the court must
then examine the way the state resolves other conflicts betwee n the
competing values, to see if the challenged regulation reflects a hierarchy of values consistently instan tiated in the law. If it does - if
the value subordinated by the particular law at issue also loses
when the burden of its defeat falls on the people well represented in
the legislature - it retlects a permissible choice between values. If
not, it suggests that discrimination is at work .354
The parallels should b e clear. Sister state laws and domiciliaries
are always likely candidates for discrimination, for they have no
electoral voice. Federal courts sh ould thus look to other examples
of state conflicts decisionmaking to see if the factors asserted to
make local law prevail in one case succeed when they support foreign law or foreign domiciliaries. Constitutional constraints do not
usurp states' abilities to decide which contacts are most important
- the danger analogous to judicial determination of which rights
are fundamental - but they do require that states' claims to authority over particular cases b e based on a consistent hierarchy of
contacts and not on discriminati o n against foreign law or citizens.
Preventing this discrimination is all that the Constitution does.
A domestic conflicts theory may in fact need more , but this is the
most important thing, and probably the only realistic goal for theory, rather than federal legislation. If states comply with their constitutional obligations, laying claim only to those cases to which
they sincerely believe they have a superior claim, there is no theoretical basis on which to fault them. There may be irresoluble disagreements between states even on this approach , and these are the
352. See Calabresi, supra note 351, at 91.
353. See id. at 91 ·93.
354. See id.
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real true conflicts. Federal legislation may resolve them - it may
set out the substantive rights that always prevail, or it may prescribe
conflicts rules by which states must abicl e.355 The conflicts mod el
reveals what federal judges should do in the absence of federal
legisiation.

355 . Congress's powe r to leg islate under Article! is of course lim ited . see Ci ty of Boerne
v. Flo res, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, A:vr ER ICi\N Co:--~snTuTIONAL
LAw§ 5-1, at 297 (2d ed. 1988), a nd it might be hard to dispi;Jce loca l tort laws. Congress can
also legisla te pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Cla use, which permits it to specify con flicts rules. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, ~ 1; see TRIBE, supra, ~ S-2 . nt 298.

